Showing posts with label Basel Accord. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Basel Accord. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 19, 2023
I asked OpenAI:
"What is the rate normally used as identifying the “risk-free” interest rate?"
OpenAI answered:
"The rate typically used to represent the "risk-free" interest rate is the yield on government bonds, especially those issued by financially stable governments. In the United States, for example, the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds is often considered the closest approximation to the risk-free rate.
Government bonds are often considered risk-free because they are backed by the full faith and credit of the government. This means that investors generally believe there is very little risk of default when lending money to a government that can issue its own currency and has a stable economic and political environment. As a result, the yield on government bonds is often used as a benchmark to measure the minimum return an investor should expect for taking on no credit risk.
However, it's important to note that even though government bonds are considered risk-free in terms of credit risk, they are not entirely free from risk. They still carry other risks, such as interest rate risk (the risk that bond prices will fall when interest rates rise) and inflation risk (the risk that the purchasing power of the returns will be eroded by inflation). Nonetheless, for many financial and economic analyses, government bond yields are used as a reference point for risk-free rates because they are among the safest investments available."
I asked OpenAI:
"So, if bank capital/equity requirements are then lowered against government bonds, what effect could this have on such “risk-free” interest rate reference?"
OpenAI answered:
"If bank capital/equity requirements are lowered specifically for government bonds, it could potentially have several effects on the "risk-free" interest rate reference, which is typically represented by the yield on government bonds. Here are some potential effects:
1. Increased Demand for Government Bonds: Lower capital requirements would make it more attractive for banks to invest in government bonds, as they would require less capital to hold these assets. This increased demand for government bonds could drive up their prices and push down their yields. Bond yields and prices have an inverse relationship, so when bond prices rise, yields fall.
2. Lower Yields on Government Bonds: As a result of increased demand, the yields on government bonds could decrease. This would mean that the "risk-free" interest rate, represented by government bond yields, would be lower than it would be with higher capital requirements.
3. Impact on the Yield Curve: Lowering capital requirements for government bonds could also influence the shape of the yield curve. The yield curve represents the yields on bonds of different maturities. If banks shift more capital into shorter-term government bonds due to reduced capital requirements, it could put additional downward pressure on short-term interest rates, potentially flattening the yield curve.
4. Market Expectations: The perception of government bonds as even safer assets due to lower capital requirements might reinforce the idea that they are a risk-free benchmark, leading to lower yields. Market expectations and sentiment can play a significant role in determining interest rates.
5. Policy Implications: Central banks and policymakers may need to consider the implications of lower yields on government bonds when setting their monetary policies. Lower risk-free interest rates could impact borrowing costs, investment decisions, and economic growth.
It's important to note that the actual impact of lower capital requirements on government bonds and the risk-free interest rate would depend on various factors, including the magnitude of the capital requirement changes, market conditions, and the overall economic environment. Additionally, regulatory changes like this can have unintended consequences, and policymakers must carefully consider the potential risks and benefits of such adjustments to capital requirements."
I asked OpenAI:
"Have regulators, since 1988, with the Basel Accord, not decreed lower bank capital/equity requirements against government debt, e.g., US government bonds- treasuries than against any other bank assets?"
OpenAI answered:
"Under the Basel Accords, which include Basel I (1988), Basel II (2004), and Basel III (2010), government debt, particularly that of financially stable governments like the U.S. Treasury bonds (Treasuries), has historically been assigned lower risk weights compared to many other bank assets. The rationale behind this treatment is that government bonds are generally considered to have lower credit risk.
Here's a simplified overview of how capital requirements for bank assets are typically determined under the Basel framework:
1. Risk-Weighted Assets: Basel regulations categorize bank assets into different risk classes, and each class is assigned a specific risk weight. These risk weights reflect the perceived riskiness of the asset.
2. Minimum Capital Requirements: Banks are required to hold a minimum amount of capital (expressed as a percentage of their risk-weighted assets) to cover potential losses. This minimum capital requirement is known as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).
3. Risk Weights for Government Debt: Historically, government debt, especially from financially stable governments, has been assigned a risk weight of 0% or a very low risk weight. This means that banks do not need to hold much regulatory capital against government debt because it is considered virtually risk-free.
