Showing posts with label oxygen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oxygen. Show all posts
Sunday, March 6, 2022
A brief summary:
No understanding about what immense hubris “experts” are capable of, like believing they can weigh bank capital requirements for perceived credit risks… and then mostly ignoring misperceived risks and unexpected events e.g., pandemic war.
No understanding of how allowing banks to leverage their capital differently with different assets, will make it easier/harder for banks to obtain the desired risk adjusted returns on equity; something which distorts the allocation of credit.
No knowledge about conditional probabilities; which therefore helps to believe those excessive exposures that could become truly dangerous to bank systems, are built up with assets perceived as risky.
Not understanding that risk-taking is the oxygen of all development.
Consequentially:
No understanding of their pro-cyclicality. When risks are perceived low, credit ratings are high, banks can hold little capital, buy back stock, pay much dividends and bonuses, and so, when times worsen, or something unexpected like a pandemic or a war occurs, banks will stand there naked, precisely when it would be the hardest for them to raise new capital, precisely when we need them the most
No understanding of that since the capital requirements are lower for lending to the “safe” government than to the risky citizens, this implies bureaucrats/politicians know better what to do with (taxpayer’s) credit than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs. (Of course, they could also be agreeing with that for pure ideological considerations.)
No understanding of what capital requirements being lower for “safe” residential mortgages than for loans to risky small businesses and entrepreneurs, implies to the possibilities of generating the jobs/incomes needed to service mortgages and pay living costs.
Friday, July 5, 2019
Risk weights are to access to credit what protectionist tariffs are to trade, only more pernicious.
A letter to the Executive Directors and Staff of the International Monetary Fund.
For decades now IMF has helped to spread around all developing countries the pillar of the Basel Committee’s bank regulations; the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.
Since risk taking is in essence the oxygen of any development, that piece of regulation is fundamentally flawed, especially for developing countries.
How do risk weighted capital requirements alter the incentives for banks?
If banks hold the same capital against their whole portfolio, as they used do until some three decades ago, then with an eye on their overall portfolio and funding structure, banks lend in accordance to what produces them the highest risk adjusted interest rate; which would also provide them with the highest risk adjusted return on equity.
But, when different assets have different capital requirements, obtaining the highest risk adjusted return on equity will depend on how many times the risk adjusted interest rate for any specific loan or asset will depend on how many times it can be leveraged. The higher the allowed leverage is, the easier it is to obtain a high ROE; which means that “safe” highly leveregable loans could be competitive at lower risk adjusted interest rates than before, while “risky” lower leveregable loans would require paying higher risk adjusted interest rates.
In essence the introduction of that regulation has caused banks to substitute savvy loan officers with equity minimizing engineers.
How do risk weighted capital requirements distort the allocation of bank credit?
The regulators based their decision on how much banks were allowed to leverage their capital with for the different assets, solely on the perceptions of credit risk. It never explicitly had one iota to do with banks fulfilling their obligation of allocating credit efficiently to the real economy.
So the introduction of that regulation simply distorts the allocation of bank credit; in favor of “the safer present” and against “the riskier future”.
“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”, John A Shedd.
Specifically, a credit that is perceived as risky but that is directly related to helping reach a Sustainable Development Goal is much less favored by bankers, and now by bank regulators too, than a credit, perceived as safe, but which purpose could in fact be harmful to any SDG.
Specifically, safe credits for the purchase of houses are much more favored over credits to risky entrepreneurs, those who could create the jobs that would allow the income needed to service the mortgages and pay the utilities.
Specifically, assigning lower risk weights to the sovereign than to citizens de implies de facto a statist belief that bureaucrats know better what to do with bank credit, than entrepreneurs who put their name on the line.
In other words these risk weight are to access to credit what tariffs are to trade, only much more pernicious.
Do risk weighted capital requirements make our banks system safer?
If that regulation made the financial system safer there would at least be a favorable tradeoff. But it doesn’t, much the contrary. Too much easy credit can turn what is safe into something risky, like for instance morphing houses from being affordable homes into investment assets.
The 2007/2008-bank crisis would never have happened or, if so, remotely had been of the same scale had regulators, for their risk weights, instead of perceived credit risk risks, used the probabilities of banks investing conditioned on how credit risks were perceived.
Many Eurozone sovereigns would not face current high levels of indebtedness had not EU authorities decreed a Sovereign Debt Privilege and assigned it a 0% risk weight, this even though they take on debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not their domestic printable one.
And so, at the end of the day, this regulation only guarantees especially large bank crisis, caused by especially large exposures to what was perceived (or decreed) as especially safe, which end up being especially risky, and are held against especially little capital.
Risk weighted capital requirements and inequality.
John Kenneth Galbraith wrote: “The function of credit in a simple society is, in fact, remarkably egalitarian. It allows the man with energy and no money to participate in the economy more or less on a par with the man who has capital of his own. And the more casual the conditions under which credit is granted and hence the more impecunious those accommodated, the more egalitarian credit is… the poor risk… is another name for the poor man.” “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975.
So I ask, how many millions of SMEs and entrepreneurs have not been given the opportunity to advance with credits over the last 25 years as a direct result of it?
IMF, please, wake up!
Should banks not be regulated?
Of course these need to be regulated! I am only reminding everyone of the fact that the damage dumb bank regulators can cause when meddling without taking enough care, by far surpasses anything the free market can do. A free market would never have knowingly allowed banks to leverage 62.5 times their equity like regulators did, only because some very few human fallible credit rating agencies had assigned an AAA to AA rating to some securities backed with mortgages to the US subprime sector.
A simple leverage ratio between 10 to 15% for all banks assets would be a much mote effective regulation than all those thousands of pages that currently exist.
And please, please, please, stop talking about "deregulation" in the presence of such an awful and intrusive mis-regulation. The regulators imposed the worst kind of capital controls.
Of course, just in case, all problems here referred to, are clearly applicable to developed economies too.
Sincerely,
Per Kurowski
@PerKurowski
PS. “The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages. Ironically, losses on those two types of assets would fuel the global crisis in 2008 and a subsequent European crisis in 2011”, “Keeping at it” 2018, Paul Volcker
PS. An ever growing aide memoire on Basel Committee’s many mistakes.
PS. The risk weighted bank capital requirements utterly distorted central banks’ monetary policy by directing way too much credit to what’s decreed or perceived as “safe”, sovereign/ residential mortgages/ AAA rated; and way too little to “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs.
PS. Because it would also create distortions I am not proposing it, but would not risk weighted bank capital requirements based on SDGs ratings at least show more purpose for our banks? And, in the case of sovereigns, besides credit ratings, do we citizens not also need ethic ratings?
PS. “Are Basel bank regulations good for development?” a document presented at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, New York, October 2007.
PS. Being creditworthy and being worthy of credit, c'est pas la même chose :-(
Saturday, January 12, 2019
What I as a former Executive Director of the World Bank pray that any new President of it understands
I was an Executive Director at the World Bank from November 2002 until October 2004. During that time the Basel Committee's Basel II bank regulations were being discussed. It was approved in June 2004.
I was against the basic principles of those regulations that had begun with the Basel Accord of 1988, Basel I. That should be clear from Op-Eds I had published earlier, transcripts of my statements at the WB Board, and in the letters that I wrote and FT published during that time. Here is a brief summary of all that
Since then I haven't changed my mind... the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, which are a pillar of those bank regulations, is almost unimaginable bad.
I pray the next president of the world’s premier development bank, whoever he is, and wherever he comes from, at least, as a minimum minimorum, understands:
First, that risk-taking is the oxygen of any development, and therefore the regulators’ risk adverse risk weighted capital requirements, will distort against banks taking the risks that help to push our economies forward. “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.”, John A Shedd.
Second, that what’s perceived as risky is much less dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe, and so that these regulations doom us to especially large bank crises, because of especially large exposures to what is especially perceived (or decreed) as safe, against especially little capital.
Do you not agree that mine is a quite reasonable wish?
@PerKurowski
Thursday, March 16, 2017
If Basel’s capital requirements for banks were gender or race weighted, would the world have been so silent?
We now have risk weighted capital requirements for banks, more risk more capital, which clearly discriminates against the access to bank credit of those perceived as risky. That even when what is perceived as risky has never ever caused a major bank crisis; in terms of risk perceptions, that dishonor has always fallen on those ex ante perceived as very safe.
And so SMEs and entrepreneurs have much less access to bank credit, that is unless they are willing to pay much higher risk premiums. And so our economies are provided with much less of that oxygen that risk-taking signifies to its development.
And yet the world keeps mum on it.
I wonder what hullaballoo it would raise if instead those capital requirements were gender or race based?
I ask because when it comes down to odious discrimination it all seems the same.
Monday, August 22, 2016
Mr R Gandhi, ignore the Basel Committee’s mutual admiration club, and concentrate on the needs or your India.
Mr R Gandhi, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at the FIBAC 2016 in a speech titled “New horizons in Indian banking”, Mumbai, 17 August 2016 said the following:
“I regret that at the very end of these two days deliberations on future of banks, I have to paint such a dismal future for your existence as banks….One big area, you vacated and / or let others to occupy by your lackluster attitude is there for your rightful reclaim, if only you make concerted and conscious effort. That is SME financing. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are a major, yet often overlooked sector by formal financial institutions. The SMEs reportedly account for more than half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) and employ almost two-thirds of the global work force. However, they are the neglected lot world over. As reported by the International Financial Corporation (IFC), a “funding gap” of more than $2 trillion exists for small businesses in emerging markets alone...
I can only conclude with the idea that if you make yourself socially relevant, not just relevant in economic sense alone, you can have hopes to exist”
Holy moly. unless Mr R Gandhi is simply thickheaded and does not understand, he should be ashamed of trying to blame the banks for this ignoring his own responsibilities as a regulator.
Who told banks to get out of SME financing? The bank regulators did; by requiring banks to hold much more capital when lending to SMEs than when lending to those perceived as safer. That made it difficult for banks to earn competitive risk adjusted returns on equity lending to the SMEs.
Who made banks socially irrelevant? The bank regulators did, by regulating banks without ever having defined their purpose… like that of allocating credit efficiently to the real economy.
And since risk-taking is the oxygen of any development, a developing country like India is one of those who could least afford to introduce regulatory risk aversion. Not as if those developed can either, but at least they have reached higher altitudes before starting to climb down their mountains.
In 2007, at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, I explained why the Basel regulations were harmful to development, and my opinion was even reprinted in October 2008 in the Icfai University Journal of Banking Law.
Sadly though, as happens with most central bankers and regulators from developing countries, they end up more interested in being accepted by their peers in the developed countries, and in belonging to their mutual admiration club, than in doing what is best for their own countries.
Friday, January 8, 2016
World Bank, the credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks promote financial instability and exclusion
May 9-13, 2016 the World Bank will hold “The 13th Overview Course on Financial Issues: Promoting Stable and Inclusive Financial Systems”
And I wonder if they are still going to ignore the distortions produced by the credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks; more risk, more capital – less risk less capital.
These capital requirements allow banks to leverage more with “the safe” than with “the risky”; which means banks will earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity lending to “the safe” than when lending to “the risky”; which means banks will lend too much to “the safe” and too little to “the risky”. And that will:
Promote financial instability since all major bank crisis have always resulted from excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived as safe but that ex post resulted risky.… in this case aggravated by the fact that banks against that hold especially little capital.
Promote exclusion, as it odiously discriminates against the risky… like SMEs and entrepreneurs.
I quote John Kenneth Galbraith from “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975. “The function of credit in a simple society is, in fact, remarkably egalitarian. It allows the man with energy and no money to participate in the economy more or less on a par with the man who has capital of his own. And the more casual the conditions under which credit is granted and hence the more impecunious those accommodated, the more egalitarian credit is… Bad banks, unlike good, loaned to the poor risk, which is another name for the poor man.”
