J'accuse the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision

The following are facts that should be understood by any economist.

The Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements distort the allocation of credit.

By favoring the refinancing of the safer present, it builds up dangerous large exposures to what’s perceived or decreed safe e.g., public debt, residential mortgages and AAA rated securities.

By hindering the financing of the riskier future, e.g., loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, the economy weakens and grows less.

These are extremely procyclical. When times are good and risk perceived low, banks are allowed to hold less equity, therefore able to pay much dividends and buy back shares. When times turn bad, banks stand there naked, just when its hardest for these to raise new equity.

As valiantly confessed by Paul Volcker the risk weights are much influenced by politics. 

The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences has not been awarded to anyone who has warned or much less criticized this risk weighted regulations. As a very active member of the Basel Committee, Sveriges Riksbank that stands behind such prize, has a serious conflict of interest it has not been able to manage.

#AI #OpenAI #ChatGPT Do regulators favor refinancing the safer present over financing the riskier future? If so, what about its consequences?

I asked ChatGPT:

"By imposing lower bank capital requirements against what’s perceived or decreed as safe, than against what’s perceived as risky, could one argue the regulators prefer the refinancing of the safer present over the financing of the riskier future?"

ChatGPT answered:

Yes, one could argue that by imposing lower capital requirements on what is perceived as "safe" compared to what is perceived as "risky," regulators are implicitly encouraging the refinancing of existing, less risky assets rather than the financing of potentially riskier, future-oriented ventures.

Here's the reasoning:

1. Lower Capital Requirements for "Safe" Assets: When regulators impose lower capital requirements on assets deemed "safe" (such as government bonds or highly rated corporate debt), banks are incentivized to allocate more capital to these assets. This makes it easier and cheaper for banks to hold or refinance existing, safe assets.

2. Higher Capital Requirements for "Risky" Assets: Conversely, higher capital requirements for riskier assets (like loans to startups or investments in innovative but uncertain technologies) make it more expensive and less attractive for banks to finance these ventures. This could discourage banks from providing capital for new, potentially transformative projects that carry higher risk but also higher potential for future growth.

3. Preference for Stability: Regulators typically focus on financial stability and risk mitigation. By encouraging banks to hold safer assets, they aim to reduce the likelihood of financial crises. However, this also means that the flow of capital is directed more towards maintaining and refinancing the present state of the economy rather than taking risks that could lead to future innovation and growth.

4. Impact on Economic Growth: Over time, this bias towards safety could lead to underinvestment in riskier, forward-looking projects that are necessary for long-term economic growth and innovation. The economy might become more stable in the short term, but at the cost of slower growth and reduced dynamism in the long term.

In summary, the structure of capital requirements can indeed reflect a regulatory preference for maintaining the status quo (the "safe" present) over investing in uncertain but potentially more rewarding future opportunities (the "risky" future).

I asked ChatGPT:

"If so, could one also argue such regulation favors the wants of the current generation (grandfathers and parent) over the needs of the future generation (children and grandchildren)?"

ChatGPT answered:

Yes, one could argue that such regulation, by favoring the refinancing of safer, established assets over riskier, innovative ventures, implicitly prioritizes the wants and stability of the current generation over the needs and potential opportunities for future generations. Here's how this argument might be structured:

1. Focus on Present Stability: Regulations that encourage banks to favor "safe" assets—often linked to established sectors or government debt—aim to maintain financial stability. This approach aligns with the interests of the current generation, who may prioritize preserving wealth and stability in the short to medium term.

2. Underinvestment in Future-Oriented Ventures: By imposing higher capital requirements on riskier investments, which often include funding for new technologies, startups, or infrastructure, these regulations can lead to underinvestment in areas that are crucial for long-term growth and innovation. The future generation, which would benefit from these developments, may find fewer opportunities for economic advancement and growth.

3. Intergenerational Equity: The preference for maintaining the current state of the economy could be seen as catering to the immediate needs and desires of the current generation, particularly those in or nearing retirement (grandfathers and parents), who might be more risk-averse. This can come at the expense of the future generation (children and grandchildren), who may face a less dynamic economy with fewer resources for innovation and growth.

4. Long-Term Consequences: While the current generation enjoys the benefits of stability, the future generation may inherit an economy that is less resilient to new challenges, less innovative, and potentially less capable of sustaining long-term growth. This could lead to a scenario where future generations are left with fewer opportunities and greater challenges.

5. Moral and Ethical Considerations: This situation raises questions of intergenerational equity, where the decisions and policies of one generation disproportionately affect the prospects of future generations. If regulations prioritize the short-term stability and preferences of the current generation, they might be neglecting the broader, long-term needs of those who will inherit the economy.

In summary, the regulation of capital requirements that favors safer, present-oriented investments could be seen as prioritizing the immediate wants of the current generation over the long-term needs and opportunities of future generations.

I said: Thanks!

ChatGPT said: You're welcome! If you have any more questions or need further clarification on anything, feel free to ask.

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations

In Martin Wolf’s Economic Forum in October 2009, I wrote: “Please free us from imprudent risk-aversion and give us some prudent risk-taking”

Here more about the fundamental violation of that Intergenerational Social Contract Edmund Burke wrote about.

Easy Money - Easy Street

By favoring banks financing the “safer” present, public debt and residential mortgages, over the “riskier” future, loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, the regulators, generously assisted by central banks with abundant QE, and by the MMT preachers, provided the last generations loads of Easy Money, something which allowed these to live very happily on Easy Street. 

But, now it is all coming home to roost. Nations, needing more debts in order to service their current debts, are turning into zombies. 😢

Q. If we compare the economy to a human body, have not regulators, with risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, imposed a lousy diet with way too much carbs and way too little proteins? Has that not produced dangerous obesity? 😡

How do you regulate a regulator’s algorithm?

Sir, I refer to your opinion “Want to regulate ‘the algorithm’? It won’t be easy” Washington Post December 3, 2021, in which you discuss the thorny issue of how to regulate social media in general and Facebook in particular.

Regulators, like the Federal Reserve, de facto also use an algorithm, the risk weighted bank capital requirements. This one determines how much capital/equity banks need to hold and, by its incentive of allowing more or less leverage of bank capital, influences how credit is allocated to the economy.

Let me list a few of too many worrisome aspects of that algorithm:

That what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to bank systems than what’s perceived as safe

That bureaucrats know better what to do with taxpayer’s credit than e.g.., entrepreneurs with theirs.

That banks should refinance much more our “safer” present than finance our children’s and grandchildren’s’ “riskier” future.

That residential mortgages should be prioritized over small business loans.

How did we get there? My briefest answer: Groupthink by deskbound members of a mutual admiration club. Anyone who has walked on main-streets would e.g., understand that the real risks are conditioned to how risks are perceived, signifying assets can become very risky by the sole fact of being perceived very safe.

John A. Shedd, in “Salt from my attic” 1928 wrote: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”. Sir, I submit that goes for banks too. Try to ask current regulators about the purpose of our banks.

PS. IBM, we need our bank regulators to be helped by your Watson.

PS. Rachel Siegel wrote on December 3 “Biden’s pledge to bring ‘new diversity’ to Federal Reserve to soon be tested” I just hope the true meaning of diversity is really understood.

J’Accuse[d] the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) a thousands times, but I am no Émile Zola and there’s no L’Aurore

J’Accuse the Basel Committee of setting up our bank systems to especially large crises, caused by especially large exposures to something perceived as especially safe, which later turns into being especially risky, while held against especially little capital.

My letter to the Financial Stability Board

J’Accuse the Basel Committee for distorting the allocation of bank credit to the real economy by favoring the sovereign and the safer present, AAA rated and residential mortgages, while discriminating against the riskier future, SMEs and entrepreneurs.

My letter to the International Monetary Fund

A question to the Fed: When in 1988 bank regulators assigned America’s public debt a 0.00% risk weight, its debt was about $2.6 trillion, now it is around $22 trillion and still has a 0.00% risk weight. When do you think it should increase to 0.01%?

Are these reasons not enough cause for impeaching the current bank regulators?

By setting higher bank capital requirements for what is already perceived as risky than against what could wrongly be perceived as safe, the regulators guarantee especially large bank crises, from especially big exposures to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital.

By the same token they guarantee more than ordinary access to credit for the “safer” present, which will cause bubbles, like in house prices, and less credit to the “riskier” future, like to entrepreneurs, which will weaken the real economy.

By the same token, giving the banks huge incentives to finance what’s safe, has expelled the rest of the economy, like pension funds and private savers into the shadow banking system, having to take on much more “risky” investments, like leveraged loans, for which they are much less prepared for than banks.

My 4 tweets on the access to bank credit war

1. Way too much discussions on whether bank capital requirements should be 4%, 8%, 15%, 20% or whatever, and way to little about the fact that different capital requirements for different assets, dangerously distorts the allocation of bank credit.

2. The risk weights in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks are de facto tariffs on the access to bank credit. Sovereigns 0%, AAA rated 20%, residential mortgages 35%, unrated citizens 100%, below BB- corporates 150%.

3. So why do all those who tear their clothes about trade protectionism, keep silence about the access to bank credit protectionism imposed by “the safe” on “the risky”, and which can have even much more serious implications for the world economy.

4. As is it guarantees especially large bank crises from especially big exposures to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital.

As is, by favoring credit to the “safer” present over the “riskier” future it guarantees stagnation.

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2019/03/my-letter-to-financial-stability-board.html

PS. It has caused houses to morph from being homes into being investment assets.

PS. More than a trade war it is actually this access to bank credit war that is most likely to bring the euro and then EU down.

PS. 0% risk weights will turn sovereign into spoiled filthy rich brats that will end up defaulting.

PS. Are these reasons not enough cause for impeaching the current bank regulators?

Many experts read, agree and rightfully praise Hans Rosling, yet don’t understand him at all.

I quote from “Factfulness”, 2018 by Hans Rosling, Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Rönnlund. 

“Fear vs. Danger. Being afraid of the Right Things:

Fear can be useful but only if it is directed at the right things. The fear instinct is a terrible guide for understanding the world. It make us give our attention to the unlikely dangers that we are most afraid of, and neglect what is actually most risky…

‘Frightening’ and ‘Dangerous’ are different things. Something frightening poses a perceived risk. Something dangerous poses a real risk. Paying too much attention to what is frightening rather than to what is dangerous--that is, paying too much attention to fear--creates a tragic drainage of energy in the wrong directions.”

But here we are, with expert bank regulators who, with their credit risk weighted capital requirements, decided that what is frightening to them, namely what is perceived risky, is more dangerous to our bank system than what is really dangerous to it, namely what is perceived as safe.

And so by imposing their fear on our banks we have:

A banking system that is doomed to especially large crises, as a result of building up especially large exposures to what is especially perceived as safe, against especially little capital.

A banking system that finances way too much the safer present and way too little the riskier future, dooming our economy to a lack of the oxygen it most needs, namely that of risk taking.

And it is seemingly impossible to make them understand their mistake 

Where would we be had they introduced their fright of what they perceive as risky a couple of hundred years before their 1988 Basel Accord?

To top it up they decreed a risk weight of 0% to the sovereign and 100% to the citizen, and with that, they guaranteed way too high exposures to what I am most scared of, namely a great overhang of public debt that will cloud the future of my grandchildren.

Basel III - sense and sensitivity”? No! Much more “senseless insensitivity”

I refer to the speech titled “Basel III - sense and sensitivity” on January 29, 2018 by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank.

“Senseless and insensitive” is how I would define it. It evidences that regulators have still no idea about what they are doing with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

Ms Lautenschläger said: With Basel III we have not thrown risk sensitivity overboard. And why would we? Risk sensitivity helps align capital requirements with actual levels of risk and supports an efficient capital allocation. It prevents arbitrage and risk shifting. And risk-sensitive rules promote sound risk management.

“Risk sensitivity helps align capital requirements with actual levels of risk and supports an efficient capital allocation” No! The ex ante perceived risk of assets is, in a not distorted market aligned to the capital by means of the size of exposure and the risk premium charged. Considering the perceived risk in the capital too, means doubling down on perceived risks; and any risk, even if perfectly perceived, if excessively considered causes the wrong actions.

“It prevents arbitrage” No! It stimulates arbitrage. Bankers have morphed from being diligent loan officers into too diligent equity minimizers. 

“It prevents risk shifting.” No! It shifts the risks from assets perceived as risky to risky excessive exposures to assets perceived as safe.

“It promote sound risk management” No! With banks that compete by offering high returns on equity, allowing some assets to have lower capital requirements than other, makes that impossible.

Ms Lautenschläger said: “for residential mortgages, the input floor increases from three basis points to five basis points. Five basis points correspond to a once-in-2,000 years default rate! Is such a floor really too conservative?”

The “once-in-2000 years default rate on residential mortgages!” could be a good estimate on risks… if there were no distortions. But, if banks are allowed to leverage more their capital with residential mortgages and therefore earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on residential mortgages then banks will, as a natural result of the incentive, invest too much and at too low risk premiums in residential mortgages… possibly pushing forward major defaults from a “once-in-2000 years default” to one "just around the corner". That is senseless! Motorcycles are riskier than cars, but what would happen if traffic regulators therefore allowed cars to speed much faster?

I guess Basel Committee regulators have never thought on how much of their lower capital requirement subsidies are reflected in higher house prices?

Then to answer: “Does this mean that Basel III is the perfect standard - the philosopher's stone of banking regulation? Ms Lautenschläger considers “What impact will the final Basel III package have on banks - and on their business models and their capital?”

Again, not a word about how all their regulations impacts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy… as if that did not matter… that is insensitivity!

Our banks are now financing too much the “safer” present and too little the “riskier” future our children and grandchildren need and deserve to be financed.

PS. In 2015 I commented another speech by Ms Lautenschläger on the issue of “trust in banks”.

Sadly the Basel Committee did not perform a Gedankenexperimente before regulating banks.

I just read about "Gedankenexperimente" in The Economist of June 10, 2017 "Quantum mechanics and relativity theory: Does one thing lead to another?" 

So, if the Basel Committee had done a Gedankenexperimente before regulating banks, then, if also applying Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, they would have understood that the better current risks are perceived and the more you want banks to go for what is now safe, the riskier the future becomes.

First, because risk taking is the oxygen of development and a better future is built at least as much upon failures than upon successes. 

Second because what would be perceived as safe in the present would then get too much access to bank credit and thereby at one point in the future become very risky.

And so the regulators would have realized that with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks, they would be setting up the bank system for the worst kind of explosion imaginable, namely huge exposures to something very safe, turning very risky, against little capital, and with a real economy that has gone soft. 

PS. July 2011 I wrote twice to the Financial Times about Basel Committee’s regulations and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle but, since I've been censored by FT, the editor was not interested. 

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2011/07/bank-regulators-should-read-up-on.html

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2011/07/arbiters-under-fire-should-be-bank.html

Regulators make banks finance “safe” basements where young can live with their parents, not the risky jobs they need.

Ever since regulators introduced credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks, these are not financing sufficiently the "riskier" future, only refinancing excessively the "safer" past and present.

For instance, the risk weight of 35% when financing “safe” houses, and of 100% when financing “risky” SMEs, results only in the building of basements where the young can live with their parents, and not in the creation of the new generation of jobs the young need.

Here's an aide memoire on the monstrous mistakes of such capital requirements.

P.S. Washington Post. December 2018: “Affordable homes or houses as investment/retirement assets?”