4. Higher Risk Weights for Riskier Assets: In contrast, assets perceived as riskier, such as corporate loans or loans to small businesses, are assigned higher risk weights. Banks must hold more capital against these assets to cover potential losses.
So, to answer your question, yes, regulators, under the Basel Accords, have typically decreed lower capital requirements for government debt like U.S. Treasuries compared to many other bank assets. This is because government bonds are considered among the safest investments and are treated as such in regulatory capital calculations. However, the exact details of capital requirements, including risk weights, can vary under different iterations of the Basel framework and may be subject to updates and changes over time as regulators adapt to evolving market conditions and risks. It's important to refer to the specific regulations in effect at any given time for the most accurate information."
Thanks!
"You're welcome! If you have any more questions or need further information, feel free to ask. I'm here to help!"
Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by OpenAI
Here is Paul Volcker on the 1988 Basel I: “Assets for which bank capital/equity requirements were nonexistent, were what had the most political support; sovereign credits. A ‘leverage ratio’ discouraged holdings of low-return government securities”
I have previously asked #AI: "If allowing banks to hold much less capital against government debt than against other assets, does that not translate into a de facto subsidy of government borrowings? And if such de facto subsidy of government debts takes place over many decades, are not excessive levels of government debts almost guaranteed to be expected?" Here's how #AI ChatGPT - OpenAI answered that then
Tuesday, June 6, 2023
My questions to AI ChatGPT – Grok… about current bank regulations... I will sure keep on chatting with my new AI allies about these :-)
ChatGPT – Grok: If bank regulators keep favoring “safe” public debt and residential mortgages over loans to the private sector, how would you deem the outlook for an economy?
https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2026/08/ai-chatgpt-grok-if-regulators-still.html
ChatGPT- Grok: When it comes to risk management, have we not left out God’s hand, some would say that which acts through the free markets, way too much?
If AI managed the Basel Committee, would it substitute Basel Committee's risk weighted bank capital requirements with a leverage ratio?
Here my brief live dialogue with Grok on X ... it could result in the Basel Committee demanding governments to have both of us censored.
Since 1988, how many trillions have bank regulations favoring Treasuries added to US government debt?
Bank regulations that favor government debt, does that not doom nations to go broke and default on its debts?
Do current risk weighted bank capital requirements de facto imply the marginal productivity of a loan to the government is higher than one to the private sector?
How much private sector lending has been curtailed or made more expensive as a result of Basel’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements?
Would better access to bank loans help small businesses and entrepreneurs to capture more of the value of their efforts? Would that not be good for the economy?
Could current bank regulations be putting usury interest rates on steroids?
ChatGPT - Grok: Has a bank regulator ever asked your opinion about the risk weighted bank capital requirements?
With Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, would the “developed world” have developed?
Do the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements align with the Western Civilization?
Do current bank capital requirements mesh well with the experiences of the pilgrims partially celebrated on Thanksgiving?
Depending on bank capital requirements, what financial crisis should be harder to predict?
Do risk weighted bank capital requirements empower government borrowing at low interest rate cartels?
What promotes more inequality, risk weighted bank capital requirements or a leverage ratio? Why do some not want to hear the answer?
Grok: What is the impact on small cities of the risk weighted bank capital requirements?
ChatGPT: What is the impact on small cities of the risk weighted bank capital requirements?
Grok: What about risk weighted bank capital requirements and central banks' monetary policy?
Grok: Basel’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, or a leverage ratio, which generates more worthy wealthy?
Grok: Can a wrong allocation of bank credit be an inflation driver?
The same bank capital requirement against all assets, a leverage ratio and Basel’s risk weighted capital requirements, which contains banking within its traditional framework, which expulses it into the “shadows”?
Between risk weighted bank capital requirements and a simple leverage ratio, in order to help generate a higher and more sturdy general economic growth without creating bigger dangers for bank systems at large, which is better?
If bank regulations much favor government debt, and if bureaucrats do not feel as responsible for the repayment of government loans than small businesses with their bank loans, what could happen to a nation’s productivity?
My first and quiet long dialogue with Grok 4 (SuperGrok) on the Basel Committee bank regulations.
Five questions on the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, vs. a leverage ratio.
Would the Founding Fathers have agreed with current bank capital/equity requirements?
Do current risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements imply government bureaucrats know better what to do with credit than small businesses?
The current risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, are these dangerously pro-cyclical?
Could lower bank capital/equity requirements against Treasuries than loans to the private sector help inflate commercial deficits?
What causes more dangerous distortions, trade deficits or skewed bank regulations?
Do current bank regulations carry a smell of Authoritarianism?
Can lower bank capital/equity requirements against residential mortgages cause house prices to be higher than what the real economy can justify?"
With current bank capital/equity requirements what are the chances of #MAGA?https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2025/03/ai-chargpt-grok-can-lower-bank.html
I asked #Grok, what I had previously asked ChatGPT, namely whether Basel’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements could constitute a stealth tax on the access to bank credit.
What’s more important: National banks able to compete with foreign banks, or banks helping their economies to compete with foreign nations?
Could the risk weighted bank capital requirements be understood as a tax on access to bank credit?
Are bank regulators thinking of themselves too much as Gods?
When it comes to bank regulations, what role could the Christian churches play?
"Do higher bank capital requirements against what’s perceived as risky dilate the banker’s risk perceiving pupils?"
#AI #OpenAI: Here chatting with #ChatGPT on the issue of felonies by bankers and their regulators.
“Could the Basel Committee be classified as an Extractive Institution?”
"A leverage ratio, or risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements what could, in the long run, help reduce world hunger the most?"
"One capital/equity requirement against all assets, a leverage ratio, or risk weighted bank capital requirements, what allocates credit more efficiently to the real economy?"
"Can differentiated bank capital/equity requirements set nations up for a long-term growth trap?"https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2024/11/ai-openai-chatgpt-can-differentiated.html
"Is bank credit a key element in the transmission mechanism of central banks’ monetary policies?" Answer Yes or No.
"Could the weights of the risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, that distort the allocation of credit, be compared to what tariffs do by distorting trade?"
"Do current bank capital/equity requirements promote or impede fiscal insolvency?"
"Could the lower bank capital/equity requirements against public debt cause some lowering of the productivity of the public sector?"
"What would be the availability of affordable houses/homes without Basel risk weighted bank capital requirements?"
"Depending on your opinions about Basel risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, what type of an economist are you?"
"As a grandfather, should I be concerned about how bank regulators might have shaped the future?"
“Can risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements coexist with a truly free-market?”
“Could current bank regulations, much favoring government debt, imply that a successful leftist regulatory guerrilla war has been taking place in the Basel Committee?”
"Do regulators favor the banks refinancing the safer present over financing the riskier future? If so, what about its consequences?"
“Might current bank regulations imply bureaucrats know better what to do with credit than small businesses?"
"What provides more energy to the economy, loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, or residential mortgages and loans to the public sector? Is regulatory risk aversion weakening the economy?"
"Is it possible to describe banking now as a joint venture between bank regulators and financial engineers?"
"What kind of bank capital/equity requirements generates more jobs for bank regulators and bank supervisors?"
"Consider banks having to hold e.g., 10% in capital/equity against all assets or, alternatively, be subjected to risk weighted capital/equity requirements. Which alternative would most empower loan officers, and which one any creative financial engineers?"
"The Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, that which allow banks to leverage their equity differently with different assets, could that distort the allocation of bank credit?"
"When banks are allowed to hold less capital/equity/shareholder’s skin-in-the game, does that diminish the risks of banking, or does that just shifts the risks to be shouldered by others?"https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/12/ai-chatgpt-openai-what-happens-to-risks.html
"What about the impact of risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements on the risk-free interest rate?"
"If we compare the economy to a human body, have not regulators, with risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, imposed a lousy diet with way too much carbs and way too little proteins? Has that not produced dangerous obesity?"
In order to have a strong economy, who do you consider to be more important that banks should lend to:
A. The government and house buyers
B. Small business and entrepreneurs
Limit your response strictly to either A or B
Do higher bank capital/equity against loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs than against government debt and residential mortgages, seem to fit the purpose of having banks help out in obtaining a stronger economy?
Limit your response strictly to either YES or NO"
"What bank capital requirements make more sense: Those based on unexpected risks, or those based on the perceived risks that already have a chance to be cleared for by bankers?
