#AI ChatGPT: Allowing lower bank equity requirements against what’s perceived safe than against what’s perceived risky, could that distort the allocation of bank credit?

I asked ChatGPT:

"When lending banks take into account what they perceive as safe and as risky. If regulators allow lower bank equity requirements against what’s perceived safe than against what’s perceived risky, could that distort the allocation of bank credit?"

ChatGPT answered:

"Yes, if regulators allow lower bank equity requirements against what is perceived as safe than against what is perceived as risky, it could distort the allocation of bank credit. Banks have an incentive to allocate more credit to what is perceived as safe, even if it is not the most economically productive use of that credit, in order to take advantage of the lower equity requirements.

This could lead to a misallocation of credit, as potentially more productive or riskier investments may not receive the necessary funding. Moreover, it could lead to an overconcentration of credit in certain areas, which could create systemic risks in the banking system.

To mitigate these risks, bank regulators should ensure that equity requirements are appropriately set based on the risk of the underlying assets. This would help ensure that banks allocate credit based on economic merit rather than regulatory arbitrage, which is essential for a healthy and stable banking system."

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT

PS. I’ve been arguing for decades against bank regulations based on that what’s perceived as risky being more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe. For instance, 2012, Financial Time’s chief economics commentator Martin Wolf gave a testimony to that effect.

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations

More asking and chatting with ChatGPT OpenAI: Risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements

Note: This is a continuation from previous chats on this topic with ChatGPT OpenAI

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/04/chatgpt-openai-should-bank.html
https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/04/chatgpt-openai-who-might-know-better.html
https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2023/04/asking-and-chatting-with-chatgpt-openai.html

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT

Those large exposures that can become dangerous to our bank systems are built-up with assets perceived as risky or with assets perceived as safe?

Large exposures that can become dangerous to bank systems can be built-up with either risky assets or safe assets, depending on the circumstances.

If a bank has a large exposure to risky assets such as high-yield bonds or subprime mortgages, then a sudden drop in the value of these assets can lead to significant losses for the bank. This can be especially dangerous if the bank is highly leveraged, meaning it has borrowed a lot of money to invest in these assets.

On the other hand, large exposures to safe assets such as government bonds or highly rated corporate bonds may not seem risky on the surface. However, if a bank has a significant amount of its assets invested in these types of securities and there is a sudden rise in interest rates, the value of these bonds may fall, causing losses for the bank. In addition, if many banks are invested in the same types of safe assets, a sudden market shift could lead to widespread losses across the banking system.

In either case, it's important for banks to manage their exposures carefully and have robust risk management practices in place to identify and mitigate potential risks.

What’s more dangerous to bank systems assets perceived ex ante as risky turning out to be risky ex post, or assets perceived as safe turning out risky?

Both types of assets can be dangerous to bank systems, but assets that are perceived as safe but turn out to be risky ex post can be particularly dangerous.

When a bank invests in assets perceived as risky, it is aware of the potential risks and should be taking steps to manage and mitigate those risks. However, when a bank invests in assets perceived as safe but turns out to be risky ex post, it may not have taken sufficient precautions to manage those risks, and the losses can be unexpected and severe.

For example, during the 2008 financial crisis, many banks had invested in mortgage-backed securities that were perceived as safe because they were rated AAA by credit rating agencies. However, when the underlying mortgages began to default at higher rates than expected, the value of these securities plummeted, causing significant losses for banks that held them.

In contrast, when a bank invests in assets perceived as risky and they turn out to be risky ex post, the bank may have already factored in potential losses and taken steps to manage the risks. Of course, it is still important for banks to carefully manage their exposure to risky assets and have strong risk management practices in place to minimize potential losses.

How much must bank regulators know about risks, before they should be allowed to introduce risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements? 

Bank regulators should have a thorough understanding of the risks that banks face before introducing risk-weighted bank capital/equity requirements. This includes understanding the nature of different types of risks, such as credit risk, market risk, operational risk, and liquidity risk, as well as the ways in which these risks can interact with each other.

Regulators should also have a good understanding of how banks manage and mitigate these risks, and the potential unintended consequences of introducing risk-weighted capital requirements. For example, if capital requirements are too high, it could discourage banks from lending to small and medium-sized enterprises or investing in certain types of assets, which could have a negative impact on the economy.

In addition, regulators should have a strong understanding of the financial system as a whole and the potential systemic risks that could arise from the failure of a large bank or a significant disruption in financial markets.

Therefore, it is important for regulators to have a strong expertise in finance and risk management, as well as access to high-quality data and analysis, before introducing risk-weighted bank capital/equity requirements. This can help ensure that the regulations are effective in promoting financial stability while also minimizing unintended consequences.

Comment: As a minimum minimorum they should not have missed the lectures on conditional probabilities.

What would you opine of risk weighted bank capital requirements with risk weights assigned for political reasons?

Introducing risk-weighted bank capital requirements with risk weights assigned for political reasons would be inappropriate and potentially dangerous.

Risk-weighted capital requirements are intended to be based on objective assessments of the riskiness of different types of assets, such as loans or investments. These assessments should be based on factors such as the creditworthiness of the borrower, the type of collateral, and the potential for default.

Assigning risk weights for political reasons, such as to promote certain types of lending or investment, would undermine the integrity and effectiveness of the regulatory framework. It could lead to distortions in the allocation of credit and investment, and increase the likelihood of losses for banks and ultimately taxpayers.

In addition, assigning risk weights for political reasons could erode confidence in the regulatory framework and lead to a loss of trust in the financial system as a whole. This could have serious consequences for financial stability and economic growth.

Therefore, regulators should base risk-weighted capital requirements on objective assessments of risk, rather than political considerations. This can help ensure that the regulations are effective in promoting financial stability and minimizing risks to the banking system.

Comment: “Assets assigned lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were nonexistent or low, what had most political support: sovereign credits & home mortgages. A ‘leverage ratio’ discouraged holdings of low-return government securities” Paul Volcker

Based on the immense knowledge about risks that is presumed by those introducing risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements, where would you place such regulatory concept, before or after the Scientific Revolution? 

As an AI language model, I do not hold personal opinions or beliefs. However, I can provide you with some historical context regarding the regulatory concept of risk-weighted bank capital requirements.

The idea of risk-weighted bank capital requirements is a relatively modern regulatory concept that emerged in the late 20th century as a response to financial crises and increased globalization of financial markets. The concept involves assigning different risk weights to various types of assets held by banks, with the aim of ensuring that banks hold sufficient capital to absorb potential losses.

Therefore, based on this historical context, it is clear that the concept of risk-weighted bank capital requirements emerged after the Scientific Revolution. The Scientific Revolution took place in Europe from the 16th to the 18th century and was characterized by the emergence of new scientific methods and the development of new technologies. This period marked a significant turning point in human history and had far-reaching impacts on the world of finance and economics. However, the concept of risk-weighted bank capital requirements is a relatively modern development that emerged long after the Scientific Revolution.

Comment: I do hold an opinion. The risk weighted bank capital requirements have nothing to do with science and all to do with hubris. Sadly Basel Committee's fortune tellers were/are not questioned sufficiently 

Two options:

A: The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as risky

B: The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as safe

To which option respectively do the terms geocentric and heliocentric best apply?

Option A: "The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as risky" can be compared to the geocentric model of the universe. In the geocentric model, the Earth was believed to be the center of the universe, and all other celestial bodies revolved around it. This model was widely accepted for centuries, despite evidence to the contrary, because it aligned with people's perceptions and beliefs. Similarly, in the banking system, if risk is perceived in a certain way, it may be accepted and even encouraged despite evidence to the contrary.

Option B: "The most dangerous risks to banking system revolve around what’s perceived as safe" can be compared to the heliocentric model of the universe. In the heliocentric model, the Sun was believed to be the center of the solar system, and all planets, including Earth, revolved around it. This model challenged the geocentric model and required a significant shift in thinking and understanding. Similarly, in the banking system, if risk is perceived as safe, it may lead to complacency and a failure to recognize potential risks, leading to dangerous consequences.

Comment: What more than my 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board No wonder they never answered me.

Tombstones

Here rests a bank regulator who all his life believed that what bankers perceived as risky was more dangerous to our bank systems than what bankers perceived as safe. 

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who based the risk weighted bank capital requirements on bankers perceiving risk correctly, and not on that they could be wrong.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a regulator who missed his lectures on conditional probabilities, and therefore did not set the risk weighted capital requirements conditioned on how bankers respond to perceived credit risks.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a regulator who even though bankers respond to perceived credit risks, with size of exposures and risk adjusted interest rates, also wanted bank capital to double up on that same perceived risk

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who never understood the systemic risks he introduced into banking, by for instance assigning so much power to credit rating agencies, or his stress-testings on the stresses a la mode.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who never understood his own risk aversion and confirmation bias stress, before stress testing banks on the possibility of his own regulations being wrong.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who for the risk weighted bank capital requirements agreed with risk weights of 20% for dangerous AAA rated and 150% for innocous below BB- rated

May his soul rest in peace.

“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John A. Shedd.

Here rests a bank regulator who caused banks to dangerously overpopulate safe harbors, and sent other investors and small time savers out on the risky oceans. 

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who by much favoring banks to finance the "safer" present over the "riskier" future, blocked millions of SMEs' and entrepreneurs' access to bank credit and with it to risk-taking… the oxygen of all development

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a statist bank regulator who believed a government bureaucrat knows better (Risk Weight 0%) what to do with credit he’s not personally responsible for, than an entrepreneur or SME (RW 100%)

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator who for risk weighted bank capital requirements agreed with a low 35% risk weight to residential mortgages, which caused houses to morph from affordable homes to risky investment assets.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a bank regulator with a Ph.D. who proved right Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who supposedly held “There are some mistakes only Ph.Ds. can make.

May his soul rest in peace.

Here lies a central banker who injected huge amounts of liquidity without understanding how risk weighted bank capital requirements distorted the allocation of credit

May his soul rest in peace.

Here lies a financial journalist who scared stiff he would never be invited to WEF in Davos, never questioned the risk weighted bank capital requirements. 

May his soul rest in peace.

Here lies an ordinary citizen who wanting so much to believe it true, swallowed lock stock and barrel the regulatory technocrats' populism imbedded in the risk weighted bank capital requirements

May his soul rest in peace.

Here rests a regulator who helped guarantee especially large bank crises, caused by especially large exposures to what’s perceived especially safe and might not be, and is held against especially little capital

May his soul rest...

Here rests a regulator who assisted by his central bank colleagues, helped set horrible Minsky moments on steroids
May his soul rest...

PS. A summary of The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision's mistakes

My letter to the Financial Stability Board was received.

Note: When reading this remember that “bank capital requirements” de facto translates into bank equity / bank shareholders’ skin in the game, requirements.

.

http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Per-Kurowski.pdf

From: Per Kurowski

Sent: 18 March 2019 19:16

To: Financial Stability Board (FSB)

Subject: SME financing evaluation

I have not found sufficient strength to sit down and formally write up my comments, because I feel I would just be like a heliocentric Galileo writing to a geocentric Inquisition.

The Basel Committee’s standardized risk weights are based on the presumption that what is ex ante perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system.

And I hold a totally contrarian opinion. I believe that what is perceived a safe when placed on banks balance sheets to be much more dangerous to our bank system ex post than what is perceived ex ante as risky; and this especially so if those “safe” assets go hand in hand with lower capital requirements, meaning higher leverages, meaning higher risk adjusted returns on equity for what is perceived safe than for what is perceived as risky.

The following Basel II risk weights are signs of total lunacy or an absolute lack of understanding of the concept of conditional probabilities.

AAA to AA rated = 20%; allowed leverage 62.5 times to 1. Below BB- rated = 150%; allowed leverage 8.3 times to 1

The distortion the risk weighting creates in the allocation of credit to the real economy is mindboggling. Just consider the following tail risks.

The best, that which perceived as very risky turning out to be very safe. The worst, that which perceived as very safe turning out to be very risky.

And so the risk weighted capital requirements kills the best and puts the worst on steroids... dooming us to suffer an weakened economy as well as an especially severe bank crisis, resulting from especially large exposures, to what was especially perceived as safe, against especially little capital.

In relative terms all that results in much more and less (see note) expensive credit to for instance sovereigns and the purchase of houses, and less and more expensive credit to SMEs

I am neither a banker nor a regulator but I do believe that the following post helps to give some credibility to my opinions on the issue. And, as a grandfather, I am certainly a stakeholder.

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2004/11/some-of-my-early-public-opinions- on.html

And here is a more detailed list of my objections to the risk weighting

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

Now if by any chance you would dare open your eyes to the mistakes of your risk weighted bank capital requirements and want more details from me, you know where to find me.

Sincerely

Per Kurowski

A former Executive Director of the World Bank (2002-2004) 

@PerKurowski

Note: In the original letter I erroneously wrote "more and more expensive credit to sovereigns" and not "cheaper and cheaper", but this should be easily understood as a mistake.

PS. FSB keeps avoiding the issue: June 7, 2019 FSB published a Consultative Document: “Evaluation of the effects of financial regulatory reforms on small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing” I quote two parts of it.

1. “For the reforms that are within the scope of this evaluation, post-crisis financial regulatory reforms, the analysis, does not identify negative effects on SME financing in general.” 

Comment: The scope of the analysis does explicitly not include pre-crisis financial regulatory reform, like Basel II. When compared to what was introduced in Basel II, the changes in Basel III produced not really that much “more stringent risk-based capital requirements”. Therefore to limit the analysis to the impact of Basel III changes to risk-based capital requirements, is basically to avoid the issue of how these have, especially since Basel II, profoundly distorted the allocation of credit, and negatively affected the financing of SMEs.

2. “There is some evidence that the more stringent risk-based capital requirements under Basel III slowed the pace and in some jurisdictions tightened the conditions of SME lending at those banks that were least capitalised ex ante relative to other banks.”

Comment: That the Basel III risk-based changes, which in my opinion are minor relative to their importance, “tightened the conditions of SME lending at those banks that were least capitalized ex ante relative to other banks” is something to be expected. But there, close to when hitting the roof, on the margin, is where the risk weighting most impacts; think of “The drowning pool”

PS. My 2019 letter to the IMF: "The risk weights in the risk weighted bank capital requirements are to access to credit, what tariffs are to trade, only more pernicious.

PS. From what I see my comments were totally ignored

PS. And the Academia has kept total silence on it.

PS. Now, April 2023, in #AI ChatGPT – Grok, I have at long last found an ally in my fight against the geocentric bank regulation Inquisition.

Nothing could be so dangerous as big data wrongly interpreted and manipulated

Regulators gathered data on credit risks and developed their risk weighted capital requirements for banks… more risk, more capital – less risk less capital.

But the data they were looking at was the ex-ante perceived credit risks, and not the ex-post possible risks after the ex-ante risks had been cleared for.

And therefore they never realized that what is most dangerous for the banking system is what is perceived very safe and could therefore create large exposures; while what is perceived as very risky is by that fact alone, made innocuous for the banking system

And as a consequence we have already suffered a big crisis because of excessive exposures to AAA rated securities backed with mortgages to the subprime sector; and millions of those risky young dreaming of an opportunity of a bank credit to prosper, have had to give up their dreams or pay higher interest rates that made them even riskier. 

So friends, always prefer well interpreted and well manipulated small data over mishandled big data.

Why are excessive bank exposures to what’s perceived safe considered as excessive risk-taking when disaster strikes?

In terms of risk perceptions there are four basic possible outcomes:

1. What was perceived as safe and that turned out safe.

2. What was perceived as safe but that turned out risky. 

3. What was perceived as risky and that turned out risky.

4. What was perceived as risky but that turned out safe.

Of these outcomes only number 2 is truly dangerous for the bank systems, as it is only with assets perceived as safe that banks in general build up those large exposures that could spell disaster if they turn out to be risky.

So any sensible bank regulator should care more about what the banks ex ante perceive as safe than with what they perceive as risky.

That they did not! With their risk weighted capital requirements, more perceived risk more capital – less risk less capital, the regulators guaranteed that when crisis broke out bank would be standing there especially naked in terms of capital. 

One problem is that when exposures to something considered as safe turn out risky, which indicates a mistake has been made, too many have incentives to erase from everyones memory that fact of it having been perceived as safe.

Just look at the last 2007/08 crisis. Even though it was 100% the result of excessive exposures to something perceived as very safe (AAA rated MBS), or to something decreed by regulators as very safe (sovereigns, Greece) 99.99% of all explanations for that crisis put it down to excessive risk-taking.

For Europe that miss-definition of the origin of the crisis, impedes it to find the way out of it. That only opens up ample room for northern and southern Europe to blame each other instead.

The truth is that Europe could disintegrate because of bank regulators doing all they can to avoid being blamed for their mistakes.

The curious border between what finance professors can understand, and what they cannot understand

If with regulations you allow banks to leverage much more their equity, and all the support these receives from society, with assets type A than with asset type B, then banks will be able to obtain higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity with assets A than with assets B. 

