In the case of banks, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is absolutely inapplicable

James Kwak of the Baseline Scenario, in a post titled: “More Misinformation about Banking Regulation” while discussing the effects of increased capital requirements writes:

“The Modigliani-Miller Theorem…says that a firm’s capital structure — the amount of equity it has relative to debt — doesn’t matter: in the case of the hypothetical bank, if you increase equity and reduce debt, after the reduced debt payments, there is just enough cash left over to compensate the larger number of shareholders at the lower rate that they are now willing to accept.

Now, the assumptions of Modigliani-Miller don’t hold in the real world, but the main reason they don’t hold is the tax subsidy for debt…

Since the cost of capital doesn’t change with capital requirements (except, again, because of the tax subsidy for debt), the amount of bank lending doesn’t change either.” 

Oops… that is in itself some misinformation! 

For banks, besides tax considerations, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is absolutely inapplicable; since it does not consider the value of the support society (taxpayers) explicitly or implicitly give the holders of bank debt. If a bank has 100% equity then all risk falls on the shareholder and the societal support is 0. If a bank has 5% equity and 95% debt then society contributes a lot to the party.

Frankly, like in Europe, where some banks were leveraged about 50 to 1, and rates on bank deposits are still low, who on earth can one even dream to bring the Modigliani-Miller Theorem into the analysis?

And the fluctuating societal support, is one of the main reasons behind the argument I have been making for over a decade, about how credit-risk adjusted capital requirements for banks distort the allocation of credit. Regulators are telling the banks: If you lend to what is perceived as safe, like to the AAArisktocracy, then you are allowed to hold less capital, meaning leveraging more, meaning you will receive more societal (taxpayer) backing, than if you lend to a risky SME. 

And so of course, if you increase capital requirements which reduces the leverage, banks will get less taxpayer support… ergo lend less and at higher interest costs. Would that be bad for the economy? Of course it would keep billions out of the economy (it already happens) especially while business models are adjusted and bank capital increased. But that austerity J (less societal support spending) though it would hurt would not necessarily be bad… what is really bad for the economy are the different capital requirements for different assets… since that stops bank credit from being allocated efficiently.

Take away all deposit guarantees and all bailout assistance, and then the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, subject to tax considerations would be more applicable to banks.

The poor, “the risky” and the future are subsidizing the bank borrowings of “the absolutely safe”. Now how about that?

Governments guarantees to help bank creditors if banks fail, which in all essence is a support subsidy to the banks.

And, if banks fail, and government needs to pay up, it is argued that it is the taxpayers who must pay… and we usually leave it at that. 

But, when taxpayers pay, it is actually all who pay, and that means, in relative terms, especially the poor; because the wealthy have more deposits in the banks which are saved; and because the poor would probably be the one most to benefit with the taxes that could be collected, if the support subsidy was not needed to be paid.

But regulators also allow banks to hold less equity when lending to those from a credit point of view perceived as absolutely safe, than when lending to those perceived as risky; and that signifies that the support subsidy is effectively bigger for those perceived as absolutely safe than for those perceived as risky.

Finally, what has already made it, namely the history, has a lot more possibilities of being perceived as absolutely safe, than what needs an opportunity to be, namely the future.

All that translates into that the poor, those perceived as "risky" and the future, are subsidizing the bank borrowings of the “absolutely safe”… now how about that? And, if that is not a cruel way of fostering inequality, what is?

If I was the FDIC, I would ask bank regulators two questions

If I was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, mandated to insure depositors for when banks fail, I would not lose one minute of sleep concerning myself with bank assets perceived as “risky”, but I would certainly toss and turn all night, thinking about assets that are perceived as “absolutely safe” and might not be. 

“The Risky” assets those take care of most of my risks on their own, by means of lower bank exposures, higher interest rate premiums and tougher contract terms. 

It is always “The Infallible” assets which represent the really expensive dangers to me, since if these assets, as sometimes happens, ex-post turn out to be very risky, then the bank exposures are usually enormous, the earned risk premiums much too low, and the contracting terms much too lax. 

And so, if I was the FDIC, I would ask the current bank regulators about what they are thinking when they allow banks to hold so much less capital against “The Infallible” than against “The Risky”. 

And since if I was the FDIC, and therefore also responsible for “promoting sound public policies … in the nation's financial system”, I would also ask the regulators whether allowing banks to leverage their equity much more when lending to “The Infallible” than when lending to “The Risky”, does not introduce distortions that make it impossible for the banks to assign resources in the real economy, with any type of efficiency.

In short, if I was FDIC, current capital requirements based on perceived risk would be completely unacceptable.

It’s what’s safe that’s truly risky.