Showing posts with label Washington Post. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Washington Post. Show all posts

Thursday, December 5, 2024

Bank regulators, go west!

Sir, I refer to John Dearie’s “Go west, Federal Reserve” Washington Post December 5, 2024.

In his book "Money: Whence it came, where it went” (1975), John Kenneth Galbraith discusses banks and banking issues which, because of the risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, is very timely today.

In one section, he addresses the function of banks in the creation of wealth. Galbraith speculates on the fact that one of the basic fundamentals of the accelerated growth experienced in the western and south-western parts of the United States during the past century was the existence of an aggressive banking sector working in a relatively unregulated environment. He writes:

Banks opened and closed doors and bankruptcies were frequent, but as a consequence of agile and flexible credit policies, even the banks that failed left a wake of development in their passing.

And in a second section, Galbraith refers to the banks’ function of democratization of capital as they allow entities with initiative, ideas, and will to work although they initially lack the resources to participate in the region’s economic activity. In this case, Galbraith states that as the regulations affecting the activities of the banking sector are increased, the possibilities of this democratization of capital would decrease. There is obviously a risk in lending to the poor.

Sir, is that all not a good reason why bank regulators should also have a look at how the west was won?

PS. Sir, that book set me up for an already over twenty-five years fight against the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements.

Tuesday, August 22, 2023

A letter in Washington Post: "The economic revolution"


In his Aug. 17 op-ed, “Team Biden wants an economic revolution,” Robert B. Zoellick wrote, “National security adviser Jake Sullivan has argued that reliance on private businesses and markets has resulted in major economic and social failures. The Biden administration instead relies on state direction in areas of the economy far beyond infrastructure, R&D and education.” That might be so, but such a revolution has already been going on for 35 years.

Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul A. Volcker, in his 2018 memoir, “Keeping at It,” co-written with Christine Harper, wrote that assets for which bank capital and equity requirements were nonexistent were what had the most political support, sovereign debt. A leverage ratio discouraged holding low-return government securities.

That referred to Basel I’s 1988 risk-weighted bank capital requirements with decreed risk weights: zero percent federal government, 100 percent taxpayers. If that’s not an economic revolution, what is?

Independent of Treasurys being safer than other bank assets, those risk weights de facto imply that American bureaucrats know better what to do with credit for which repayment they’re not personally responsible than, e.g., American small businesses and entrepreneurs.

What would the Founding Fathers think?

Per Kurowski, Rockville

“Assets for which bank capital and equity requirements were nonexistent were what had the most political support, sovereign debt.”
If that’s not a valiant, courageous and honorable confession by Paul Volcker what is?
Thanks Washington Post for not ignoring it.




 My other letters published in the Washington Post related to this issue:

Friday, August 11, 2023

Few things fertilize populism as much as excessive government resources.

Few things fertilize populism as much as excessive government resources.

Sir, I refer to “Populism thrives because people are mad, and also because they’re sad” Charles Lane, Washington Post, August 10, 2023.

Without opining on its arguments, as someone from a nation cursed by centralized oil revenues (Venezuela) I must remind you that few things propel populism, of the good, bad or ugly types, as too much government financial power. 

So let me quote Paul Volcker from his 2018 autobiography “Keeping at it” penned together with Christine Harper: “Assets for which bank capital/equity requirements were nonexistent, were what had the most political support; sovereign credits. A ‘leverage ratio’ discouraged holdings of low-return government securities”. Which, for the risk weighted bank capital requirements of Basel I in 1988, meant decreeing risk weights of: 0% Federal Government – 100% We the People.

That has set the America I admire on a course much different from what its Founding Fathers dreamt of. Neither the US Congress or SCOTUS have ever questioned such regulatory overreach.

I asked ChatGPT – OpenAI: “From a political philosophy’s angle, where would those risk weight most likely fit: Russia, Argentina or the United States?  It answered Russia and Argentina. “Government assets receiving preferential treatment over citizen assets, would not align with the prevailing political philosophy in the United States.”

Sir, has AI got it all wrong?

The more there's in the piñata, the larger it is, the harder will be the fight for its contents, so as to gain access to what can be shared out (against support/votes) to admiring/needing supporters.

