Showing posts with label #BoEOpenForum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #BoEOpenForum. Show all posts

Saturday, November 21, 2015

Mr Mario Draghi. For Europe’s good, why not take a sabbatical year and do all it takes for you to understand the RWCR?

The citations below are extracted from the speech “Cross-border markets and common governance” delivered by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, during the Bank of England Open Forum, London, 11 November 2015.

These evidence that the former Chair of the Financial Stability Board, does yet not understand what caused the current crisis, namely the distortion in banks assets allocation to the real economy produced of Basel II’s risk weighted capital requirements for banks (RWCR); more ex ante perceived risk, more capital – less risk, less capital.

Draghi: “To reap the benefits of openness, markets require appropriate governance. Indeed, a market stipulates not just the freedom to take part in the market, but also the means to protect that freedom. That means the confidence that contracts entered into will be enforced. It means the assurance that the rules of fair competition will be upheld, that property rights will be respected, that standards and codes will be applied properly. It means, in short, the Rule of Law.”

Mr. Draghi: The RWCR violated directly the rules of fair competition in the markets for bank credits. These allow banks to earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity on assets perceived as safe than on assets perceived as risky. As a consequence those perceived as safe and who already pay lower interest rates and have access to more bank credit are, because of the RWCR, treated even better, in direct detriment to the fair access to bank credit of those perceived as risky. And negating the risky fair access to bank credit is a prime inequality driver. 

Draghi: “For financial markets this is especially important given their inherent fragility. If rules and standards are not effectively applied, it can produce information asymmetries and other destabilising forces which, in turn, lead to sudden reversals of confidence in the market. We have seen in the past how markets have run ahead of regulation leaving them vulnerable to such dynamics.”

Mr. Draghi: Those RWCR produced gigantic information asymmetries and destabilising forces. Go back and read all the specialized newspaper that spoke of well capitalized banks, like of a 10 to 1 leverage, without understanding that this was based on risk-weighted assets and that their real leverage was often 50 to 1.

Draghi: “Here is one illustration: during the crisis, the market for securitised assets was all but destroyed by a collapse of confidence. Lack of oversight allowed excesses to be committed and market abuse to take place” 

Mr. Draghi. The fact that Basel II of June 2004 allowed banks to hold those securities against only 1.6 percent in capital if they achieved an AAA to AA rating; which means an almost unimaginable allowed leverage of 62.5 to 1, provided the incentives for excesses and market abuse to be committed. Before that there had been mortgages to the subprime sector for many decades, without these causing any problems.

Draghi: “Securities that were previously deemed safe, certainly with some measure of complacency and too much blind confidence, turned out to be very unsafe indeed, and imparted significant losses on their holders.”

Mr. Draghi: Securities or loans "that were previously [ex ante] deemed safe, certainly with some measure of complacency and too much blind confidence, and turn out [ex post] to be very unsafe” is precisely the stuff all major bank crises in history are made of. Show us one bank asset that was perceived as risky when it was placed on the balance sheets and that amounted to such an importance that it caused a major bank crisis? There is none! 

Draghi: “What is also unfortunate is that the subsequent attempts to re-regulate that market have threatened to undermine the parts that are beneficial to many. There was too much opacity as to the nature of the assets underpinning asset-backed securities, too damaging a breakdown of confidence in the integrity of those who packaged and sold them. And the immediate temptation of regulators was to impose punishing capital charges on holdings of asset-backed securities, independent of their individual characteristics, mixing the wheat with the chaff.”

Mr. Draghi. Regulators should not substitute for the markets. Let the market value the individual characteristics of the wheat and the chaff. At this moment all the stimulus to the economy are being dangerously wasted because regulators have decided, with their risk weights to treat the “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs as chaff, and not as the nutrient and for the economy indispensable wheat they represent. 

Mr. Draghi the capital of banks is to cover for unexpected losses, and that is something explicitly accepted by the regulators. And so here follows some basics in risk management you and your colleagues could benefit from knowing:

It does not make any sense setting what is to cover for the unexpected based on expected credit losses already cleared for.

The RWCR doubled up on credit risk; and any risk, even if perfectly perceived, results in the wrong actions if excessively considered.

The regulators concerned themselves with the risks of bank assets while their worry should have exclusively been on how banks manage the risks of those assets.

You allowed big banks to decide on the capital required by using risk models. That was like telling your kids they can pick anything they want from a menu of ice-cream chocolate cake, spinach and broccoli. Is that a market?

The safer something is perceived the greater its potential to deliver unexpected losses.

Motorcycles are riskier than cars, but car accidents cause more deaths than motorcycle accidents.

It is not by telling banks to avoid risks that we can live up to that holy intergenerational bond Edmund Burke spoke of.

Mr Mario Draghi. For the good of Europe, why do you not take a sabbatical year to reflect on this? You said you were willing to do all it takes.

Hopefully Mr Draghi you would end up understanding that the biggest systemic risks for banks are always imbedded in the assets perceived as the safest or so safe that all must have them; and that excessive risk aversion is about the riskiest there is for the economy...

Sunday, November 8, 2015

#BoEOpenForum: What a great opportunity to make questions that have bothered me for over a decade, but which are never responded

The Bank of England announced: “Send your thoughts and ideas by email to: OpenForum@bankofengland.co.uk We will publish as much of this material as we can.”

