Showing posts with label ROEs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ROEs. Show all posts
Friday, September 15, 2017
Should banks consider risk factors, such as the probability of default (PD) and the expected loss given a default (LGD), when setting the interest rates it charges clients? Of course, higher perceived risk-higher interests, lower risks-lower interest rates.
But regulators curiously decided that these risks should also be cleared for in the capital requirements for banks, and decreed: higher perceived risk-higher capital, lower risks-lower capital.
So now banks clear for these risks both with risk adjusted interest rates and risk adjusted capital. That’s a real serious problem because any risk excessively considered, will produce the wrong decision, even if the risk is perfectly perceived.
Now a higher interest rate perfectly set in accordance to a perfectly perceived higher risk translates, because of higher capital requirement, meaning a lower leverage, into a lower risk adjusted expected return on equity.
Now a lower interest rate perfectly set in accordance to a perfectly perceived lower risk translates, because of a lower capital requirement, meaning a higher leverage, into a higher risk adjusted expected return on equity.
So now banks, even when the risks are perfectly perceived, lend too little to the risky, or in order to compensate for lower ROEs, at too high risk adjusted interest rates; and lend too much to the safe, or thanks to higher ROEs, at too low risk adjusted interest rates.
This is insane! It produces dangerous misallocation of bank credit to the real economy. Too little financing of the "riskier" future and too much refinancing of the "safer" present.
PS. There is a possibility of credit being allocated efficiently to the real economy, but that requires that what is perceived as safe to be much safer and what’s perceived as risky to be much riskier. What credit rating agencies could guarantee us such mistakes?
Regulators and bankers looking out for the same risks
Wednesday, August 9, 2017
Ten years ago ECB decided to ignore the benefits of a hard landing and go for kicking the can down the road
In August 2006, when we were already hearing worrisome comments about complex securities linked to mortgages, I wrote a letter to FT titled “The Long Term Benefits of a Hard Landing”. At that moment I had not yet been censored by FT and so they published it.
One year later, when panic about the AAA rated securities backed with mortgages to the subprime sector impacted the financial markets, ECB (and the Fed earlier) decided to ignore that option and go for the politically more convenient short-termish option of kicking the can down the road, with QEs and ultralow interest rates.
It could have worked, if only what had caused the crisis and what hindered the stimuli to flow in the correct directions had been removed. But no, the regulators refused to admit their mistake with the risk weighted capital requirements.
And so here we are, a full decade later, still allowing banks to multiply the net margins obtained more when it relates to assets perceived, decreed or concocted as safe, than with assets perceived as risky, and so obtain higher expected risk adjusted returns on their equity financing the safe than financing the risky.
In a historic analogy, regulators still believe the sun to be circling around the earth; in this case that what is perceived as risky is more dangerous to the banking system than what is perceived as safe.
As a result “safe” sovereigns, AAArisktocracy and residential houses still dangerously get way too much bank credit, while “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, way too little to keep our economies dynamic.
Every day we allow regulators like Mario Draghi to regulate based on a flawed theory, the worse for all of us.
But what are we to do when there are so many vested interests in shutting up this the mother of all bank regulation mistakes?
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
Shame on you bank regulators… you even dared lie to your own Queen, to her face!
November 2008, Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth asked: why did nobody notice the “awful" financial crisis earlier?
But now I see that in December 2012, four years later the “Queen finally finds out why no one saw the financial crisis coming”. Interested I went to read about it and, not really unsurprisingly, they are shamelessly lying to their own Queen, in her face.
It states: “As she toured the Bank of England's gold vault, Sujit Kapadia, an economist and one of the Bank's top financial policy experts, stopped the Queen to say he would like to answer the question she had posed. And Kapadia went on to explain that as the global economy boomed in the pre-crisis years, the City had got "complacent" and many thought regulation wasn't necessary.
Kapadia told Her Majesty that financial crises were a bit like earthquakes and flu pandemics in being rare and difficult to predict, and reassured her that the staff at the Bank were there to help prevent another one. "Is there another one coming?" the Duke of Edinburgh joked, before warning them: "Don't do it again."
When the Queen was leaving the governor of the Bank, Sir Mervyn King, said: "The people you met today are really the unsung heroes, the people that kept not just the banking system but the economy as a whole functioning in the most challenging of circumstances.”
Holy moly what bullshit! If it was my Queen, I would never have lied to her that way,I would have asked her instead for her pardon.
Of course financial crisis are difficult to predict but, in this case it was a crises fabricated by bad bank regulations.
Kapadia explained: “the City had got "complacent" and many thought regulation wasn't necessary”.
Absolutely not! The regulators intervened perhaps more than ever and in doing so completely distorted the allocation of bank credit to the real economy.
With their risk adjusted capital requirements they allowed banks to leverage immensely more on assets ex ante perceived or deemed as "safe", like AAA rated securities or loans to Greece, than with assets perceived as "risky", like small loans wit high risk premiums to SMEs and entrepreneurs.
And that meant they allowed bankers fulfill their wet dreams of earning the highest expected risk adjusted profits on what’s safe. And if, as a regulator, you do a thing like that, something is doomed , sooner or later, to go very bad.
In January 2003 I had already warned in a letter to the Financial Times: “Everyone knows that, sooner or later, the ratings issued by the credit agencies are just a new breed of systemic errors, about to be propagated at modern speeds. Friends, as it is, the world is tough enough.”
And worst of all is that basically the same regulators keep on regulating basically the same way, Basel I, II and III.
And all for nothing, since never ever have major bank crises resulted from excessive exposures to what was ex ante perceived as risky; these always resulted from excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived as risky, but that ex post turned out to be very risky.
The absolute truth is that had the regulators not regulated at all, banks would never have been leverage as much as they did.
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