Pocas cosas fertilizan populismo y autocracias tanto, como excesivos recursos gubernamentales. Cuanto más en la piñata, más dura la lucha por su contenido, para tener acceso a que compartir, entre admiradores y partidarios, contra su apoyo y sus votos.


@PerKurowski

Monday, June 12, 2023

Wildfires and bank crises have much in common.

In the Washington Post, June 12 2023. Jennifer K. Balch wrote:: Fire can be used as a tool to reduce the fuels that lead to more intense wildfires… Native Americans have managed fire with cultural burning for millennia.” “Learn, baby learn: Altering our approach to wildfires” 

Indeed, that goes for bank crises too. In May 2003, as an Executive Director at the World bank, during a workshop for bank regulators I argued:

“There is a thesis that holds that the old agricultural traditions of burning a little each year, thereby getting rid of some of the combustible materials, was much wiser than today’s no burning at all, that only allows for the buildup of more incendiary materials, thereby guaranteeing disaster and scorched earth, when fire finally breaks out, as it does, sooner or later. 

Therefore, a regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises.”

Monday, November 28, 2022

Before the debt ceiling is lifted, which it must be, Congress must dare to at least pose a question.


Before the debt ceiling is lifted, which it must be, Congress must dare to at least pose a question.

In much of Peter Orszag’s Nov. 22 op-ed, “GOP threats to weaponize the debt limit are dangerous,” one can agree with his conclusion, but when he mentioned, “The evolution of debt is also influenced by the economy, market interest rates and other factors, but those are mostly outside the control of policymakers,” he omitted vital aspects. Let me explain it with a question:

What would the United States’ public debt be in the absence of regulatory subsidies, such as bank capital requirements with decreed risk weights of zero percent against federal government debts and 100 percent against citizens’ debts; copious amounts of Treasury purchases by the Fed with quantitative easing programs; and the preaching by modern monetary theory fans that has definitely promoted a dangerous lackadaisical attitude when discussing the limits of public debt?

Yes, Congress must approve increasing the debt level. It’s too late to do otherwise, but to do so without even trying to answer that question would be to irresponsibly kick the debt can forward and upward with disastrous consequences.

And, by the way, the Supreme Court should look at what the Founding Fathers might have thought about the aforementioned risk weights.

PS. The links displayed above are the ones placed on the web by the Washington Post
PS. The decreed risk weights 0% Federal Government - 100% We the People, seem clearly un-American. Have these been discussed and approved by the US Congress in accordance to the Constitution?



In short: Regulatory subsidies, QEs and MMT preaching, allowed governments the very Easy Debt that generated the Easy Money which, for decades, has kept bureaucrats/politicians/apparatchiks living on Easy Street 


My other letters published in the Washington Post related to this issue:

Friday, March 4, 2022

What if in the early 19th century The First Bank of the United States had regulated banks as the Federal Reserve began to do in 1988.

Sir, it is only now I read Steven Pearlstein reviewing Jonathan Levy’s “Age of American Capitalism”, “From commerce to chaos: An economic history of the United States”, Washington Post, June 4, 2021 

It says: “The ‘American system’ … required a new system of credit built around a government-chartered National Bank and government debt”.

That contrasts with John Kenneth Galbraith's: “Banks opened and closed doors and bankruptcies were frequent, but as a consequence of agile and flexible credit policies, even the banks that failed left a wake of development in their passing” “Money” (1975)

Why does not Washington Post invite some prominent financial historians to debate: Where would America be if “The First Bank of the United States” (1791-1811) had imposed bank capital requirements similar to those the Federal Reserve did in 1988? 

What the Fed did was succinctly explained by Paul Volcker in his 2018 autobiography in terms of: “The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages”. 

Would that not be an important debate that should have been started long ago? 

PS. That quote from Galbraith’s “Money” has a very personal meaning to me. It inspired my very first Op-Ed, 1997 in Caracas Venezuela. 

PS. Steve Pearlstein wrote: “Moral Capitalism: Why Fairness Won’t Make Us Poor”. Since current bank capital requirements, by doubling down on perceived credit risk unfairly decrees that the less creditworthy are also less worthy of credit, he could be interested in what Galbraith, opined in that same “Money”.

The banks’ function of democratization of capital as they allow entities with initiative, ideas, and will to work although they initially lack the resources to participate in the region’s economic activity. In this second case, Galbraith states that as the regulations affecting the activities of the banking sector are increased, the possibilities of this democratization of capital would decrease. There is obviously a risk in lending to the poor.” 

Indeed, when it comes to access to bank credit, fairness, can only help to make us rich.



Friday, December 3, 2021

How do you regulate a regulator’s algorithm?

Sir, I refer to your opinion “Want to regulate ‘the algorithm’? It won’t be easy” Washington Post December 3, 2021, in which you discuss the thorny issue of how to regulate social media in general and Facebook in particular.

Regulators, like the Federal Reserve, de facto also use an algorithm, the risk weighted bank capital requirements. This one determines how much capital/equity banks need to hold and, by its incentive of allowing more or less leverage of bank capital, influences how credit is allocated to the economy.

Let me list a few of too many worrisome aspects of that algorithm:

That what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to bank systems than what’s perceived as safe

That bureaucrats know better what to do with taxpayer’s credit than e.g.., entrepreneurs with theirs.

That banks should refinance much more our “safer” present than finance our children’s and grandchildren’s’ “riskier” future.

That residential mortgages should be prioritized over small business loans.

How did we get there? My briefest answer: Groupthink by deskbound members of a mutual admiration club. Anyone who has walked on main-streets would e.g., understand that the real risks are conditioned to how risks are perceived, signifying assets can become very risky by the sole fact of being perceived very safe.

John A. Shedd, in “Salt from my attic” 1928 wrote: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”. Sir, I submit that goes for banks too. Try to ask current regulators about the purpose of our banks.


PS. Rachel Siegel wrote on December 3 “Biden’s pledge to bring ‘new diversity’ to Federal Reserve to soon be tested” I just hope the true meaning of diversity is really understood.

Thursday, November 11, 2021

To help moor (my) inflationary expectations, get rid of what facilitates it.

Paul Volcker, in his autography “Keeping at it”, penned together with Christine Harper in 2018, wrote: “The assets assigned the lowest risk [in 1988], for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages… The American ‘overall leverage’ approach had a disadvantage as well in the eyes of shareholders and executives focused on return on capital; it seemed to discourage holdings of the safest assets, in particular low-return US government securities."

Washington Post, in reference to your “Do not underestimate inflation” November 11 let me assure you that, just as lower bank capital requirements against residential mortgages fuels house prices; lower bank capital requirements against Treasuries, by artificially lowering the interest rate on these, sooner or later, are bound to facilitate those excessive injections of liquidity that fuels inflation.

I’m not an expert on the US Constitution, I’m not even an American citizen, but I cannot understand how Section 8’s "The Congress shall have the power to borrow Money on the credit of the United States" could be read as to include the assistance of a Federal Reserve quantitative easing; and bank capital requirements with risk weights: 0% the Federal Government, 100% We the People.


PS. Fight inflation, from bottom up! Injecting liquidity while banks obtain higher risk adjusted returns on equity with Treasuries & residential mortgages (carbs) than with loans to small businesses & entrepreneurs (proteins), that favors demand over supply, something which can only help to inflate inflation.


@PerKurowski

Thursday, May 27, 2021

Where would the Home of the Brave be, if all its immigrants had been met by risk-adverse bank regulations?

In his Washington Post May 27 op-ed, “Subsidizing America’s most important product," George F. Will referred to “Joseph Schumpeter an immigrant from Austria” whose theory was that “the principal drivers of social dynamism are… innovators — inventors of new things and companies” and added that “The common denominator [of it] is the restless, risk-taking spirit of a talented few.”The de facto spirit of the risk weighted bank capital requirements in the United States can currently be summarized in the following way: 

“We regulators allow you banks to leverage your capital a lot, and therefore earn high risk adjusted returns on equity, with what’s safe, e.g., Treasuries and residential mortgages. But, as a quid pro quo, you need to stay away from what’s risky, e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs”

So, let me ask: Where would the Home of the Brave be if all its immigrants had been met by such regulatory risk adverseness?


PS. John Kenneth Galbraith wrote: “For the new parts of the country [USA’s West] … there was the right to create banks at will and therewith the notes and deposits that resulted from their loans…[if] the bank failed…someone was left holding the worthless notes… but some borrowers from this bank were now in business... [jobs created]. “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975

PS. And at the World Bank I argued time and time again: “There’s a clear need for an adequate equilibrium between risk-avoidance and the risk-taking needed to sustain growth.”


PS. And, to top it up, in The Land of the Free, that risk aversion came hand in hand with outright statism

Sunday, April 19, 2020

A letter in Washington Post: The capacity to borrow at reasonable interest rates is a strategic sovereign asset

In his April 12 op-ed, "How economists led us astray" Robert J. Samuelson wrote, "What we conveniently overlooked was the need to preserve our borrowing power for an unknown crisis that requires a huge infusion of federal cash."

Yes, the capacity to borrow at a reasonable interest rate (or the seigniorage when printing money) is a very valuable strategic sovereign asset, and it should not be squandered away by benefiting the members of the current generations or with some nonproductive investments. 

So, when public borrowings are authorized, that should require Congress being upfront that a part of that borrowing capacity is being consumed, which has a cost, and give an indication of who (children or grandchildren born what year) are expected to have to pay back that debt.

Mr. Samuelson also referred to "low dollar interest rates [that] will keep down the costs of servicing the debt." Sadly, those current "low dollar interest rates" are artificial rates, much subsidized in that since 1988, with Basel I regulations, banks are not required to hold any capital against Treasuries, and of course subsidized by the Federal Reserve purchasing huge quantities of Treasuries.

PS. A reverse mortgage on our children’s and grandchildren’s future

Sunday, December 30, 2018

A letter in Washington Post: Affordable homes or investment assets?


Should houses be affordable homes, or should they be investment assets? They can’t be both.

In 2004, under the Basel II business standards, if securities obtained a AAA rating, European banks and U.S. investment banks regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission needed to hold only 1.6 percent in capital against them. That created an enormous demand for highly rated securities. The truth of securitization is that, as when making sausages, the worse the ingredients the larger the profits.

And the highly rated securities backed by mortgages to the subprime sector became the primary cause for the 2008 crisis.

After the crisis, ultra-low interest rates and huge liquidity injections fed the price of houses. In the process, houses morphed from being homes into investment assets.

That aspect of the housing market is what I most missed in the Dec. 26 front-page article “Quick to evict, properties in disrepair.”

If you want easy financing to help someone afford a house, then house demand and house prices go up, and you need to give even more help to the next person who wants to afford a house.

Do we want affordable homes or houses as investment assets? There’s no easy answer, because going back to just homes would also cause immense suffering for all those believing they have, with their houses, built up a safety net.

Per Kurowski, Rockville 

PS. “The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were therefore low, were those that had the most political support…home mortgages” Paul Volcker 2018

PS. "Lower bank capital requirements against residential mortgages allows easier financing that will cause house prices to increase, and so we bureaucrats can get more in property taxes… and everyone’s happy.”





A tweet: If banks are allowed to leverage their equity/capital twice as much with residential mortgages than with loans to small businesses & entrepreneurs, you will get too many mortgages and too few jobs providing the income to service these. It ain’t science!


A tweet: Economy 101: Allowing banks to leverage capital much more with residential mortgages than with business loans will cause: a) increased house prices, b) decreased job opportunities and, consequentially, more children having to live in their parents’ house.


My letters in the Washington Post on bank regulations:

September 6, 2007: Factors in the Financial Storm
June 20, 2008: An Aspect of the Bubble
December 27, 2009: Another 'worst': Faulty bank regulation
January 6, 2012: Handcuffed by a triple-A rating
May 1, 2013: An American approach to banking
December 23, 2014: Let the market rule on risky trades
November 11, 2015: Reverse-mortgaging the future
August 9, 2016: Banks, regulators and risk
April 16, 2017: When banks play it too safe 
July 11, 2018: There is another tariff war that is being dangerously ignored.

Wednesday, July 11, 2018

Trade wars will mean new tariffs

There is another tariff war that is being dangerously ignored. 

The July 6 editorial "A splendid little tariff war?" rightly held that "tariffs create all sort of inefficiencies, unintended consequences and uncertainty."

The risk-weighted capital requirements for banks also translate de facto into subsidies and tariffs, which have resulted in a too much-ignored allocation of bank credit war. 

One consequence is that those perceived as risky, such as entrepreneurs, have their access to bank credit made more difficult than usual, and our economy suffers. Another is that by promoting excessive exposures to what is especially dangerous, because it is perceived as safe, against especially little capital, guarantees that when a bank crisis results, it will be especially bad. 

In terms of Mark Twain's supposed saying, these regulations have bankers lending out the umbrella faster than usual when the sun shines and wanting it back faster than usual when it looks like it is going to rain.


A 2019 letter on this issue to the Executive Directors and Staff of the International Monetary Fund.







Sunday, April 16, 2017

When banks play it too safe - putting inequality on steroids - the McKinsey silence

In his April 9 Outlook essay, “Public Policy, Inc.,” Daniel W. Drezner, writing about how consultancies such as McKinsey have started to act like policy knowledge brokers, mentioned that these “have their own biases.” Indeed.

Bankers love to hold assets perceived as safe against very little capital. It helps them earn great risk-adjusted returns on equity.

But we citizens have no reason for loving that:

By going too much for the safe, banks will not lend sufficiently to the riskier entrepreneurs who are the prime builders of our grandchildren’s future. Sooner or later, banks will get caught with little capital holding dangerously large exposures to something that was perceived safe but that turned out risky. Depositors and taxpayers will suffer.

There is no question that banks are more important clients for consultant companies such as McKinsey than citizens are. That must be why financial consultants have not denounced how the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s risk-weighted capital requirements for banks dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy.

Millions of entrepreneurs around the world have, as a direct consequence of these capital requirements, been denied the opportunity of bank credit. Talk about putting inequality on steroids. 

Per Kurowski, Rockville
The writer was an executive director at the World Bank from 2002 to 2004.

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Banks and regulators don’t care about our economy

Banks, regulators and risk

The Aug. 5 Economy & Business article “What happens when lines blur between banks, regulators” referred to several issues and conflicts of importance between banks and regulators but did not mention the prime point of agreement between all regulators and all banks: None of these actors cares about the state of the real economy.

Banks love to earn high-risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to something perceived as absolutely safe, so they love when regulators allow them to hold much less equity when lending to something perceived, decreed or concocted as safe.

Regulators love it when banks avoid taking risks, so they are more than happy to allow banks to hold much less equity when lending to something ex-ante perceived by them as safe, and therefore allow banks to earn much higher risk-adjusted returns on equity when staying away from the risky.

Our problem, though, is that we need for our banks to lend to the risky, such as small and medium-size enterprises and entrepreneurs, to keep our economy moving forward.

Regulators have never defined the purpose of the banks, so they do not care about whether these banks allocate credit efficiently to our real economy.

Per Kurowski, Rockville
The writer was an executive director at the World Bank from 2002 to 2004.

A letter in the Washington Post




My letters in the Washington Post on bank regulations:
September 6, 2007: Factors in the Financial Storm
June 20, 2008: An Aspect of the Bubble
December 27, 2009: Another 'worst': Faulty bank regulation
January 6, 2012: Handcuffed by a triple-A rating
May 1, 2013: An American approach to banking
December 23, 2014: Let the market rule on risky trades
November 11, 2015: Reverse-mortgaging the future
August 9, 2016: Banks, regulators and risk
April 16, 2017: When banks play it too safe
July 11, 2018: There is another tariff war that is being dangerously ignored.
December 30, 2018: Affordable homes or investment assets?
April 19, 2020: The capacity to borrow is a valuable sovereign asset.
November 28, 2022: Before the debt ceiling is lifted
August 22, 2023: The economic revolution


Wednesday, November 11, 2015

A letter in Washington Post: Reverse-mortgaging the future

Reverse-mortgaging the future

The reverse mortgage on the economy the baby boomers allowed will forever shame their intellectual elite.

In 1988, the Basel Capital Accord introduced the concept of credit-risk-weighted capital requirements for banks. More risk, more capital — less risk, less capital. That allowed banks to leverage more, and therefore to earn higher risk-adjusted returns on equity when lending to the safe as opposed to the risky.

As a result, it also imposed a de facto reverse mortgage on the economy, which extracted the value it already contained, as banks focused more on refinancing the safer past than the riskier future.

And that also meant we refused those coming after us the risk-taking that brought us here and, in such a way, we baby boomers — or at least our elite — allowed the intergenerational holy bond that Edmund Burke wrote about to be violated. That is something the good we might have done in the 1960s will never be able to excuse.






When will US Congress or Scotus review the constitutionality of current risk weighted bank capital requirements?


PS. The capacity to borrow at a reasonable cost is a very valuable strategic sovereign asset. It should not be squandered away by the generation in turn only to benefit its members, or with some non-productive investments. 

PS. In 1988, when bank regulators decreed a 0% risk-weight for US public debt, its debt was $2.6 trillion, 50% GDP. Now on way to $ 30 trillion, about 130% GDP, it still has a 0% risk weight. When do you think its risk weight should increase to 0.01%?



PS. Some couples might benefit from a reverse mortgage on their house, but it would be very irresponsible for a whole nation/generation, to place a reverse mortgage on all the economy. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is a poisonous Love Potion Number Nine.


It should not be surprising if those young living in the basements of their parents’ houses one day shout out: “Ma-Pa, now it’s our turn to live upstairs, you move down to the basement!” 

This letter in The Washington Post 


My letters in the Washington Post on bank regulations:
September 6, 2007: Factors in the Financial Storm
June 20, 2008: An Aspect of the Bubble
December 27, 2009: Another 'worst': Faulty bank regulation
January 6, 2012: Handcuffed by a triple-A rating
May 1, 2013: An American approach to banking
December 23, 2014: Let the market rule on risky trades
November 11, 2015: Reverse-mortgaging the future
August 9, 2016: Banks, regulators and risk
April 16, 2017: When banks play it too safe
July 11, 2018: There is another tariff war that is being dangerously ignored.
December 30, 2018: Affordable homes or investment assets?
April 19, 2020: The capacity to borrow is a valuable sovereign asset.
November 28, 2022: Before the debt ceiling is lifted
August 22, 2023: The economic revolution

Sunday, June 21, 2015

How do you explain to grownups the benefits of compound interests in times of zero or negative interest rates?

The Washington Post carried a story on June 21 titled “Where broke millennials go to learn aboutmoney – Financial planning for grownups.

In it its author Jonelle Marte, writes about a wine-tasting meeting organized by the Society of Grownups, in which “Stephanie Labelle was busy jotting notes as financial planner Jena Palisoul explained compound interest”.

And I was left wondering about how you go about and explain the benefits of compound interests, in times of zero or even negative interest rates.

Also, if I had been there to advise these young adults on the best way to guarantee their future I would, without a shadow of a doubt, told them to get rid of current bank regulators with their senseless risk-aversion. 

The currentcredit-risk-weighted capital requirements, make banks invest in assets much more compatible with the investment needs of a retiree with very few years of life expectancies, than with those of young grownups… those who needs banks to finance “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, in order to have the economy going and generating jobs.

Actually I would suggest the Society of Grownups writing the regulators a kind letter reminding them that major bank crisis are never ever caused by excessive exposures to what is perceived as risky, but always from too large exposures to what has been erroneously perceived as very safe.

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

Let the market rule on risky trades

Let the market rule on risky trades

Harold Meyerson referred in his Dec. 18 op-ed column, "Warren's friends on the right," to Democratic senators joining Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) in voting against "allowing publicly insured banks to trade risky derivatives."

How do these senators know that these derivatives are more risky than AAA-rated securities collateralized by subprime mortgages or loans to "infallible sovereigns" such as Greece? 

The economic crisis in the Western world can be traced to excessive bank lending - to borrowers regulators considered absolutely safe, against minimum capital, meaning minimum equity.

The home of the brave needs to beware of too much dangerous nannying because nannying is not what made it great.