That finance professors can understand.

And the above will cause the banks to exclusively hold assets A, unless assets B offers these a much higher risk adjusted return than what would have been the case in the absence of such regulations.

That finance professors can understand.

And that clearly signifies a distortion in the allocation of bank credit. 

And that finance professors can understand.

But if you just substitute “safe assets” for assets “type A”, and “risky assets”, like loans to SMEs and entrepreneurs, for assets “type B”, then suddenly finance professors no longer understand.

And that I know because no one of them is protesting the distortions in the allocation of credit produced by the risk weighted capital requirements for banks. 

Strange eh?

What behavioral theory explains that?

Real banking risks do not revolve around what is perceived “risky”, as experts think, but around the “absolutely safe”

What happened with the experts swearing by geocentrism, or the Ptolemaic system, that with the cosmos having Earth stationary at the center of the universe, when Galileo Galilei, Nicolaus Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler, convinced the world of the heliocentric model, that with the Sun at the center of the Solar System?

I ask it curious to know of what will happen with all those experts in the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board the IMF and places like the academia and the press; like for instance Mario Draghi, Stefan Ingves, Jaime Caruana, Mark Carney, Olivier Blanchard, José Viñals, Martin Wolf and so many other; when it is finally realized that the real serious risks in banking do not revolve around assets perceived as “risky”, as they all think, but around assets perceived as “absolutely safe”.

These regulators’ silly portfolio invariant credit risk based capital (meaning equity) requirements for banks, by impeding the fair access to bank credit of “the risky”, like small businesses and entrepreneurs, not only distorts and hurts the real economy; but they also guarantee major system crisis, since banks are then doomed to, sooner or later, to get caught with their pants down (meaning little equity), with huge exposures to something which was perceived as “infallible” but which has turned into something very risky… often precisely because of too much credit at too low interest rates.

Should it be "More risk more equity – less risk less equity" as these regulators argue?

No! I prefer no distortion, but, if anything, then just the opposite.

These current regulators they all confuse the world of ex-ante perceived risks with the world of ex-post realized dangers.

These regulators have never heard or understood Mark Twain’s “A banker is he who lend you the umbrella when the sun is out, and wants it back as soon as it looks like it is going to rain”

Worse than trucks being allowed high speeds, is that different speeds are allowed.

Anat Admati in “The Compelling Case for Stronger and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking” October 14, 2013, refers to “The speeding analogy” which appeared in hers and Martin Hellwig’s splendid book "The Bankers' new clothes"

“Imagine that trucks were allowed to drive faster than all other cars on the road even though they are the most dangerous. Further suppose that the trucking companies and the drivers are rewarded the faster they are able to make a delivery, benefit from subsidized insurance, and have a special safety system that protects the driver in case of accidents and explosions. The companies might produce narratives suggesting that their deliveries are essential and that the fast delivery is important for economic growth. They and others might produce models suggesting possible “tradeoffs” associated with a lower speed limit for the trucks. Whereas there probably are tradeoffs associated with trucks driving too slowly, it is clear that they are irrelevant, and there are no tradeoffs, when choosing between 90 miles per hour and 50 miles per hour for a truck carrying dangerous cargo in a residential neighborhood”

Yes, Admati is right in her analogy.

What guarantees mayhem more than a generally allowed high speed is, as I have argued for years, to allow different vehicles, based on safety ratings, to drive at different speeds (risk-weights) on the same streets. Sooner or later those safety ratings, will either be captured by interested speeders, or simply be wrong; and besides these loony traffic regulations will make it more difficult for doctors, fire trucks and other vital essentials to arrive in time.

But no, Admati is very wrong in her analogy when she mentions: “Imagine that trucks were allowed to drive faster than all other cars on the road even though they are the most dangerous.”

That is because what's perceived as “most dangerous”, the risky, the trucks, is what currently in banking must transit at the slowest speeds, the lowest allowed bank leverages; while those perceived as the safest, like sovereigns, residential mortgages and AAA rated securities, are those allowed to go through our residential neighborhoods at the highest speeds, the highest allowed leverages.

I do understand, it is hard to internalize that, at least when it comes to banking, that which is perceived as safe is so much more dangerous to the system than that which is perceived as risky. Sadly way too many missed their lectures on conditional probabilities. 

I've used a very similar though quite distinct analogy on my blog.

