I warned many about the coming crisis, long before it happened, on many occasions and in many places, even at the World Bank. The regulators did not want to listen and that´s ok, it usually happens, but what's not ok, is that they still do not seem to want to hear it. “We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light.” (Plato: 427 BC – 347 BC)
"In about 600 words, what would be your explanation for the Global Financial Crisis 2008-09?"
OpenAI answered:
"The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 was one of the most severe financial crises in modern history, with far-reaching consequences that impacted economies worldwide. This crisis had its roots in a complex interplay of factors spanning financial markets, government policies, and individual behaviors. In this explanation, I will outline the key factors that contributed to the GFC, providing a comprehensive overview of the events leading up to and during the crisis.
1. Housing Bubble and Subprime Mortgages: The GFC was triggered by the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. In the early 2000s, there was a rapid increase in housing prices, fueled by speculative investments and easy credit. Lenders offered subprime mortgages to borrowers with poor credit history, allowing them to purchase homes they could not afford.
2. Securitization and Financial Innovation: Financial institutions bundled these risky subprime mortgages with other loans and assets, creating complex financial products known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). These securities were then sold to investors worldwide, who believed in their high credit ratings and returns.
3. Deteriorating Loan Quality: As the housing market slowed and interest rates increased, many homeowners found it difficult to repay their mortgages. Defaults on subprime loans surged, leading to a significant decline in the value of MBS and CDOs held by financial institutions.
4. Leverage and Overexposure: Financial institutions had heavily invested in MBS and CDOs, often using high levels of leverage to amplify returns. When the value of these assets plummeted, banks faced enormous losses, which eroded their capital base.
5. Collapse of Lehman Brothers: In September 2008, Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank heavily involved in subprime mortgage investments, filed for bankruptcy. This event sent shockwaves through the global financial system, eroding confidence and triggering a liquidity crisis.
6. Contagion and Credit Freeze: Fearful of potential losses, banks and financial institutions became reluctant to lend to one another. The credit markets froze, causing a severe shortage of liquidity, which further exacerbated the crisis and contributed to a severe global recession.
7. Government Responses: Governments and central banks worldwide implemented various measures to stabilize the financial system. These included bailouts of failing financial institutions, interest rate cuts, and injecting liquidity into the markets to restore confidence and encourage lending.
8. Spillover Effects: The crisis spread beyond the financial sector, affecting businesses, consumers, and workers. Unemployment rates surged, housing markets collapsed, and consumer spending declined, leading to a severe downturn in economic activity.
9. Global Impact: The interconnectedness of the global financial system meant that the GFC had widespread repercussions on economies around the world. Many countries experienced recessions, and international trade and investment suffered.
10. Regulatory Reforms: In the aftermath of the crisis, there were widespread calls for regulatory changes to prevent similar events in the future. Governments introduced measures to increase oversight of financial institutions, improve risk management practices, and enhance transparency in financial markets.
In conclusion, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 was a result of a perfect storm of factors, including the housing bubble, risky lending practices, complex financial products, and overexposure to mortgage-related assets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers acted as a catalyst, leading to a severe liquidity crisis and a broader economic downturn. Governments and central banks took unprecedented measures to stabilize the financial system, but the consequences of the crisis were felt globally for years. It served as a wake-up call for policymakers to address the vulnerabilities in the financial system and implement reforms to prevent similar crises in the future.
I asked OpenAI:
Basel II assigned a 20% risk weight for securities rated AAA to AA; and a 50% risk weight for what was rated A+ to A-
That meant US investment banks and European banks had to hold 1.6% in capital/equity against securities e.g., MBS rated AAA to AA; and 4% against what was rated A+ to A- or against securities covered by a CDO issued by a similarly rated insurance company, e.g., AIG
That meant US investment banks and European banks had to hold 1.6% in capital/equity against securities rated AAA to AA; and 4% against what was rated A+ to A-
That meant US investment banks and European banks could leverage their capital/equity 62.5 times with securities rated AAA to AA; and 25 times against what was rated A+ to A-
Even higher capital/equity leverages, according to their credit ratings, were allowed for holding sovereign debts
Question: Would the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 have happened if banks had needed to hold e.g., 8% in capital/equity against all assets?
OpenAI answered:
"The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 was a complex event with multiple contributing factors, and it is difficult to attribute the entire crisis to a single regulatory measure such as the capital/equity requirements. While higher capital/equity requirements could have had some impact on the severity of the crisis, it is unlikely that they would have entirely prevented it from occurring.
Higher capital requirements, such as an 8% capital/equity ratio against all assets, would have made banks more resilient to losses and potentially reduced the extent of risk-taking and leverage in the financial system. This, in turn, could have dampened the scale of the crisis and mitigated its impact to some extent.
However, it's important to consider that the GFC had multiple underlying causes beyond just capital requirements:
1. Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The crisis was triggered by the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble and the subsequent defaults on subprime mortgages. These defaults led to significant losses for financial institutions holding mortgage-backed securities and other related assets.
2. