A tweet to: @IMFNews, @WorldBank, @BIS_org @federalreserve, @ecb @bankofengland @riksbanken @bankofcanada
"Should you allow the Basel Committee to keep on regulating banks as it seems fit, or should you not at least listen to other proposals?
Bank capital requirements used to be set as a percentage of all assets, something which to some extent covered both EXPECTED credit risks, AND UNEXPECTED risks like major sudden downgrading of credit ratings, or a coronavirus.
BUT: Basel Committee introduced risk weighted bank capital requirements SOLELY BASED ON the EXPECTED credit risk. It also assumes that what is perceived as risky will cause larger credit losses than what regulators perceive or decreed as safe, or bankers perceive or concoct as safe.
The different capital requirements, which allows banks to leverage their equity differently with different assets, dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit, endangering our financial system and weakening the real economy.
The Basel Committee also decreed a statist 0% risk weight for sovereign debts denominated in its domestic currency, based on the notion that sovereigns can always print itself out of any problem, something which clearly ignores the possibility of inflation, but, de facto, also implies that bureaucrats/politicians know better what to do with bank credit they are not personally responsible for, than for instance entrepreneurs, something which is more than doubtful.
Basel Committee's motto: Prepare banks for the best, for what's expected, and, since we do not know anything about it, ignore the unexpected
I propose we go back to how banks were regulated before the Basel Committee, with an immense display of hubris, thought they knew all about risks; which means one single capital requirements against all assets; 10%-15%, to cover for the EXPECTED credit risk losses and for the UNEXPECTED losses resulting from wrong perceptions of credit risk, like 2008’s AAA rated securities or from any other unexpected risk, like COVID-19.