Friday, June 14, 2019
I refer to IMF Policy Paper “A Strategy for IMF Engagement on Social Spending” dated June 2019.
The best strategy for IMF to engage on Social Spending is making sure the real economy, in a sustainable way, provides the most resources to it. That must at this moment begin by loudly protesting the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, something on which the IMF, sadly, has kept silence on for soon three decades.
Since 1988, with the Basel Accord, bank regulations have included, as its pillar, risk weighted capital requirements for banks. The higher the perceived credit risk is, the higher the capital banks need to hold and vice versa, the lower the perceived credit risk is, the lower the capital banks need to hold.
In Basel II of 2004 these risk weights ranged from 0% assigned to AAA to AA rated sovereigns, to 150% assigned to corporates rated below BB-. With a basic capital requirement of 8% that allowed banks to leverage their capital from, an infinite number of times till about 8.3 times.
By doing so that piece of regulation has seriously distorted the allocation of credit, putting both our bank systems at great risk and weakening the possibilities of our real economy to grow in a sustainable balanced way.
We already heard a canary clearly sing in the mine when a crisis exploded because of excessive demand for the securities backed by mortgages to the subprime sector. That demand resulted from that US investment banks and European banks, were allowed to leverage their capital with these securities a mind-boggling 62.5 times, if only a human fallible rating company had assigned it an AAA to AA rating.
And all that “safe” financing of houses, have only caused these to morph from being homes into being investment assets, at great risk of causing future financial instability.
And all those “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, who used to have their credit needs primarily serviced by banks, are now forced to fish in other less adequate waters.
And what to say about the 0% risk weighting of all eurozone sovereigns that assume debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not their domestic printable one?
A lower risk weight assigned to the sovereign than to an entrepreneur implies the opinion that a bureaucrat knows better what to do with bank credit, than the entrepreneur who puts his own name to it. If that’s not statism what is?
In summary: To favor the financing of the ‘safer present’ over the ‘riskier future’ only guarantees the weakening of the economy; and especially large bank crises, because of especially large exposures to what is especially perceived as safe, against especially little capital.
And sadly IMF has kept notorious silence on this.
Sunday, June 2, 2019
Are these reasons not enough cause for impeaching the current bank regulators?
By setting higher bank capital requirements for what is already perceived as risky than against what could wrongly be perceived as safe, the regulators guarantee especially large bank crises, from especially big exposures to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital.
By the same token they guarantee more than ordinary access to credit for the “safer” present, which will cause bubbles, like in house prices, and less credit to the “riskier” future, like to entrepreneurs, which will weaken the real economy.
By the same token, giving the banks huge incentives to finance what’s safe, has expelled the rest of the economy, like pension funds and private savers into the shadow banking system, having to take on much more “risky” investments, like leveraged loans, for which they are much less prepared for than banks.
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