De riskvägda bankkapitalkraven borde åtminstone ha baserats på betingade sannolikheter. Det var de/är de inte.

Här några tweets om P (A / B)

I sannolikhetsteori är betingat sannolikhet sannolikheten för att en händelse (A) inträffar (som att banker lånar för mycket till någon säker), med tanke på att en annan händelse (B) har inträffat (att bankirerna hade uppfattat denne någon som mycket säker).

I sannolikhetsteori är betingat sannolikhet sannolikheten för att en händelse (A) inträffar (som att  banker lånar för mycket till någon riskabel), med tanke på att en annan händelse (B) har inträffat (att bankirerna hade uppfattat denne någon som mycket riskabel).

Ingen tillsynsmyndighet som vet något om betingad sannolikhet skulle aldrig ha tilldelat, med tanke på riskvägda bankkapitalkrav, en låg riskvikt på bara 20% till de bedömda som mycket säkra AAA, och en hög 150% till de bedömda som mycket riskabla lägre än BB-

PS. Mitt brev till Financial Stability Board

Paul Krugman there's huge Excel type data mistake that is bringing the Western economies down into deep depression

Ref: http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2013/04/paul-krugman-the-excel-depression.html

The regulators of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, when designing their risk weighted capital requirements for banks made the outrageous mistake of looking at the specific risks of banks assets, and not at the risk of those assets to the banks, or to the bank system.

That is why they came to assign a whopping 150% risk weight to what is rated below BB-, something so risky that bankers wont even touch it with a ten feet pole; while only a minuscule risk weight of 20% to what is rated AAA and that because of its perceived safety, could cause banks to create such exposures that if ex post the asset turn out riskier, these could bring the whole system down.

That makes banks dangerously lend too much to what is perceived safe and for the economy equally dangerous too little to what is perceived as risky, like SMEs and entrepreneurs. 

The Western world has thrived on risk-taking not risk aversion.

PS. The 0% risk weighing of sovereigns is just as mind-boggling.

My tweet comments on Stephen Cecchetti's and Kim Schoenholtz's "The financial crisis, ten years on", Vox August 2017

"The financial crisis, ten years on"

Does a crisis start when the bomb is armed, the fuse is lit, the explosion occurs, or when the explosion is noted? http://voxeu.org/article/financial-crisis-ten-years#

In 2003 FT published a letter I wrote about the systemic risk of giving credit rating agencies so much power https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2003/01/credit-ratings-for-developing-nations.html

In 2004 the fuse was lit when Basel II authorized banks to leverage 62.5 times with what was rated AAA http://voxeu.org/debates/commentaries/impose-higher-bank-capital-requirements-what-has-best-credit-ratings

In August 2006 clearly the bomb had already exploded https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2006/08/long-term-benefits-of-hard-landing.html

Unfortunately it was not until July 2007 credit rating agencies woke up and in August that the fan started to spread out the shit.

A challenge: Can you spot the lunacy in the Basel Committee’s risk weighted capital requirements for banks?

These are the facts established by Basel II in 2004.

1. Very safe AAA to AA rated = 20% risk weight = 1.6% capital requirement = 62.5 times to 1 allowed leverage.

2. Very risky below BB- rated = 150% risk weight = 12% capital requirement = 8.3 times to 1 allowed leverage.

So what’s crazy with that?

Let me give you a clue! 

What can create those kinds of excessive bank exposures that could bring down a bank system?

A safer banking system compared to our current dangerously misregulated one with so many systemic risks on steroids

What is a safer banking system?

One in which thousand banks compete and those not able to do so fail as fast as possible, before some major damage has been done, while even, as John Kenneth Galbraith explained, often leaving something good in their wake. 

What is a dangerous banking system?

One were all banks are explicitly or implicitly supported, by taxpayers, as long as they follow one standard mode that includes living wills, stress tests, risk models, credit ratings, standardized risk weights... all potential sources of dangerous systemic risks.

A bank system in which whenever there is a major problem, the can gets kicked down the road with QEs and there is no cleaning up, and banks just get bigger and bigger.

One that make it more plausible that the banks will all come crashing down on us, at the same time, with excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived safe that ex-post turned out risky, and therefore the banks holding especially little capital.

But you don’t worry; the regulators have it all under control with their Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). “Orderly”? Really?

So that is why when I hear about banks “cheating” with their risk models I am not too upset, since that at least introduces some diversity. 

Also that cheating stops, at least for a while, the Basel Committee regulators from imposing their loony standardized risk weights of 20% for what has an AAA rating, and so therefore could be utterly dangerous to the system; and one of 150% for the innocuous below BB- rated that bankers don’t like to touch with a ten feet pole.

How did we end up here? That is where you are bound to end up if you allow some statist technocrats, full of hubris, to gather in a mutual admiration club, and there engage into some intellectually degenerating incestuous groupthink.

Statist? What would you otherwise call those who assign a 0% risk weight to the Sovereign and one of 100% to the citizen?

And it is all so purposeless and useless!

Purposeless? “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”, John A Shedd

Useless? “May God defend me from my friends, I can defend myself from my enemies”, Voltaire

In essence it means that while waiting for all banks to succumb because of lack of oxygen in the last overpopulated safe-haven available, banks will no longer finance the "riskier" future our grandchildren need is financed, but only refinance the "safer" present and past.

In April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank I argued: "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."

PS. FDIC... please don't go there!

Note: For your info, before 1988, we had about 600 years of banking without risk weighted capital requirements for banks distorting the allocation of bank credit to the real economy.

PS. The best of the Financial Choice Act is a not distorting, not systemic risks creating, 10% capital requirement for all assets. Its worst? That this is not applied to all banks.

PS. If I were a regulator: Bank capital requirements = 3% for bankers' ineptitude + 7% for unexpected events = 10% on all assets = Financial Choice Act
 

Here is one mystery in current bank regulations that regulators refuse to reveal to us.

That which has an AAA rating, meaning it is perceived as very safe, will of course have much access to bank credit, and be required to pay very low risk premiums. If those ratings then turn out to be wrong, sometimes precisely because since it was considered very safe too much credit was given to it, individual banks, and the bank system, face a very serious problem.

That which has a below a BB- rating, meaning it is perceived as extremely risky, has access to much less credit and, when it gets it, will be by paying much higher risk premiums. If those ratings turn out to be even worse, some individual bank might have a smaller problem, but the bank system as such, would face no problems at all.

But, an here is the mystery, bank regulators, with their Basel II, in June 2004, for the purpose of setting the capital requirements for banks, set a 20% risk weight for the AAA rated and 150% for what is below BB-.

Why so? If "safe" could be dangerous and "risky" is innocuous, could it not really be the other way around?

And that, since regulators refuse to explain it, is now, soon 13 years later, still a mystery to us

PS. Questions regulators refuse to answer

Mercatus Center, in order to reframe financial regulations, you must dig in much deeper into the current mistakes.

I refer to “Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability  and Protecting Consumers” 2016, by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and edited by Hester Peirce & Benjamin Klutskey.

The book includes many wise suggestions but, since it does not seem to capture how incredibly faulty current regulations really are, it has gaps that make it more difficult to understand how sensitive the financial system, primarily banks, and the real economy as such, is to the process of implementing a “reframing”.

For brevity and because my main reservations with current financial regulations have to do with the issue therein discussed, I will limit my comments to Chapter 1: Risk-Based Capital Rules by Arnold Kling.

The author writes: “Risk-based capital rules dramatically affect the rate of return banks earn from holding different type of assets. Regardless of the intent of these rules they strongly influence capital allocation in the economy.”

That is correct, although referring to the ex-ante expected risk adjusted returns on equity would be more precise.

