Showing posts with label ABACUS 2007-AC1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ABACUS 2007-AC1. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

The lover’s spat between Goldman Sachs, Paulson and “sophisticated investors” is not the real problem!

The beauty of the action of the SEC against Goldman Sachs is that it allows us to understand with a real and public example a lot of what happened all over the market. Let us see it here from the perspective of IKB the German Bank who invested $150 million in ABACUS 2007-AC1.

In paragraph 58 we read that IKB bought $50 million of the A1 tranche paying Libor plus 85 basis points, and $100 million of the A-2 tranche paying Libor plus 110 basis points. The average return comes to about 102 basis points.

Since these $150 million were rated Aaa by Moody’s and AAA by S&P when purchased, that meant that IKB’s investment, for bank capital requirement purposes, would be weighted at only 20% signifying only $30 million for which 8% capital requirements had to be held. IKB would therefore need $2.4 million of their own capital to back the operation, a leverage of 62.5 to 1.

$150 million at 102 basis points and $ 2.4 million in capital signifies then an expected gross return of 63.75% on IKB’s capital.

In order for IKB to make a comparable return when lending to their traditional client base of small and medium sized businesses, most certainly unrated, and who therefore are risk weighted at 100%, IKB would have to lend them the funds at Libor plus 510 basis points.

And here we have it, the way the current capital requirements for banks are based on the risks perceived by the credit rating agencies, provide huge incentives for the banks to enter into the virtual world and invest in these “synthetic” operations, instead of lending to the real world... and, that problem is so much larger than a simple lover’s spat between Goldman Sachs, Paulson and “sophisticated investors”.

Do you understand why I beg of you to keep your eyes on the ball? Do you understand why I am upset nothing of this is even discussed in the current proposals for financial regulatory reform?

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Goldman’s ABACUS 2007-AC1: The whole truth and nothing but the inconvenient truth!

But the whole truth and nothing but the truth would in the case of ABACUS 2007-AC1 have to include the following facts, no matter how politically or agenda inconvenient they might be:

IKB, a commercial bank headquartered in Germany did not use $150 million to lend to small and medium sized German companies, as they historically had done, but instead invested and lost “$50 million in Class A-1 notes at face value” and “$100 million in Class A-2 Notes at face value” in ABACUS 2007-AC1, exclusively because of the following two reasons:

First both tranches, the A1 paying Libor plus 85 basis points, and the A-2 paying Libor plus 110 basis, points were rated Aaa by Moody’s and AAA by S&P when purchased by IKB.

Second, in order to invest $150 million in these securities which because of their ratings were risk-weighted by Basel II at only 20%, IKB needed only to have $2.4 million of capital, 1.6%, compared to the $12 million it would be required to have if lending that amount to unrated small and medium sized German companies.

If IKB had known that Paulson had had his hand in the picking, and known fully about his motives, then they might have asked for a slightly higher interest rate, maybe 10 basis points more, and still have bought the securities.

If the securities did not have the splendid credit ratings assigned to them by the credit rating agencies then they would probably not have bought them even if Mother Teresa had done the picking.

If the regulators had placed the same type of capital requirements on all assets then IKB would have stayed home, lending to their traditional clients, instead of going to California to dig prime rated subprime gold.


And so while naturally we should lend all our support to efforts to eliminate wrong-doings like those described in the SEC action against Goldman that should not signify we take our eyes of the unfortunate truth of having been saddled with grossly inept regulations, creating grossly bad regulations.

Now all of this does of course not imply that the Goldman Sachs, the Tourres, the Paulsons or the ACAs of this world are angels… it is just about putting it all in the right perspective.


And now, is it time for some “Razzle dazzle 'em”?

SEC’s action against Goldman Sachs in paragraph 53 states:

“IKB… late 2006, was no longer comfortable investing in the liabilities of CDOs that did not utilize a collateral manager, meaning an independent third-party with knowledge of the U.S. housing market and expertise in analyzing RMBS”.

The above sounds a lot like a type of b.s. excuse, construed by someone trying to hide their own responsibility in the affair… that of having invested solely based on the juicy interest rate offered when considering solely the credit ratings issued by the credit rating agencies.

Did for instance IKB really believe what is said on ABACUS 2007-AC1 flip book, on page 34, about ACA Capitals ABS Credit Selection including an “On-site Visit”? What a laugh! Checking up on the individual mortgages?

And so do not take your eyes of the IKB executives either, they most probably perpetrated real silly stuff against their own investors and so they might now be doing a “Razzle dazzle 'em” routine to cover their own fingerprints.

Are not victims inclined to perform as victims… especially when sophisticated? Are we seeing an Oscar class crocodile tears performance here? ... for which the SEC has also fallen?


Give 'em the old Razzle Dazzle, Razzle Dazzle 'em,

Show 'em the first rate sorceror you are

Long as you keep 'em way off balance

How can they spot you've got no talent

Razzle Dazzle 'em, Bazzle 'em,

And they'll make you a star!

Hush! Less we lose the chance to beat on a foe or a convenient scapegoat.

The ABACUS 2007-AC1 flip book states:

“Although at the time of purchase, such Collateral will be highly rated, there is no assurance that such rating will not be reduced or withdrawn in the future, nor is a rating a guarantee of future performance.”

The truth is that had it not been because the investors believed that the credit ratings were correct, they would not have invested, no matter how much Goldman Sachs could have argued with them based on other false statements.

But this is of course is something many do not want to be known, because this would take away all the fun of being able to go after such a juicy foe as Goldman Sachs or such a convenient scapegoat to be used by the inept regulators.

We need to get to the real bottom of this... because that is were the truth can be found.