And when will the World Bank, the world’s premier development bank remind the world of that risk-taking is the oxygen of any development.
Again I quote John Kenneth Galbraith from “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975. “For the new parts of the country [USA’s West]… there was the right to create banks at will and therewith the notes and deposits that resulted from their loans…[if] the bank failed…someone was left holding the worthless notes… but some borrowers from this bank were now in business...[jobs created]... It was an arrangement which reputable bankers and merchants in the East viewed with extreme distaste… Men of economic wisdom, then as later expressing the views of the reputable business community, spoke of the anarchy of unstable banking… The men of wisdom missed the point. The anarchy served the frontier far better than a more orderly system that kept a tight hand on credit would have done…. what is called sound economics is very often what mirrors the needs of the respectfully affluent.”
In March 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank I gave the following formal statement on this:
And soon 12 years later, I am still waiting L
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
Risk taking provides the financial system with the Lebensraum it needs to grow sturdy
The better the credit ratings are, and the better our risk models are, the better will we stack our financial system, for a while, but then also the higher¸ in Nassim Taleb´s terms, its fragility, or its brittleness will be.
If we want a flexible, a sturdy, or in Nassim Taleb´s terms an anti-fragile system, then our financial system need risk-taking, a lot of it, of many varied kinds. Risk-taking is not only the oxygen of economic growth it is also what allows our financial system the Lebensraum it needs..
Risk-taking is “anti-fragility”, which is why in our churches we can hear the prayer of “God make us daring!” Our current problem is that our nanny bank regulators in the Basel Committee completely forgot all about it… or perhaps they never knew.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
Tuesday, November 30, 2004
Some of my early public opinions on the Basel Committee's bank regulations
Background: It was John Kenneth Galbraith with his "Money: Whence it came, where it went” (1975), plus the fact that in Venezuela, my homeland, as a corporate strategy and financial advisor I began to receive some very bad vibes from bank regulations coming out from Basel, that got me hooked on this theme. I quote Galbraith:
"Banks opened and closed doors and bankruptcies were frequent, but as a consequence of agile and flexible credit policies, even the banks that failed left a wake of development in their passing"
"As the regulations affecting the activities of the banking sector are increased, the possibilities of this democratization of capital would decrease. There is obviously a risk in lending to the poor."
June 1997, in an Op-Ed Venezuela “If we insist in maintaining a defeatist attitude which definitely does not represent a vision of growth for the future, we will most likely end up with the most reserved and solid banking sector in the world, adequately dressed in very conservative business suits, but presiding over the funeral of the economy. I would much prefer the regulators to put some blue jeans on and try to help to get the economy moving.”
October 1998, Op-Ed Venezuela: “In many cases even trying to regulate banks runs the risk of giving the impression that by means of strict regulations, the risks have disappeared. Sometimes it is good faith... sometimes it is only pure faith… Frequently, in matters of financial regulations, the most honest, logical and efficient is simply to alert about the risks and allow the market, by assigning prices for them, to develop its own paths. I do not propose, not for a moment, that the State abandons completely the regulatory functions, much the opposite, what I propose is that it assumes it correctly. History is full of examples of where the State, by meddling to avoid damages, caused infinite larger damages”
November 1999, Op-Ed Venezuela: “The possible Big Bang that scares me the most, is the one that could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause its collapse”
July 2000. Extracted and translated from Op-Ed in Venezuela: "Financial regulations. Banking, in addition to promoting savings, offering reasonable returns and certainty of recovery, must fulfill the functions of supporting economic growth and democratizing access to capital. In terms of banking regulation, it would seem that the country has forgotten these last two functions, accepting, without blinking, the Basel regulations, much more appropriate for the banking of an already developed country than for ours. There is nothing wrong with being a developing country, what is wrong is believing that by simply adopting different positions, you can reach another level of maturity – like a little girl who borrows her mother's lipstick to feel grown up."
March 2001, Op-Ed Venezuela: “Beware of bank consolidation” (an early manifestation against too big too fail and govern banks, and against too few bank regulation criteria) “Today, when the world seems to be asking much for bank mergers or consolidations, I wonder if we on the contrary should be imposing on banks special reserves depending on their size. The bigger the bank is, the worse the fall, and the greater our need to avoid being hurt”
September 2002, Op-Ed Venezuela: “The riskiness of country risk: What a nightmare it must be to be a sovereign risk evaluator! If they underestimate the risk of a given country, it will most assuredly be inundated with fresh loans and leveraged to the hilt. If on the contrary, they exaggerate the country’s risk level, it can only result in making access to international financial markets more difficult and expensive. Any mistake will turn out to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Any which way, either extreme will cause hunger and human misery.”
January 2003, while an ED of the World Bank, in a letter published by the Financial Times: “Everyone knows that, sooner or later, the ratings issued by the credit agencies are just a new breed of systemic errors, about to be propagated at modern speeds”
March 2003, in a formal discussion at the Executive Board of the World Bank: “The financial sector’s role, the reason why it is granted a license to operate, is to assist society in promoting economic growth by stimulating savings, efficiently allocating financial resources satisfying credit needs and creating opportunities for wealth distribution. Similarly, the role of the assessor –in this case, the World Bank– is to fight poverty, and development is a task where risks need to be taken.
From this perspective I have the impression that the Financial Assessment Program Report might revolve too much around issues such as risk avoidance, vulnerabilities, stress tests and compliance with international regulations, without referring sufficiently to how the sector is performing its social commitments.
Risk aversion comes at a cost - a cost that might be acceptable for developed and industrialized countries but that might be too high for poor and developing ones. In this respect the Bank has the responsibility of helping developing countries to strike the right balance between risks and growth possibilities…. In this respect let us not forget that the other side of the Basel [Committee’s regulatory risk weighted capital requirements] coin might be many, many developing opportunities in credit foregone.
The sole chance the world has of avoiding the risk that entities such as the Basel Committee, accounting standard boards and credit rating agencies introduce serious and fatal systemic risks, is by having an entity like the World Bank stand up to them, instead of sort of fatalistically accepting their dictates."
From this perspective I have the impression that the Financial Assessment Program Report might revolve too much around issues such as risk avoidance, vulnerabilities, stress tests and compliance with international regulations, without referring sufficiently to how the sector is performing its social commitments.
Risk aversion comes at a cost - a cost that might be acceptable for developed and industrialized countries but that might be too high for poor and developing ones. In this respect the Bank has the responsibility of helping developing countries to strike the right balance between risks and growth possibilities…. In this respect let us not forget that the other side of the Basel [Committee’s regulatory risk weighted capital requirements] coin might be many, many developing opportunities in credit foregone.
The sole chance the world has of avoiding the risk that entities such as the Basel Committee, accounting standard boards and credit rating agencies introduce serious and fatal systemic risks, is by having an entity like the World Bank stand up to them, instead of sort of fatalistically accepting their dictates."
April 2003, in a formal written statement delivered as an ED of the World Bank: “The Basel Committee dictate norms for the banking industry… there is a clear need for an external observer of stature to assure that there is an adequate equilibrium between risk-avoidance and the risk- taking needed to sustain growth.”
April 2003, commenting on the World Bank's Strategic Framework 04-06 "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."
"Nowadays, when information is just too voluminous and fast to handle, market or authorities have decided to delegate the evaluation of it into the hands of much fewer players such as the credit rating agencies. This will, almost by definition, introduce systemic risks in the market"
April 2003, commenting on the World Bank's Strategic Framework 04-06 "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."
"Nowadays, when information is just too voluminous and fast to handle, market or authorities have decided to delegate the evaluation of it into the hands of much fewer players such as the credit rating agencies. This will, almost by definition, introduce systemic risks in the market"
May 2003, in comments made at a workshop for regulators at the World Bank: There is a thesis that holds that the old agricultural traditions of burning a little each year, thereby getting rid of some of the combustible materials, was much wiser than today’s no burning at all, that only allows for the buildup of more incendiary materials, thereby guaranteeing disaster and scorched earth, when fire finally breaks out, as it does, sooner or later.
Therefore a regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises.
Knowing that “the larger they are, the harder they fall,” if I were regulator, I would be thinking about a progressive tax on size”
Therefore a regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises.
Knowing that “the larger they are, the harder they fall,” if I were regulator, I would be thinking about a progressive tax on size”
May 2003, in the same workshop above: “Be careful, when looking for ways of avoiding a bank crisis, you could be inadvertently slowing development. I have been sitting here for most of these five days without being able to detect a single formula or word indicating that growth and credits are also a function of bank regulations.”
May 2003, Op-Ed Venezuela: “In a world that preaches the worth of the invisible hands of the market, with its millions of mini-regulators, we find it so strange that the Basel Committee delegates, without protest heard, so much responsibility in the hand of so very few and human-fallible credit rating agencies… Perhaps we need to include a label that states: Warning excessive banking regulations from the Basel Committee can be very dangerous for the development of your country”
Paraphrasing George Clemenceau: Regulation of the financial system is too important to be left in the hands of regulators and bankers.
October 2004, in a written statement delivered as an ED at the Board of the World Bank: “We believe that much of the world’s financial markets are currently being dangerously overstretched, through an exaggerated reliance on intrinsically weak financial models, based on very short series of statistical evidence and very doubtful volatility assumptions”
November 2004, in a letter published by the Financial Times: “Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector (sovereigns)? In some developing countries, access to credit for the private sector is all but gone, and the banks are up to the hilt in public credits. Please, help us get some diversity of thinking to Basel urgently; at the moment it is just a mutual admiration club of firefighters”
PS. My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board
Thursday, May 8, 2003
Warning about Basel bank regulations
Denying a loan for only seeking to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system could mean the loss of a unique opportunity to achieve economic growth.
All development involves risks, so its path, by definition, is littered with bankruptcies and tears, framed in the human oscillation of one little step forward and 0.99 little steps back. Perhaps then the best way to regulate is to allow some banks to fail, too, before their problems have calcified or become too great.
Developed countries may never have developed under the yoke of puritanical financial regulation, hence my insistence since 1997 on the need for the development perspective to be considered when regulating. Paraphrasing someone; regulation of the financial system is too important to be left in the hands of regulators and bankers. (See note)
Furthermore, in a world that so much preaches the benefits of the invisible hand of the market, with its millions of mini-regulators, we are surprised that Basel delegates, without question, so much responsibility in the hands of a very few and very fallible credit rating agencies.
Basel has recently come under significant criticism:
The World Bank in its 'Global Financial Development of 2003', referring to the new ways of calculating capital requirements, known as Basel 2, warns both about the risk of making access more expensive and more difficult for developing countries to financial sources, such as favoring international banks to the detriment of domestic banks.
Dr. Alexander Kern, from the University of Cambridge, recently stated at a seminar organized by the G24 (developing countries), that because standards have been developed almost exclusively by European countries (G10), they lack the transparency and legitimacy necessary to accept that they are subject to a quasi-mandatory international legalization process.
The comptroller of the United States Currency, in charge of supervising 55% of the banking system in his country, declared his disagreement with the Basel 2 regulations, and even said that they may simply ignore them.
Friends, it may be worth including in all encyclopedias issued by Basel: 'Warning, excessive banking regulations in Basel can be very detrimental to the development of your country'
PS. Sometime later I found out about the bank capital (equity) requirements with risk weights of 0% government and 100% citizens, as if bureaucrats know better what to do with credit than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs. If I was to help finance development in developing (and in developed) countries, the first condition for doing so would be to eliminate such loony regulations.
PS. Mi first Op-Ed ever June 12, 1997 Puritanism in banking
PS. Most of my Op-Eds in El Universal disappeared from the web when I was censored by the new owners in 2014
PS. Most of my Op-Eds in El Universal disappeared from the web when I was censored by the new owners in 2014
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