All this is of course why I give much more importance to eliminating the risk-weighting of the capital requirements for banks, than just increasing the basic capital required. In fact the more capital banks are asked to increase the capital means that, while that is being taken cared off, the worse will be the effective discrimination against those who, even though they in fact pose the least de facto risks for the banks, are been castigated with the highest risk weights. Remember "The drowning pool"

Two whys on bank regulations

How can I, as an ordinary citizen, obtain a decent return on my savings when investing in safe securities, having to compete with banks who can leverage their equity more that 60 to 1 when they do so?

How can I, as an ordinary small businesses or entrepreneur, get a decent interest rate on my bank loans, when banks can leverage their equity so much more when lending to those officially perceived as not-risky? 

It is so unfair! Who are these bank regulators? Who invested them with so much power?

Banking - between mirrors and piglets

Although I have never worked in the banking sector, I do remember, during the latter part of the seventies, being proud about the development of Venezuelan banks. I thoroughly enjoyed listening to anecdotes such as the fact that the most popular software application (i.e. SAFE) for the management of on-line banking operations had been developed in Venezuela. 

I was also aware of the fact that on-line banking in the country was being applied to a much greater degree than in the United States. I loved to read in the press about the participation of Venezuelan financial institutions in international loan syndications, although while doing so I pondered about the sanity of this participation and had the same ambiguous love-hate feeling as when I flew overseas with VIASA, our flagship airline. 

Finally, the fact that Venezuelan banks routinely appeared in “The Banker” magazine’s listing of largest banks, made reading this publication in London waiting rooms quite agreeable.

Twenty years later, I cannot but feel somewhat humiliated when I am asked to feel respectful and thankful that we are now to be the beneficiaries of new banking technology that in my humble opinion for the moment merely seems to imply substituting the small mirrors used by the Conquistadores to seduce the continent’s Indians with little plastic piglets.

Let me make it clear that my possible observations as a Patriot about the strategies established by financial Neo-Royalists are certainly not based on the rejection of the presence of foreign banks in general, much less of Spanish financial institutions, which due to their high profile will undoubtedly bear the brunt of humoristic expressions so proper of the Venezuelan populace. 

On the contrary, I am certain that there is an important place for foreign banks in Venezuela, although I would have liked to see an early aperture of the financial system aimed more at strengthening than at the reconstruction, in the style of the mythical Phoenix, of a system in ruins.

What motivates me is that an excessive praise heaped on the newly arrived foreign bankers, in addition to possibly causing unnecessary damage to the egos of our local bankers (that famous patriotic cry, “Vuelvan Caras”, is already audible in banking circles), clearly tends to confuse the issues and principal causes of the collapse of our financial system.

History can be written in a few words. A series of devaluations, the breach of exchange guarantee contracts, restrictions on offshore positions, obligatory preferential treatment for certain sectors of the economy, minimized participation in the financing of petroleum industry projects and surprising macroeconomic policy decisions such as the application of exorbitantly high real interest rates. 

All these factors caused a drastic decline in the quality of bank loan portfolios and an erosion of their respective net worth values to a minimum. Responsibility for all these ills lies principally with the Central Government and their main cause is again the fundamental failing of our society, i.e. the excessive concentration of national wealth in the hands of the State.

Each case must by analyzed separately but in general terms, I’m certain that should the United States, the United Kingdom and even Spain have had to suffer through similar catastrophes, the mortality rate would have been the same or higher. Likewise, I’m sure that the future productivity of Venezuelan banks will depend more on the rectification of the State’s actions than on the masterly lessons in banking we may receive from, with all due respect, the Casa Cándido strategists (Casa Cándido is a restaurant in Segovia famous for its servings of roasted piglet).

A better supervision of the banking sector by a professional Superintendency; reasonable norms that regulate the banking activities without strangling it; development of management capabilities that would insure the proper handling of banking crises without multiplying their initial cost; and responsible, professional bankers. 

All the above certainly must exist in order to head off another financial tragedy in the future, but they are certainly not enough to avoid such disasters.

As long as the size of Venezuelan State is not reduced in proportion to the private sector and the State continues to impose its omnipresent influence over all aspects of national life, the possibility of creating and environment of economic rationality is remote. Without economic rationality there is no way to avoid another financial crisis. Today’s generation of local bankers hopefully has already learned its lesson and I sincerely hope our newly arrived visitors will not have to do so as well.