Current bank regulators have no moral right to address the misconduct of other in the financial sector.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published November 6 a progress report for the G20 on the FSB’s work on addressing misconduct in the financial sector. The progress report on the Measures to reduce misconduct risk sets out details about the FSB-coordinated work to address misconduct in the financial sector and the timeline for the actions.

For many years argued that the bank regulators themselves carried out the most serious misconduct in the financial sector.

With their portfolio invariant credit-risk weighted capital requirements for banks, imposed without the slightest evidence of having empirically studied why bank crises occur, and without defining what is the purpose of banks, they manipulated the world’s bank credit markets with serious consequences for millions.

Compared to that, the manipulation of of example the Libor rate, although clearly not to be excused in any way, is simply peanuts.

When we consider the millions of SMEs and entrepreneurs who have been impeded fair access to bank credit, and the loss of job creation for the coming generations that must have resulted from that; and the trillions of public bailout/stimulus debts hanging over us, the regulators should better retire in shame than preach about the misconduct of others.

In the case of banks, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is absolutely inapplicable

James Kwak of the Baseline Scenario, in a post titled: “More Misinformation about Banking Regulation” while discussing the effects of increased capital requirements writes:

“The Modigliani-Miller Theorem…says that a firm’s capital structure — the amount of equity it has relative to debt — doesn’t matter: in the case of the hypothetical bank, if you increase equity and reduce debt, after the reduced debt payments, there is just enough cash left over to compensate the larger number of shareholders at the lower rate that they are now willing to accept.

Now, the assumptions of Modigliani-Miller don’t hold in the real world, but the main reason they don’t hold is the tax subsidy for debt…

Since the cost of capital doesn’t change with capital requirements (except, again, because of the tax subsidy for debt), the amount of bank lending doesn’t change either.” 

Oops… that is in itself some misinformation! 

For banks, besides tax considerations, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is absolutely inapplicable; since it does not consider the value of the support society (taxpayers) explicitly or implicitly give the holders of bank debt. If a bank has 100% equity then all risk falls on the shareholder and the societal support is 0. If a bank has 5% equity and 95% debt then society contributes a lot to the party.

Frankly, like in Europe, where some banks were leveraged about 50 to 1, and rates on bank deposits are still low, who on earth can one even dream to bring the Modigliani-Miller Theorem into the analysis?

And the fluctuating societal support, is one of the main reasons behind the argument I have been making for over a decade, about how credit-risk adjusted capital requirements for banks distort the allocation of credit. Regulators are telling the banks: If you lend to what is perceived as safe, like to the AAArisktocracy, then you are allowed to hold less capital, meaning leveraging more, meaning you will receive more societal (taxpayer) backing, than if you lend to a risky SME. 

And so of course, if you increase capital requirements which reduces the leverage, banks will get less taxpayer support… ergo lend less and at higher interest costs. Would that be bad for the economy? Of course it would keep billions out of the economy (it already happens) especially while business models are adjusted and bank capital increased. But that austerity J (less societal support spending) though it would hurt would not necessarily be bad… what is really bad for the economy are the different capital requirements for different assets… since that stops bank credit from being allocated efficiently.

Take away all deposit guarantees and all bailout assistance, and then the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, subject to tax considerations would be more applicable to banks.

Greece, a great referendum… one more!

Of course the timing is lousy, but I believe the referendum proposed by Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to be the absolutely correct thing to do… better late than never. The bail-out deal offered to Greece can only be successful if it can count with the legitimacy of the full approval of the Greeks, otherwise not even a 90 percent haircut could be enough. On the contrary, not doing the referendum would, de-facto, mean giving in to those who are opposing the current bail-out agreement. Should they vote yes or no? That is entirely for them to decide.

By the way, I would also like to see a referendum in Greece, and in the rest of Europe, regarding whether to keep in their posts, or fire without any sort of letter of recommendation, all those bank regulators in the Basel Committee who allowed the European banks to lend to a Greece, Italy, Portugal… against only 1.6 percent in capital, meaning authorizing the banks to leverage their equity over 60 times when lending to the politicians of these sovereigns…