Then the author states: “They substitute even crude regulatory judgment for individual bank discretion and market mechanism”. 

That is not entirely correct. The real problem is that since banks already clear for ex ante perceived risks, when setting interest rates and the amount of their exposures, that regulators also use basically the same ex ante risk perceptions for determining the capital requirements, means that “ex-ante perceived risks”, will be doubly considered. What regulators missed entirely, is that any risk, even if perfectly perceived, will cause the wrong actions, if excessively considered.

The book identifies partly what the distortion in the allocation of bank credit could do to the safety of banks, but what it most misses to comment on, is what the risk weights actually calculated and used, really meant and mean to the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. 

For instance Basel I, 1988, applied to the United States, set the risk weight of 0 percent for US Treasuries; 20 percent for claims to for instance local governments; 50 percent when financing residential properties and revenue bonds; and 100 percent all other claims on private obligors.

0% risk weight for the sovereign? If that’s not in runaway statism what is? De facto it implies that regulators consider government bureaucrats will give better use to bank credit than the private sector.

In 2001 the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC set the following risk weight depending on credit rating; AAA to AA 20 percent; A 50%; BBB (the lowest investment grade) 100 percent; and BB (below investment grade) 200%.

If that’s not runaway stupidity what is? The regulators really seem to have thought (and think) that assets perceived as extremely risky, are more dangerous to the bank system than assets perceived as safe. As if they never heard of Mark Twain’s “A banker lends you the umbrella when the sun shines and wants it back when it looks it could rain”; as if they never heard of Voltaire’s “May God defend me from my friends, I can defend myself from my enemies”. 

Worse though, they never gave any consideration to the possibility that millions of “risky” 100% weighted SMEs and entrepreneurs, so vital to the sturdy growth of the real economy, would see their credit applications negated only because of this. 

Mercatus Center, any reframing of current financial regulations that is not based on a full understanding of how statists and stupid current regulations are, will not be able to adequately deliver what we, especially the young, so urgently need.

For instance all those propositions of increasing the capital requirements for banks with higher leverage ratios but that would keep of the risk weighting in place fail to understand that the bigger the capital squeeze the more will the risk weighing distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. (Think of “The Drowning Pool”)

For instance to avoid imposing on the real economy the bank credit austerity that would result in the initial stages of capital increases the grandfathering of old capital requirements for existing assets until these are disposed would be a must.

Mercatus Center, you have clout that I as a citizen have not! Do all us a favor and request straight answers from the regulators on some very basic questions.

One of the greatest myths is that if Greece had collected all taxes, Greece would not have been in trouble.

Greece is not in trouble because of the taxes it did not collect. Greece is in trouble because its government squandered away funds it borrowed. And because the Greek government was able to borrow so much, thanks to the loony bank regulations. 

For instance, if a German bank wanted to lend to a German entrepreneur, according to Basel II it needed to hold 8 percent in capital, which meant it could leverage its capital 12.5 to 1 times, but, if it lent to Greece, the way Greece was rated at the time, it only had to hold 1.6 percent in capital, which meant it could leverage its capital a mind-boggling 62.5 times to 1. No unregulated or shadow bank would ever manage to do that. 

And that meant, sort of, that if the bank could earn a risk and transaction cost adjusted margin of 1 percent when lending to a German small entrepreneur, it could expect to earn 12.5 percent on its capital, but, if it expected to earn the same margin lending to Greece, it could earn a whopping 62.5 percent on its equity per year. And that is of course a temptation that not even the most disciplined Prussian would be able to resist. And of course what Greek (and many not Greek) politician can resist the temptation of abundant and cheap loans? 

And so had all Greeks paid all their taxes that would have made no difference, in fact, since the Greek government could then have been able to show greater fiscal income, it could have justified keeping credit ratings great for a longer time, which meant having taken on even bigger debts.