And so I did, and they replied: “Thank you for your e-mail regarding the Open Forum on Building Real Markets for the Good of the People. We welcome your interest in the event, which is due to take place on 11 November 2015 at the Guildhall, London.”

Below is what I sent… have you seen any answer?

Bank of England, how can you justify the pillar of current bank regulations that have emanated under the Basel Accord, the credit-risk weighted capital requirements for banks? More ex ante perceived credit risk, more capital (meaning mostly equity) – less risk, less capital.

1. Banks already consider credit risks when setting risk premiums and deciding on the size of their exposures. And so, considering that same credit risk again, when setting the capital requirements, causes credit risks to be excessively considered. Don’t we all know that any risk perfectly perceived results in the wrong actions, if excessively considered?

2. Why do regulators concern themselves with the risk of banks’ assets when they should really be concerned with how the banks manage those risks? Motorcycles are indeed riskier than cars, but many more die in car than in motorcycle accidents.

3. This regulation allows banks to leverage more with what is perceived as safe than with what is perceived as risky; meaning that banks will be able to earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to what is safe than when lending to what is perceived as risky; resulting in that banks will lend too much to what is perceived as safe, and too little to what is perceived as risky… like to SMEs and entrepreneurs.

4. And this means in essence that banks will be prone to stay away from financing the riskier future, and keep to refinancing the safer past. How come regulators did not define the purpose of banks, like allocating credit efficiently to the economy before settling for these capital requirements? Is being a safe mattress in which to stack away or savings, the reason why society supports the banks? That does not sound right. If regulators cannot resist the temptations to distort, why not do so based on the SDGs?

5. Besides, if capital requirements are primarily to serve as a buffer against unexpected losses, something regulators have explicitly accepted, how on earth can one justify these to be based on expected credit losses? Is it not really so that the safer something is perceived, the greatest is its potential to deliver unexpected shocks?

6. And all that credit risk aversion for what? Is it not so that no major bank crisis ever, has resulted from excessive financial exposure to assets perceived as risky when booked? Have these not always resulted from excessive financial exposures to what was wrongly considered as very safe assets when booked? What empirical data gathering about the ex post causes of bank failures and bank crises did bank regulators do, before settling for these capital requirements that are based solely on ex ante perceived credit risks?

7. And those capital requirements have seeded all type of confusion in the market. That can clearly be evidenced with the number of time specialized media, and even financial officer of high status, have made historical comparisons between the non-risk weighted capital of banks in the past and this modern credit risk-weighted concoction. Do you really think risk-weighted capital requirements allow for any sort of reasonable comparison between banks?

8. And why do you accept the increasing complexity that, with the exceptions of those who make a living out of it, serve no one well? From about 30 pages in Basel I to what there is now. And add to that massive local regulatory documentation. And how come you can sit back and not scream when subject to intellectual waterboarding, by for instance the European Commission’s decreeing “a supporting factor equal to 0,7619 to allow credit institutions to increase lending to SMEs.”?

9. Besides, the regulators set the risk weight for sovereigns much lower than for any other borrowers…. zero percent sovereigns -100 percent private sector! Some could justify that arguing that sovereigns can print money and are therefore always able to repay. But does that not ignore that sovereigns quite often end up repaying with printed money worth much less; or requiring extra taxpayer assistance. And does not that, which makes it easier for governments to borrow, imply regulators believe government bureaucrats can use bank credit more efficiently than the private sector? Are current bank regulators allowed to act as statist activists?

10. And with the above referenced regulatory favoring of that sovereign debt that is usually used as reference for the risk free rate, do we now not have a subsidized free rate that is impossible to interpret?

11. We are here thanks to the risk-taking of generations before us. Are we morally allowed to accept risk adverse regulations that negates next coming generations the risk-taking they deserve and need? Does that not break that holy intergenerational bond Edmund Burke spoke about? God make us daring!

12. And odiously discriminating in favor of The Safe, and therefore against The Risky, and thereby negating many the opportunities of betterment, is that not the surest way to increase inequalities?

13. Leverage ratios that do not depend on credit risk, are now being imposed on banks; and this undoubtedly creates extra capital scarcity. Just like when crossing a desert you sacrifice those who most consume scarce water reserves that makes on the margin the credit risk weights even more distortionary. Do regulators ignore how pro-cyclical these regulations are?

14. Though I have many other similar observations, let me just finalize here by asking: Why is it that a person like me, who has more than enough professional and academic background to be making these questions, who has proven like very few having alerted to the dangers of current bank regulations, even while being an Executive Director of the World Bank (2002-04); who has formulated thousands of questions on this issue during more than a decade, in all type of venues, has not been able to receive any sort of clear answers?

Friends, in 1999 in an Op-Ed I wrote “the possible Big Bang that scares me the most is the one that could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause its collapse”. We have already experienced one AAA-bomb exploding, but our regulators keep taking us down that same crazy road. BoE could you please help us stop them?

Yours truly,

Per Kurowski

PS. Mark Twain has been attributed with saying that the bankers are those who want to lend you the umbrella when the sun shines and want to take it away when it is raining. Dear BoE, what is to be gained by making bankers want to lend you the umbrella even more when the sun shines, and take it away even more when it looks like it is going to rain?

PS. If you need references of me here is what I can document having written early:

And since then you can find my many thousands comments in: