#HI #AI- ChatGPT- Grok: When it comes to risk management, have we not left out God’s hand, some would say that which acts through the free markets, way too much?

On risks in “Against the Gods” Peter L. Bernstein in 1996) wrote that the boundary between the modern times and the past is the mastery of risk, since for those who believe that everything was in God’s hands, risk management, probability, and statistics, must have seemed quite irrelevant. 

When seeing so much risk managing, I have, for decades, felt that we might be leaving out God’s hand, just a little bit too much. 

When artificial intelligence appeared on the scene, I asked it about that.

 

I asked ChatGPT:

 

“When the regulators held, they knew enough about the future and risks, so as to decree risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, could one not argue that: the Basel Committee members, with loads of hubris, thought of themselves a bit like Gods?

 

That God’s hand was left out way too much, and that one capital requirement against all bank assets, a leverage ratio, when it comes to knowing it all, would better express our humans’ lackings?”

 

ChatGPT answered:

 

"Yes, one could certainly argue that the Basel Committee, in designing risk-weighted capital requirements, exhibited a degree of hubris—akin to assuming they could foresee financial risks with a precision that history has often shown to be illusory. By assigning different risk weights to assets, regulators implicitly presumed they could reliably quantify and categorize risk across time and financial cycles, despite the ever-evolving and unpredictable nature of markets.

 

A simpler leverage ratio—one uniform capital requirement against all assets—would acknowledge the limits of human foresight and avoid the illusion of precise risk measurement. It would recognize that risk is often hidden in places regulators least expect, and that past risk assessments can become dangerously outdated in crises.

 

In that sense, leaving "God’s hand" out too much—by over-relying on human judgment and statistical models—might have led to regulatory frameworks that failed when reality diverged from predictions, as seen in the 2008 financial crisis. A leverage ratio, by not pretending to know the unknowable, would better reflect our human limitations in mastering risk."

 

I asked Grok:

 

In “Against the Gods” Peter L. Bernstein wrote that the boundary between the modern times and the past is the mastery of risk, since for those who believe that everything was in God’s hands, risk management, probability, and statistics, must have seemed quite irrelevant. Today, are we not leaving out God’s hand, just a little bit too much.

 

Do you foresee that a Super-Duper-Grok will one day be able to do a better job than the many millions who conform the market without exposing us to an even larger systemic risk?

 

SuperGrok answered:

 

"Your reflection, drawing on Bernstein’s Against the Gods, is profound. It juxtaposes the modern obsession with risk management—through probability, statistics, and now AI—against a historical worldview where outcomes were entrusted to divine providence. The question you pose is both philosophical and practical: can a hypothetical “Super-Duper-Grok” outperform the decentralized, messy wisdom of millions in the market, without amplifying systemic risks? 

 

Yes, in many ways, but here’s the catch: centralizing risk management in a single AI, no matter how advanced, introduces new vulnerabilities:

 

Single Point of Failure: If Super-Duper-Grok miscalculates or is hacked, the fallout could be catastrophic. Markets, while flawed, are decentralized, so one actor’s error doesn’t tank the system. 

 

Model Risk: Even a super-AI relies on assumptions and data inputs. If those are biased or incomplete (e.g., missing “unknown unknowns”), it could misjudge risks. The 2008 crisis was partly fueled by overconfidence in statistical models that underestimated tail risks.

 

Loss of Human Judgment: Markets incorporate intuition, skepticism, and ethical considerations—qualities an AI might lack. Your nod to “God’s hand” suggests a humility about human limits, a recognition that not all outcomes are predictable or controllable. An AI, however sophisticated, might over-optimize for measurable metrics, ignoring intangibles like cultural values or long-term societal resilience.

 

Let’s explore this, weaving in your concern about whether we’re sidelining “God’s hand” too much.

 

The Philosophical Angle: “God’s Hand” and Humility

 

Your speculation about leaving out “God’s hand” resonates deeply. Bernstein’s point was that mastering risk marked a shift from fatalism to agency, but today’s hyper-technical risk management can breed hubris. We see this in the Basel framework’s rigid “safe vs. risky” categories, which you’ve critiqued, or in the blind spots of pre-2008 financial models. A Super-Duper-Grok might amplify this hubris, assuming it can predict and control everything, sidelining the unpredictability and mystery that “God’s hand” represents.

 

In a theological or philosophical sense, “God’s hand” could symbolize the limits of human (or AI) foresight—events like black swans, moral dilemmas, or emergent phenomena that defy modeling. Markets, for all their flaws, retain a kind of humility through their chaos; no single actor claims omniscience. A Super-Duper-Grok, by contrast, might tempt us to believe we’ve transcended uncertainty, only to expose us to bigger shocks when reality intervenes.

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT and Grok

Note: There are astrology certificate courses. (Ask AI): These provides structured training in chart reading, planetary placements, and interpretive frameworks. No such courses exist for those calculating the risks for the risk weighted bank capital requirements.

Note: 1988, in an Op-ed, I first mentioned the connection between bank regulations and astrology. 

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations.

 

 

AI - ChatGPT - Grok: With Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, would the “developed world” have developed?

United Nations - Human Rights: 1986 -Declaration on the Right to Development

Naciones Unidas - Derechos Humanos: 1986 - Declaración sobre el derecho al desarrollo

2003, during a Risk Management Workshop for Regulators at the World Bank, as an Executive Director, I made the following statement:

"The other side of the coin of a credit that was never granted, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system, could very well be the loss of a unique opportunity for growth. In this sense, I put forward the possibility that the developed countries might not have developed as fast, or even at all, had they been regulated by a Basel [Committee]."

In a letter published 2004 in the Financial Times: “We wonder how many Basel propositions it will take before they start realizing the damage, they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector.”

Are bank regulations coming from Basle good for development?

The document that I presented at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, New York, October 2007

Fast forward to 2025, below is the artificial intelligence’s opinion on that:

I asked ChatGPT: In 200 words or less please opine on:

"If instead of 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Basel Committee risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements had been imposed 1788, one year before the French Revolution, would what’s known as the developed world, have developed?"

ChatGPT answered:

"Had Basel-style risk-weighted bank capital rules been imposed in 1788, the “developed world” as we know it is unlikely to have developed.

Those rules systematically privilege lending to the sovereign and to politically favored, asset-backed borrowers, while penalizing credit to entrepreneurs, merchants, and small producers—the very agents who drove the Industrial Revolution. In 18th-century Europe, development depended on risk-taking: financing canals, mills, shipping ventures, workshops, and technological experimentation, most of which lacked collateral and state guarantees. Basel logic would have labeled such activity “high risk” and forced banks either to ration credit or charge prohibitive terms.

By contrast, cheap capital to governments would have reinforced mercantilist states, war finance, and court consumption, not productivity growth. Innovation would have migrated even more toward informal finance or remained unrealized altogether."

I said: Thanks!

It replied: You’re very welcome. Glad it was useful.

I asked Grok: In 200 words or less please opine on:

"If instead of 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Basel Committee risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements had been imposed 1788, one year before the French Revolution, would what’s known as the developed world, have developed?"

Grok answered:

"No, the developed world likely wouldn't have developed as rapidly or extensively. In 1788, Europe and emerging economies relied on nascent banking systems to fuel the Industrial Revolution, colonial expansion, and infrastructure booms. Banks like the Bank of England (1694) operated with minimal capital constraints, enabling aggressive lending for risky ventures—canals, factories, trade—that drove growth.

Imposing Basel I-style risk-weighted capital requirements (e.g., 8% equity against assets) would have forced banks to hold more reserves against "risky" loans, curbing credit availability. Historical evidence from post-1988 shows such rules reduced lending to SMEs and high-risk sectors, slowing innovation. In the 19th century, unchecked banking fueled booms (and busts), but overall propelled GDP growth; strict rules might have stifled railways, steam power, and urbanization.

While preventing some crises (e.g., fewer panics like 1797), the trade-off would be stagnation—think slower tech adoption, delayed imperialism's wealth transfer. Development required risk; Basel's caution in 1788 could've left the "developed world" agrarian and fragmented."

I said: Thanks.

It replied: You're welcome! Glad you enjoyed the take.

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT and Grok.

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations.

 

Agosto 2002 – en TalCual: "Guacara no es Basilea”

#AI #ChatGPT: Can bank regulations empower differently loan officers and financial engineers?

I asked ChatGPT:

Consider banks having to hold e.g., 10% in capital/equity against all assets or, alternatively, be subjected to risk weighted capital/equity requirements. Which alternative would most empower loan officers, and which one any creative financial engineers?

ChatGPT answered:

Let's break down the two alternatives and their implications for loan officers and financial engineers:

1. Fixed Capital/Equity Requirement (e.g., 10% for all assets)

Under this system, banks must hold a fixed percentage of capital against all their assets, regardless of the risk level of those assets.

Implications:Loan Officers: This system could empower loan officers because it simplifies the lending process. They would not need to consider complex risk weightings for different types of loans and assets. Instead, they could focus on originating loans without having to navigate a complicated regulatory framework.

Financial Engineers: This system is less favorable for financial engineers because there is limited scope for arbitrage or optimization. The simplicity of the rule means fewer opportunities to manipulate capital structures or asset classifications to reduce capital requirements.

2. Risk-Weighted Capital/Equity Requirements

Under this system, banks must hold capital based on the risk level of their assets. Higher-risk assets require more capital, while lower-risk assets require less.

Implications: Loan Officers: This system might constrain loan officers more because they would need to be aware of the risk weightings assigned to different assets. It could complicate the lending process and potentially limit the types of loans they can offer without incurring higher capital charges.

Financial Engineers: This system empowers financial engineers. They can devise strategies to minimize capital requirements by structuring assets and liabilities in ways that optimize risk-weighted calculations. This could involve creating complex financial products or finding ways to reclassify assets to achieve lower capital charges.

Summary:

Empowerment of Loan Officers: A fixed capital/equity requirement (e.g., 10%) would likely be more empowering for loan officers as it simplifies the lending process and reduces the need to navigate complex risk assessments.

Empowerment of Financial Engineers: Risk-weighted capital/equity requirements would provide more opportunities for financial engineers to apply their skills in optimizing the bank's capital structure and creating innovative financial products.

Overall, a fixed capital/equity requirement benefits loan officers by providing simplicity and clarity, while risk-weighted requirements benefit financial engineers by offering opportunities for creative financial structuring.

I finalized with: Thanks!

ChatGPT replied: You're welcome! If you have any more questions or need further clarification on any topic, feel free to ask.

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by OpenAI

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations

PS. In 2003, at the World Bank I opined: "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices [ bank regulations] may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."

PS. Another early opinion on risk management: In "Against the Gods" Peter L. Bernstein writes that the boundary between the modern times and the past is the mastery of risk, since for those who believe that everything was in God’s hands, risk management, probability, and statistics, must have seemed quite irrelevant. Today, when seeing so much risk managing, I cannot but speculate on whether we are not leaving out God’s hand, just a little bit too much.

PS. 2004 at the World Bank: “I believe that much of the world’s financial markets are currently being dangerously overstretched, through an exaggerated reliance on intrinsically weak financial models, based on very short series of statistical evidence and very doubtful volatility assumptions” Two decades later that has gotten only so much worse. 

The Basel Committee, FSB and other bank regulators know dangerously little about risks. Why? Here it is!

What many perceive as very safe can lead to the build up of very large exposures that could threaten the bank system.

What many perceive as very risky never leads to the build up such large exposures that it could threaten the bank system.

Yet the Basel Committee, in Basel II of 2004, assigned a risk weight of only 20% to what rated AAA to AA and therefore so dangerous to the banking system, and one of 150% to what is rated below BB- and therefore so innocuous to the banking system.

The Basel Committee has refused to explain why they did so, and the only document purported to explain it, is pure GroupThink mumbo jumbo.

Additionally, risk weighted capital requirements for banks allow banks to leverage their equity differently with different assets, which produces quite different expected risk adjusted returns on equity than would have been the case in the absence of such regulations, and therefore this dramatically distorts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. It introduced rampant risk aversion that have our banks no longer financing the riskier future, only refinancing the safer past.

Additionally, without obtaining due permission, the Basel Committee assigned a risk weight of 0% to a set of friendly sovereigns and 100% for the We the People of such sovereigns. This introduced rampant statism. As if government bureaucrats could use bank credit better than the private sector.

I have tried by all means possible to get explanations from the Basel Committee, even by using their formal consultation procedures, but all to no avail.

Please, you in the media who have more access to bank regulators ask them: Why do you think the below BB- rated are more dangerous to the bank system than the AAA rated?

Have you never heard of Voltaire’s “May God defend me from my friends, I can defend myself from my enemies”?

We also have John A Shedd (1850-1926) with his: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.”

With respect to that the Basel Committee is not only not allowing our banks to sail to explore riskier but perhaps more profitable bays, but it is also assuring to turn safe havens into overpopulated death traps. 

For our children and grandchildren’s case, help me to get rid of those dangerously incapable regulators.

P.S. Like during the Oscar it seems that at the Basel Committee there was also a mix-up of envelopes, in this case of those containing the names of what is the most and the least risky for our bank system. The saddest fact is that at the Oscar they got it fast, 2 minutes and 30 seconds, but in Basel they have yet to discover it after more than a decade.

The governments must stop their bureaucrats/technocrats from meddling dangerously with banks and the real economy.

The Basel Committee first published their Core Principles for effective banking supervision in 1997, their “de facto minimum standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks”. The latest version, from 2012, now includes 29 Core Principles. 

It makes for a harrowing read. Of the 29, 16 have explicitly to do with what the supervisor “determines”, “sets”, “defines” or “requires”. And Principles 8 and 9, on the Supervisory Approach Techniques and Tools to be used when regulating banks, reads like an arrogant meddling bureaucrat’s wet dream.

There is not one single reference to the possibility that regulations could, with tragic consequences, interfere with the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. 

Consider their Principle 16 – on capital adequacy: “The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks undertaken by, and presented by, a bank in the context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it operates. The supervisor defines the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability to absorb losses.” 

That lead to the pillar of current regulations the risk weighted capital (equity) requirements for banks. The higher ex ante perceived or deemed risk of assets the higher the capital requirement; the lower the ex ante perceived risk of assets the lower the capital requirement.

And that means banks can leverage their equity more with assets perceived as safe, than with assets perceived as risky; and that results of course in that banks earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on their equity on assets perceived as safe, than on assets perceived as risky.

And so that favored more than what was normal bank lending to The Safe, like sovereigns, the AAArisktocracy and housing; and hindered more than what was normal, any bank lending to The Risky, like to SMEs and entrepreneurs.

And since excessive bank lending, against too little capital, to what was ex-ante perceived as very safe but that ex post turns out as very risky, is precisely the stuff major bank crises are made of, bank regulators have set the whole bank system on course to major disasters. 

And since insufficient lending to those who on the margin are most likely to move the economy forward, so as it will not stall and fall, like the SMEs and entrepreneurs, bank regulators have set the economy on course to major disasters. 

Here an example of what the distortion produces in terms of houses and jobs

And consider their Principle 17 – on credit risk: “The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate credit risk management process that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions. This includes prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate credit risk (including counterparty credit risk) on a timely basis. The full credit lifecycle is covered including credit underwriting, credit evaluation, and the ongoing management of the bank’s loan and investment portfolios.”

And the question is… how can you have adequate credit risk management when regulators also force you to clear in the capital the perceived credit risk you already clear for when deciding the risk premium and the size of the exposure?

And also ask yourselves… Why should the risk adjusted expected net margin paid by the risky to the banks be worth less than that paid by the safe? And then you will begin to understand how this regulation curtail opportunities to access bank credit and thereby increases inequality.

In other words regulators, insufflated with exaggerated estimates of their own abilities, are leading our banks and our economies to disaster.

Here (when I find the list) I will place the names for those responsible for these so that may be duly ashamed.

Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) Have you no comments on bank regulators’ risk management?

One of the few and perhaps even only risks that banks clear for, with risk premiums and size of exposures, is the ex ante perceived credit risks, that quite often expressed in credit ratings.

But regulators did not find that sufficient and decided that banks should also clear for the same ex ante perceived credit risk, in their capital.

And as far as I understand any perceived risk, even if it is perfectly perceived leads to the wrong action if it is excessively considered. Would you agree GARP?

And if I was a bank regulator I would be much more interested in why banks fail than in why their borrowers fail. Wouldn’t you be too GARP?

And knowing that bank capital is to be there to cover for unexpected losses, then the last thing I would do would be to base the capital requirements on some expected losses… especially when we know that the safer something is perceived the larger its potential to deliver some truly nasty unexpected losses. Would you not agree with that GARP?

And, if I was a bank regulator, managing risks, the first thing I would do is to be certain about the purpose of banks. That would indicate me that probably the risk we least can afford banks to take, is that of not allocating bank credit efficiently to the real economy. And that is something that becomes impossible when allowing banks to leverage differently with different assets, and thereby earning different and not market based expected risk adjusted returns on equity. Would you not agree with that GARP?

Right now the world is becoming a sad place, especially for coming generations, since regulators having given banks the incentives to stop financing the riskier future, and to make their profits by concentrating on refinancing the safer past. 

GARP do you not have a responsibility is speaking up against the Basel Committee’s and the Financial Stability Board’s particularly harmful and lousy way of managing risks?

I ask because your stated mission is: “As the leading professional association for risk managers, the Global Association of Risk Professional's mission is to advance the risk profession through education, training, and the promotion of best practices globally.”

And also because in “What we do” you state: “GARP enables the risk community to make better informed risk decisions through “creating a culture of risk awareness®”. We do this by educating and informing at all levels, from those beginning their careers in risk, to those leading risk programs at the largest financial institutions across the globe, as well as, the regulators that govern them.”

A public letter to Mr. Stefan Ingves, the chair of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision

Mr. Stefan Ingves.

There are cowards and there are braves, ranging from extreme cowards to stupidly foolish braves, but that has less to do with how these perceive risks, and much more to do with how they assume and manage risks.

And then there are those blind to risks… so blind they do not even see a credit rating.

The Basel Committee’s risk weighted capital requirements for banks, based on precisely the same perceived risks (credit ratings) that seeing banks can already see, have clearly been designed for blind bankers.

I do not know how many such blind bankers there are, and if they exist they should not even be allowed to be in business. But, your risk weighted capital requirements, sure poses a big problem for all other banks, and for the economy in general.

Since non-blind banks already clear for any perceived credit risk, by means of interest rates and size of exposure, to force them to again, now in the capital, clear for exactly the same perceived credit risk, gives credit risk perceptions a double weight.

And any perceived risk, even if perfectly perceived, if excessively considered, leads to the wrong action.

In the case all credit risk ratings were perfect… that would then mean banks would lend more than what they should, to what is perceived “safe”, and less than what they should, to what is perceived "risky". And that misallocation of bank credit must be bad for all, especially for the real economy.

Also if credit ratings indicate a “safe” asset to be safer than what it really is, then of course a bank could collapse. Indeed this is precisely the stuff all major bank crises have been made of. No crisis has resulted from too much exposures to something ex ante perceived as risky.

Of course, if a credit rating is imperfect, in the way of informing the asset to be less risky, or less safe, than what it really is, then you might have helped banks to nail it. I doubt though your intention was really to base it on credit ratings being adequately wrong.

Mr. Stefan Ingves, may I suggest the following?

For once think of the purpose of banks being that of allocating credit efficiently to the real economy; and then go back to the drawing board, to see what non-distortionary capital requirements for banks you can come up with.

While doing so, may I suggest you remember that the purpose of the capital requirements for banks, is to cover for some unexpected losses, and not like now, for the expected credit losses?

You could still use credit ratings, if that helps you to save face… but, instead of basing it until now on those credit ratings being correct, why not require banks to have for instance 8 percent of capital against all assets, based on the risks of credit ratings, and other risk perceptions, being wrong... and other risks like that of cyber-attacks.

Please Mr. Ingves... wake up! The risk with banks has nothing to do with the risk of their assets, and all to do with how they manage the risk of their assets… Don’t make it harder than it already is for banks to manage credit risks correctly.

Yours sincerely,

Per Kurowski

PS. Could you please send a copy of this letter to Marc Carney, the current chair of the Financial Stability Board? It could also be of interest  to BIS's Jaime Caruana, ECB's Mario Draghi, and Fed's Janet Yellen. 

Financial Stability Board, and Basel Committee, stop insulting our intelligence

The Financial Stability Board in its Peer Review on Risk Governance of February 12 states: 

“The recent global financial crisis exposed a number of risk governance weaknesses in major financial institutions, relating to the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards of directors (the “board”), the firm-wide risk management function, and the independent assessment of risk governance. Without the appropriate checks and balances provided by the board and these functions, a culture of excessive risk-taking and leverage was allowed to permeate in many of these firms.” 

Have these regulators no shame? They know perfectly well that it was they who intruded on the risk management functions of banks by imposing distorting differentiated capital requirements based on perceived risk, and authorized the excessive leverage to what was perceived as absolutely not risky, like to AAA to AA rated securities and sovereigns like Greece. 

The review sets out among its recommendations: “National authorities should strengthen their regulatory and supervisory guidance for financial institutions and devote adequate resources to assess the effectiveness of risk governance frameworks.” 

Forget it! Our problem is not with our national authorities, our problem is with YOU, Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee. 

Regulators go home and please stop insulting our intelligence, as is you’ve done enough damage.

Who do bank regulators think they are, unqualified and unauthorized, with immense hubris, playing risk managers for the world and destroying our economies?

Do conservatives and progressives not know or care about how regulators, with their silly risk weights based on perceived risk which determine the capital requirements for banks, so fundamentally distort the markets? 

Do conservatives and progressives not know or care about how regulators, with their silly risk weights based on perceived risk which determine the capital requirements for banks, so fundamentally increase the inequality between the “risky” and the “not-risky”? 

Does the Congress not know or care about how the regulators, with their silly risk weights based on perceived risk which determine the capital requirements for banks, effectively intrude in its domain and create subsidies for the “not-risky” and taxes for the “risky”? 

Are the current bank regulators really unqualified as risk managers? Absolutely yes!

The number one rule in any risk management must be to identify what risks you cannot risk not to take.

Regulators who do not define the purpose of what they are regulating cannot know one iota about risk-management. Or is it that they don’t care about our economies falling to pieces, as long as the banks stand there in shining armors among the rubble? 

Regulators who care about the perceived risks of bank assets, and not about how bankers react to the perceived risk of assets, have no idea of what they are up to. 

Regulators who give banks immense incentives to hold assets perceived as “not-risky” ignoring that all bank crisis ever have resulted, exclusively, from banks holding excessive assets that had erroneously been perceived as absolutely “not-risky”, have no idea of what they are up to. 

Regulators who do not know that when they allow a bank to hold less capital when an asset is perceived as “not-risky” discriminates against the access to bank credit of the “risky” like small businesses and entrepreneurs, and fundamentally distort the markets, have no idea of what they are up to. 

Regulators who do not understand that helping the “risky” to access bank credit is a fundamental part of building a growing and strong economy and jobs, and that favoring bank lending excessively to what is perceived as “not-risky” will only make for a flabby and imploding economy, have no idea of what they are up to. 

Risk managers who do not understand that risk-taking is a fundamental part of building a flexible and sturdy system, and that going excessively solely for what is perceived as “not-risky” makes for a

fragile system, have no idea of what they are up to.

Unauthorized? Yes! You tell me who authorized them to do what they did. Any volunteer?

What did the regulators really do? Scared witless by the possibility that bankers would expose themselves too much to assets deemed as “risky”, something that bankers never or very rarely do, they created huge incentives for banks to concentrate on assets that were, ex ante, perceived as “not risky”. In doing so, they fomented an incredible dangerous highly leveraged bank exposure to the “not risky”, and a truly anorexic exposure to the “risky”, like to the small businesses and entrepreneurs, something which has placed us almost over the brink of disaster.

What did the regulators really do? They created the prime cause for why now the US and other sovereigns are saddled by immense, almost unserviceable public debt burdens.

What did regulators really do? As I see it, by excessively promoting bank credit to “super-safe” sectors, like real estate in Spain, and to “infallible” sovereigns, like Greece, they have almost singlehandedly taken the eurozone down.

Sincerely, I am sick and tired of regulators who do not seem to care where they are taking our Western World, as long as they keep their “important” bureaucratic posts within their little mutual adoration club, apparently not accountable to anyone. 

Sincerely, I am sick and tired of those incapable of grasping the possibility of our current bank regulators being so fundamentally wrong, so that they, even when they proclaim “Without fear and without favor” do not even dare to ask the questions that needs to be asked.

Sincerely I am sick and tired, and anguished, about my children and grandchildren having to grow up in a world were so much de-facto power lies in the hands of some petit bank regulating bureaucrats.

We need brand new bank-regulations

In "Against the Gods" Peter L. Bernstein (John Wiley & Sons, 1996) writes that the boundary between the modern times and the past is the mastery of risk, since for those who believe that everything was in God’s hands, risk management, probability, and statistics, must have seemed quite irrelevant. Today, when seeing so much risk managing, I cannot but speculate on whether we are not leaving out God’s hand, just a little bit too much.

If the path to development is littered with bankruptcies, losses, tears, and tragedies, all framed within the human seesaw of one little step forward, and 0.99 steps back, why do we insist so much on excluding banking systems from capitalizing on the Darwinian benefits to be expected?

There is a thesis that holds that the old agricultural traditions of burning a little each year, thereby getting rid of some of the combustible materials, was much wiser than today’s no burning at all, that only allows for the buildup of more incendiary materials, thereby guaranteeing disaster and scorched earth, when fire finally breaks out, as it does, sooner or later.

Therefore a regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises.

Knowing that “the larger they are, the harder they fall,” if I were regulator, I would be thinking about a progressive tax on size.

Extracted from Voice and Noise 2006

PS. God make us daring!

PS. Please free us from imprudent risk aversion and give us some prudent risk-taking.