Or did the Greek politicians think the loans Greece took on would be repaid by them being able to make of the Greeks exemplary tax–paying-citizens in just some few years? If they did, then they are more stupid than any ordinary politicians.

And now what? Yes Greeks, pay your taxes! But of course only after Greece creditors have accepted a reasonable deal based on a very substantial haircut, and only after you are sure your government will not keep squandering away your taxes.

It is of course very understandable that many Greeks are mad at those who have not paid their taxes but, let’s face it, on the other hand, the way things have turned out, those taxes that were not paid in earlier, might come in very handy now, and will, hopefully, we pray, be put to a much better use.

PS. This post was made before I realized that reality was much worse. Instead of applying to Greece the risk weights dependent on credit ratings that Basel II ordered, EU authorities assigned to all Eurozone sovereigns' debts, including Greece's a 0% risk weight, this even when none of theses nations can print the euro. So European banks, when lending to Greece, did/do not have to hold any capital at all. Now how crazy is that?

PS. At the end of the day the EU authorities kept total silence about their mistake and blamed Greece for it all. What a sad European Union L

Who did the eurozone in?

There are of course many suspicious characters to blame for the eurozone’s pains, not the least the fact that it was created without any strong fiscal root system.

In November 1998, in an Op-Ed titled “Burning the bridges in Europe”, which title had to do with the fact there no escape-route from the euro had been considered. I also wrote there: “That the European countries will subordinate their political desires to the whims of a common Central Bank that may be theirs but really isn’t, is not a certainty. Exchange rates, while not perfect, are escape valves. By eliminating this valve, European countries must make their economic adjustments in real terms. This makes these adjustments much more explosive.”

But, there is one huge piece of evidence that is ignored by most of those trying to explain the current troubles. That evidence is the “risk-weights”, the smoking-gun which we find in the hands of the butlers in charge of regulating the banks, and who have their quarters in the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Yes, it was some butlers who did the eurozone in! 

The bank butlers, naturally concerned about the safety of the banks, imposed a basic bank capital requirement of 8 percent; applicable for instance when banks lent to European small unrated businesses. In this case that limited the leverage of bank equity to a reasonable 12.5 times to one. 

But, when banks lent to a sovereign, with credit ratings such as those Greece-Portugal-Italy-Spain had during the buildup of their huge mountains of debt, the bank butlers, because this lending seemed so safe to them, and perhaps because they also wanted to be extra friendly with the governments who appointed them, they applied a “risk-weight” of only 20 percent. And that translated into an amazingly meager capital requirement of 1.6 percent; and which allowed the banks to leverage their capital when lending to the infallible a mind-blowing 62.5 times. 

The result was that if a bank lent to a small business and made a risk-and-cost-adjusted-margin of 1 percent, it could earn 12.5 percent a year, not much to write home about. But, if instead it earned that same risk-and-cost-adjusted-margin lending to a Greece, it could then earn 62.5 percent on your bank equity… and that, as you can understand, is really the stuff of which huge bank bonuses are made of, and also the hormones that cause banks to grow into too-big-to-fail. 

And, as should have been expected, the banks went bananas lending to “safe” sovereigns. With such incentives, who wouldn’t? Just the same way they went bananas buying those AAA rated securities that were collateralized with lousily awarded mortgages to the subprime sector, and to which the bank-regulating-butlers also applied the risk-weight of 20 percent. And of course the governments also went the way of the banana-republics, and borrowed excessively. What politicians could have resisted such temptations? 

And it was these generous financing conditions, and all the ensuing loans, which helped to hide all the misalignments and disequilibrium within the eurozone… until it was too late. 

Now how could these bank-regulating-butlers do a criminally stupid thing like that? The main reasons were: the bank butlers only concerned themselves trying to make the banks safe, and did not care one iota about who the banks were lending to and for what purpose; they ignored that banks were already discriminating based on perceived risks so what they were doing was to impose an additional layer of risk-perception-discrimination; they completely forgot that no bank crisis in history has ever resulted from an excessive exposure to what was considered as “risky”, but that these have always been the consequence of excessive exposures to what, at the moment when the loans were placed on the banks balance sheet, was considered to be absolutely “not-risky”. 