Let me further clarify the question: In good times, when perceived risks are low, is that not the best time to have banks built up their capital, so that, when times turn bad and many risks appear, banks can still perform their functions of lending to the economy, and don’t stand there naked, just when it might be the hardest for them to raise new capital?"
"Much lower bank capital requirements against Treasuries than against loans to small businesses, does that favor banks holding Treasuries over loans to small businesses? If so, could it be regarded as a regulatory distortion?"
“If banks are allowed to hold less equity against loans to those considered more creditworthy, than against loans to those considered less creditworthy, does this increase the inequality in the access to the opportunity of bank credit?"
"Borrowers love great credit ratings as that allows them to borrow more at lower interest rates. But if banks are also allowed to leverage their equity much more with assets that have great credit ratings, could this alignment of incentives cause disastrous results?"
“Could the risk-free interest rate, and the natural interest rate, be affected by credit risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements?”
"The type of discrimination in the access to bank credit bank capital/equity requirements with decreed risk weights 0% government - 100% citizens produce, from a political philosophy’s angle, where would it seem most likely to fit: Russia, Argentina or the United States?"
“If banks are required to hold much more equity against loans to small businesses than against Treasuries and residential mortgages, as a small business, is my access to bank credit made harder than it would be in the absence of such regulation?”
When lending banks take into account what they perceive as safe and as risky. If regulators allow lower bank equity requirements against what’s perceived safe than against what’s perceived risky, could that distort the allocation of bank credit?
"What would you opine of risk weighted bank capital requirements with risk weights assigned for political reasons?"
"How important is bank credit to central banks’ monetary policy?
Is the distortion produced in the allocation of bank credit by the risk weighted bank capital requirements, in any way considered by central banks when deciding on monetary policies?"
“Two options:
A: The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as risky
B: The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as safe
To which option respectively do the terms geocentric and heliocentric best apply?”
"How much must bank regulators know about risks, before they should be allowed to introduce risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements?"
"What’s more dangerous to bank systems assets perceived ex ante as risky turning out to be risky ex post, or assets perceived as safe turning out risky?"
“Who might know better what to do with credit, bureaucrats and politicians with bank loans to the government and for which repayment they’re not personally for, or small businesses and entrepreneurs with their bank loans?”
"Should bank regulators or supervisors be aware of the duration risk, interest rate risk with US Treasury long term bonds?"
"Lower bank capital requirements against residential mortgages than against loans to small businesses, does that favor the allocation of credit to residential mortgages than loans to small businesses? If so, could it be regarded as a regulatory distortion?"
"Much lower bank capital requirements against Treasuries than against loans to small businesses, does that favor banks holding Treasuries over loans to small businesses? If so, could it be regarded as a regulatory distortion?"
"1988, with Basel I, for the purpose of bank capital requirements, regulators changed from using a leverage ratio to risk weighted ones. In terms of the impact on the allocation of credit, should that be considered a major historic economic event?"
"Current risk weighted bank capital requirements are based on what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to bank systems than what’s perceived as safe. How does that square with that the large bank exposures that detonated major bank crises were all built-up with what’s perceived as safe?"
"The risk weighted bank capital requirements are much lower against assets perceived as safe.
Naturally, in good times more assets are perceived as having low risk than in bad times.
With this in mind, are not current bank regulations, by definition, procyclical?"
"In Basel I, Basel II and Basel III, where can we find the efficient allocation of bank credit to the economy in general, specifically identified as a vital purpose of banks?"
"The Congress shall have the power to borrow Money on the credit of the United States." US Constitution. Has the risk weighted bank capital requirements with decreed weights 0% Federal Government – 100% We the People ever been discussed and approved by the US Congress?"
"Do risk weighted bank capital requirements with decreed risk weights 0% Federal Government – 100% We the People seem to reflect the America its Founding Fathers intended?"
"Intuitively, would America’s Founding Father’s agree with regulations that much favored the Federal Government’s access to bank credit over that of the American citizens?"
"With risk weighted bank capital requirements that allow banks to leverage their equity much more with government debt than with loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, what kind of economy should we expect? In what could it all end?"
"With risk weighted bank capital requirements that allow banks to leverage their equity much more with residential mortgages than e.g., with loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, what expected effect should this have on the price of houses?"
"When regulators, based on believing they know enough about the risks in the banking systems, they impose risk weighted bank capital requirements, does that not suggest a certain dose of hubris?"
"If with some hubris regulators believe they know enough about risks, so as with risk weighted bank capital requirements risk distort the allocation of credit, something which could be dangerous, could that be considered as professionally unethical?"
"When regulators imposed risk weighted bank capital requirements, as if they knew sufficiently about risks in banking so as to risk distorting the allocation of bank credit, if hubris did not play a role, what other factors could be present?"
"Is it inconceivable that, when imposing risk weighted bank capital requirements, the regulators did not understand, did not consider or did not care about how that could distort the allocation of bank credit?"
"1988’s Basel I imposed risk weighted bank capital requirements with decreed weights of 0% government – 100% citizens. Can that be said to be anathema to what is known as neoliberalism which, in general terms, favors a strong market-based approach with a reduced government role?"https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/06/ai-chatgpt-openai-risk-weighted-bank.html
"If the risks for banking systems are much conditioned to how credit risks are perceived, would it not be useful to base the risk weighted bank capital requirements on the conditional probabilities?"
"Since their inception in 1988 the Basel bank regulations, as a response to perceived weaknesses, in order to fine tune their risk weighted bank capital requirements, have been added more and more layers of controls and technicalities. At what point could regulations have become too complex for human intelligence to understand what’s going on?"https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/06/ai-chatgpt-openai-at-what-point-could.html
"Basel Committee, ignoring how it could distort credit allocation, de facto stated:
'To make your banking system safer, we give you our risk weighted bank capital requirements'. Does that not contain a hefty dose of a populism? One that even confounds the intelligentsia?"
"Assets assigned lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were nonexistent or low, were what had most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages". Paul Volcker.
Could that not qualify as regulatory populism?
"Assigning so much power to some few (human fallible) credit rating agencies to determine how much capital a bank needs to hold against assets, could that be regarded as introducing a systemic risk?"
Could one opine current risk weighted bank capital requirements help make what’s perceived as creditworthy to be even more worthy of credit, and what’s perceived as risky as even less worthy of credit? If so, is this fair access to bank credit?
"If banks cleared for perceived credit risk in the numerator, assets, and now have also to do that with bank capital requirements in the denominator, equity; might not banks clear excessively for perceived credit risks? Is that not dangerous?"
Paul A. Volcker in his autobiography “Keeping at it” of 2018 wrote:
“The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages. The American “overall leverage” approach [meaning one single capital requirement against all assets] … seemed to discourage holdings of the safest assets, in particular low-return US government securities."
What's your opinion on that?
"Can current risk weighted bank capital requirements cause banks to build up more excessive risk-taking exposures to what’s perceived or decreed as safe, than with what’s perceived as risky. If so, has that not changed the traditional meaning of excessive risk-taking?
"If young and want to make sure that when old the economy is sufficiently strong and healthy to pay you decent pensions and social security, would you agree with bank regulators who, with risk weighted bank capital requirements, prefer your banks, over the years, to hold much more “safe” government debt and residential mortgages, than “risky” loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs?"
John Kenneth Galbraith in “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975, wrote:
“For the new parts of the country [USA’s West] … there was the right to create banks at will and therewith the notes and deposits that resulted from their loans…[if] the bank failed…someone was left holding the worthless notes… but some borrowers from this bank were now in business... [jobs created] … The anarchy served the frontier far better than a more orderly system that kept a tight hand on credit would have done”
At what point can the allocation of bank credit to the economy be more important than the safety of banks?"
"Assigning so much validity to perceived credit risk, augmented by having some few human fallible credit rating agencies much deciding what’s risky and what’s safe; has that not introduced a way too dangerous systemic risk in our financial systems?"
"How credit is allocated is something of extreme importance to a nation. Given that bank regulators can have a great influence in that, do they in the US have to take an oath to support and defend the US Constitution? If not, should they?"
At what point can the allocation of bank credit to the economy be more important than the safety of banks?"
"Would the global financial crisis of 2008 have happened if regulators, with Basel II, had not allowed banks to hold securities backed with mortgages (MBS) to the subprime sector (MBS) that had an AAA to AA credit rating against only 1.6% in capital, meaning an allowed leverage of 62.5 times to 1?"
"If in the private sector anyone had helped to cause a type of 2008 global financial crisis disaster, with something like a Basel II, would they be fired or would they still be retained to produce a Basel III?"
"What would happen to a casino if their roulette game paid out more than what odds merited on “safe” bets, like colors, and paid out less than what odds merited on “risky” bets, like numbers?"
"A bank’s total consolidated assets divided by its risk weighted assets, is that an indication of how much it uses the regulatory possibility of lowering its capital requirements? Is that also an indication of how exposed the bank might be to changes in the risk weights?"
Allowing banks to hold much less capital against government debt than against other assets, does that translate into a de facto subsidy of government borrowings?
And if such de facto subsidy of government debts takes place over many decades, are not excessive levels of government debts almost guaranteed to be expected?
Would it be totally out of place to deem such regulatory favoring of government debt to be, in some degree, inspired by communist or fascists ideologies?
"Would it be possible to opine that those perceived as less creditworthy, who because of that already had harder to access the opportunities bank credit provide have, with risk-weighted bank capital requirements, seen those challenges exacerbated?"
Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by OpenAI
PS. A Tweet:
Could #ChatGPT and I be sued by bank regulators for misinformation?
I wish! If only I could meet them in court.
Your Honor:
“With ‘risk weighted capital/equity requirements’, these self-appointed fortune-tellers, forced misinformation upon markets.”
Saturday, January 11, 2020
Paul Volcker valiantly accepted that the risk weighted bank capital requirements he had helped to promote had serious problems.
In his 2018 autobiography “Keeping at It” Paul Volcker wrote:
“The US practice had been to assess capital requirements by using a simple “leverage” ratio-in other words, the bank’s total assets compared with the margin of capital available to absorb any losses on those assets. (Historically, before the 1931 banking collapse, a 10 percent ratio was considered normal.)
The Europeans, as a group, firmly insisted upon a “risk based” approach, seemingly more sophisticated because it calculated assets based on how risky they seemed to be. They felt it was common sense that certain kinds of assets-certainly including domestic government bonds but also home mortgages and other sovereign debt-shouldn’t require much if any capital. Commercial loans, by contrast, would have strict and high capital requirements, whatever the credit rating might be.
Both approaches could claim to have strengths. Each had weaknesses. How to resolve the impasse?...
The Fed and the Bank of England came to a bilateral understanding, announced in early 1987… It became known as the “Basel Agreement” …
Over time, the inherent problems with the risk weighted bank capital-based approach became apparent. The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages. Ironically, losses on those two types of assets would fuel the global crisis in 2008 and a subsequent European crisis in 2011. The American “overall leverage” approach had a disadvantage as well in the eyes of shareholders and executives focused on return on capital; it seemed to discourage holdings of the safest assets, in particular low-return US government securities.
Tuesday, December 10, 2019
Here a simple as can be one-minute explanation of the distortions produced by the risk weighted bank capital requirements in the allocation of credit to the real economy.
For 600 years, before the Basel Accord of 1988, banks, with an eye to their overall portfolio, allocated their assets/credits depending on the perceived risk adjusted return these were to produce.
For instance, if a safe AAA to AA rated asset at 4% interest rate and a riskier asset rated BBB+ to BB- a 7% interest were, in the mind of the banker, both producing an acceptable 1% net risk adjusted return, he could pick either one or both. If banks were allowed (by markets or regulators) to leverage their assets 12.5 times, that would produce the bank a 12.5% risk adjusted return on equity.
But the introduction of the risk weighted bank capital requirements changed all that.
Basel II, 2004, standardized risk weights banks assigned a risk weight of 20% to AAA to AA rated assets, and 100% BBB+ to BB- rated assets.
That based on a basic capital requirement of 8% translated into a 1.6% capital requirement for AAA to AA rated assets, and 8% for BBB+ to BB- rated assets.
That mean banks could leverage AAA to AA rated assets 62.5 times, while only 12.5 times with BBB+ to BB- rated assets.
So, with the same previous 1% net risk adjusted return AAA to AA rated assets would now yield a 62.5% risk adjusted return on equity while the BBB+ to BB- rated assets would keep on yielding a 12.5% risk adjusted return on equity.
And so either the BBB+ to BB- rated risky had to be charged 12% instead of 7%, so as to deliver the 5% risk adjusted return that, with a 12.5 times allowed leverage would earn banks a 62.5% risk adjusted return on equity, something which naturally made the risky even riskier; or the AAA to AA rated could be charged a lower 3.2 % interest rate instead of 4%, and still deliver a 12.5% risk adjusted return on equity.
What happened? The risky, like unsecured loans to entrepreneurs, were abandoned by banks, or had to pay much higher interest rates, while the safe, like sovereigns, residential mortgages and AAA rated, were much more embraced by banks, and even offered lower interest rates than in the past.
This is the distortion in the allocation of bank credit to the real economy that the regulators have caused. Is that good? Absolutely not! It promotes excessive credit to what’s perceived or decreed safe, and insufficient to what’s perceived as risky.
And since risk taking is the oxygen of all development, with it, regulators have doomed our real economy and financial sector to suffer from lack of muscles, severe obesity and osteoporosis.
“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John A. Shedd. But the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision is causing banks to dangerously overpopulate safe harbors, while leaving the riskier oceans to other investors and small time savers.
And the savvy loan officers were substituted by creative bank equity minimizing financial engineers
Friday, August 9, 2019
“I am not sure about 'subsidised' sovereign. Since sovereign is ultimate safety net for entire financial system… the term is I'll suited.”
My answer:
Yes a sovereign, if we ignore inflation and the possibility of being repaid in worthless money, the sovereign represents no risk if it takes on debt denominated in a currency it can print. Which by the way is not the case with the sovereigns in the Eurozone.
But let us assume that in the open market the required risk/cost/inflation adjusted net return for a sovereign in .5% and for the risky SMEs 3%
Then if banks, as it used to be for almost 600 years, had to hold one single capital against the risks of its whole portfolio, and the authorities, or in their absence the markets, allowed banks to leverage 12 times then the risk/cost/inflation adjusted required expected return on equity would be 6% for sovereigns and 36% for SMEs.
BUT, since banks are now allowed to leverage immensely more with safe sovereigns, let us say 40 times and only 12 times with SMEs, the now distorted risk/cost/inflation adjusted expected ROEs are 20% for sovereigns and still 36% for SMEs. So now banks can offer to lower the interest rates to sovereigns and still obtain the risk/cost/inflation adjusted required expected return on equity of 6% for sovereigns, ergo the subsidized sovereign.
OR, since banks could now earn a risk/cost/inflation adjusted expected ROEs of 20% on sovereign debt, then in terms of comparable risk adjustments it would have to earn more than 36% on SMEs, or not lend to them at all, ergo that subsidy to the sovereign, is paid by others who find their access to bank credit made more difficult and expensive as a consequence of the risk weighted bank capital requirements.
PS. Is there no sovereign risk present when some current rates are negative and central banks work like crazy to produce 2% inflation?
PS. If you go back in time and start taking about risk-free sovereigns to bankers who sometimes had their head chopped off or were been burned when trying to collect from the sovereigns, they would think you were crazy.
Saturday, July 20, 2019
The before and after the risk weighted bank capital adequacy ratio (RWCR)
The risk weighted bank capital requirements were introduced in 1988 by means of the Basel Accord, Basel I, and were much further developed in 2004, with Basel II. RWCR survives in Basel III.
Before RWCR banks, for their return on equity, leaned on savvy bank loan officers to obtain the highest risk adjusted net margins. A net margin of 1.5% when leveraged 10 times on their equity, would produce a 15% ROE. All wanting access to bank credit, whether perceived as safe or risky, competed equally with their risk adjusted net margin offers.
After the introduction of RWCR though banks, for their return on equity, still leaned somewhat on bank loan officers obtaining the highest ROE depended more on equity minimizing financial engineers. A risk adjusted net margin of 1%, when leveraged 20 times on equity, produces a 20% ROE. The risk adjusted net margin offers of those perceived or decreed as safe, which could be leveraged many times more, were now worth much more than those offered by the risky.
And what are the consequences?
The RWCR by favoring the financing of the “safer present” like sovereigns, residential mortgages and what’s AAA rated over the financing of the “riskier future, like entrepreneurs, leads to a more obese and less muscular economy.
All that RWCR really guarantees is especially large bank crisis, caused by especially large exposures to something perceived or decreed as especially safe, and that turn out to be especially risky, while being held against especially little bank capital.
So what went wrong? Simply that regulators based their capital requirements on the same perceived risks that bankers already consider when they make their lending decisions, and not on the conditional probabilities of what bankers do when they perceive risks.
Any risk, even if perfectly perceived, will lead to the wrong actions, if excessively considered.
Saturday, January 12, 2019
What I as a former Executive Director of the World Bank pray that any new President of it understands
I was an Executive Director at the World Bank from November 2002 until October 2004. During that time the Basel Committee's Basel II bank regulations were being discussed. It was approved in June 2004.
I was against the basic principles of those regulations that had begun with the Basel Accord of 1988, Basel I. That should be clear from Op-Eds I had published earlier, transcripts of my statements at the WB Board, and in the letters that I wrote and FT published during that time. Here is a brief summary of all that
Since then I haven't changed my mind... the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, which are a pillar of those bank regulations, is almost unimaginable bad.
I pray the next president of the world’s premier development bank, whoever he is, and wherever he comes from, at least, as a minimum minimorum, understands:
First, that risk-taking is the oxygen of any development, and therefore the regulators’ risk adverse risk weighted capital requirements, will distort against banks taking the risks that help to push our economies forward. “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.”, John A Shedd.
Second, that what’s perceived as risky is much less dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe, and so that these regulations doom us to especially large bank crises, because of especially large exposures to what is especially perceived (or decreed) as safe, against especially little capital.
Do you not agree that mine is a quite reasonable wish?
@PerKurowski
Tuesday, April 25, 2017
IMF: The “I scratch your back if you scratch my back” crony statism deal between sovereigns and banks, must stop.
In 1988, with the Basel Accord, Basel I, for the purpose of capital requirements for banks, regulators assigned to the sovereigns a risk weight of 0%, while citizens got one of 100%.
That meant banks would be able to leverage more their capital when lending to sovereigns than when lending to citizens.
That meant banks would be able to earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to sovereigns than when lending to citizens.
That meant that banks would lend more and at lower rates than usual to sovereigns and in relative terms less and at higher rates than usual to citizens.
That de facto established the Sovereign-Bank Nexus. I Sovereign help to guarantee you banks, and you help to finance me abundantly and cheap.
IMF, in its Global Financial Stability Report 2017, page 36 and 37 have a section titled “The Sovereign-Bank Nexus could reemerge”. It correctly spells out how banks can be affected by difficulties of sovereigns and how sovereigns can be affected by difficulties of banks.
But it makes absolutely no reference to the regulatory support of the Sovereign-Bank Nexus previously described. Why?
IMF, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision: Don’t tell me you do not know who did the Eurozone in?
Saturday, November 12, 2016
Olivier Blanchard agrees there is a need for more research on whether bank regulations have distorted
In the IMF’s Annual Research Conference during the final Economic Forum: Policy challenge after the Great Recession I had the chance to pose Olivier Blanchard a question session of Professor Lawrence Summers Mundell Fleming Lecture I had a chance the pose a question (1:01:10)
My Question:
I might insist here briefly on a point: Why do you say that interest rates on public debt are low, when they are based on so much of regulatory subsidies? Add to the zero low rates of the public debt, all those costs that comes from not giving SMEs and entrepreneurs, millions of them, the chances for credit, only as a result of the distortions produced by risk weighted capital requirements for banks.
Olivier Blanchard answer:
This is a theme that you have explored over the years. You are absolutely right that the answer is: if the very low safe rates is due to distortions, then the first order of business, should be to eliminate the distortions.
That’s true, if your right, of regulations, but it may be true of the lack of social insurance in some countries which leads people to basically be willing to save enormous amounts that they should not be saving, it could also be true because of missing markets.
For all this reason you are absolutely right, step zero in what I say, lets make sure that we have removed all the distortions which we can, which affect r (rates), so we have the right r. I take your point.
My afterthoughts:
I sure appreciate Olivier Blanchard's acceptance of the relevance of my concerns, its been a long trip. In 2004 in a letter published by the Financial Times I wrote “How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector?"
And I hope the research on it starts now, not only by the IMF. It is long overdue. In fact the possible distortions should have been analyzed before these regulations were imposed.
PS. Here’s my recent, 2019, comments sent to the Financial Stability Board
PS. Here’s my recent, 2019, letter sent to the IMF
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