Sunday, September 25, 2016

Willful (or naive) blindness of epical proportions, reigns in the world of the Basel Committe’s bank regulations

Note: The following comments have been inspired by beginning to read Margaret Hefferman’s “Willful Blindness


To agree with bank regulations for which the regulators have not even defined the purpose of the banks they regulate… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

To agree with bank regulations that look to hinder banks to hold assets ex ante perceived as risky, when these kinds of assets have never created a bank crisis… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

To agree with bank regulations based on perceived credit risks, when obviously what matter are unexpected events or not perceived credit risks… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

To believe that you could place so much decision power into the hands of some few human fallibe credit rating agencies, without intriducing a systemic risk of gigantic proportions… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

Not seeing that allowing banks to leverage their equity, and the support they receive from society differently, with different assets, will produce a serious distortion in the allocation of bank credit to the real economy… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

Not seeing that curtailing the access to bank credit of the risky, more than it is already curtailed increases inequality… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

Not seeing that future generations will be affected by denying them the risk-taking that brought current generation to where its at… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

Not understanding that banks, if allowed to use their own risk models to set their capital requirements will lower these so as to maximize their expected risk adjusted returns on equity… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

Believing that some Basel I and II regulators who were totally surprised by the 2007/08 crisis have it in them to fix it with a Basel III… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

To believe that a 2007/08 crisis and the following stagnation can be cured by just throwing QEs, fiscal deficits and low interest rates at it… is that not an act of willful (or naive) blindness?

And the list of questions related to current bank regulations that gives ground to believing willful acts of blindness takes place goes on and on and on… and I might add some with time after finishing the book that inspired this. 

PS to Financial Times: To receive thousands of letters on these problems from someone that has been showned right on many letters previously published… is that not an act of willful (not naive) blindness?