Also, when the bank-regulating-butlers decided to outsource much of the risk-perception function to some few credit-risk-rating-butlers, two additional mistakes were made. First, they completely forgot that what they needed to concern themselves with was not with the credit ratings being right, but with the possibility of these being wrong; and second, that what they needed most needed to look at was not so much the significance of the credit ratings meant, but how the bankers would act and react to these. 

And the consequences of these regulatory failure in the eurozone, are worsening by the day, or by the nanosecond… because these bank capital requirements have the banks jumping from the last ex-ante-officially-perceived-no-risk-sovereign now turned risky, to the next ex-ante-officially-perceived-no-risk-sovereign about-to-turn risky … all while bank equity is going more and more into the red… and becoming more and more scarce. 

What could be done? One solution could be that of declaring a ten year new capital requirement moratorium on all current bank exposures; allowing the banks to run new lending with whatever new capital they can raise, while imposing an equal 8 percent capital requirement on any bank business, no risk-weighting. If there’s an exception, that should be on lending to small businesses and entrepreneurs, in which case they could require, for instance, only 6 percent of capital, because these borrowers do not pose any systemic risk, and also because of: when the going gets to be risky, all of us risk-adverse need the “risky” risk-takers to get going. 

But that requires of course a complete new set of bank-regulating-butlers… as the current should not even be issued any letters of recommendations. Let’s face it, after such a horrendous flop as Basel II, neither Hollywood nor Bollywood, would ever dream of allowing the same producers and directors to do a Basel III, and much less with only small script changes and the same actors.

The saddest part is that many of those in charge of helping Europe to get out of the current mess that they helped to create, might be busying themselves more with dusting off their own fingerprints.

If there is any place that deserves an occupation... that is Basel!

PS. Years later I learned that all this was just so much worse. EU authorities had assigned all eurozone sovereigns’ debts a 0% risk weight, even Greece’s, even if they were all taking on debt denominated in a currency that was not denominated in their own domestic/printable fiat currency. Unbelievable! And then EU authorities put the whole blame for Greece's troubles on Greece and did not even consider paying for the cost of their own mistake. Is that a way to build a union? No way Jose!

The Joker on the Basel Committee

I can hear now the free market answering a confounded citizen by describing the bank regulators with the same words the Joker used in the movie The Dark Knight, 2008:

"You know, they're schemers. Schemers trying to control their worlds. I'm not a schemer. I try to show the schemers how pathetic their attempts to control things really are. So, when I say that … it was nothing personal, you know that I'm telling the truth. It's the schemers that put you where you are. I just did what I do best. I took your little plan and I turned it on itself. Look what I did to this city with a few…" of some AAA rated collateralized debt obligations, and some of their 0% risk weighted sovereigns

When I think of a small group of bureaucratic finance nerd technocrats in Basel, thinking themselves capable of exorcizing risks out of banking, for ever, by just cooking up a formula of minimum capital requirements for banks, based on some vaguely defined risks of default; and thereafter creating a risk information oligopoly empowering the credit rating agencies; and which all doomed, sooner or later, to take the world over a precipice of systemic risks; like what happened with the lousily awarded mortgages to the subprime sector, or to Greece when regulations assigned it only a 20% risk weight and doomed it to excessive public debt... I cannot but feel deep concern when I hear about giving even more advanced powers to the schemers.

PS. Years later I found out that even if Basel II would initially have risk weighted Greece 20%, European authorities assigned it a 0% risk weight, which meant European banks could lend to Greece's government without having to hold any capital against that exposure. Unbelievable! What champion schemers!

PS. Here is an updated aide-mémoire on some of the many mistakes with the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.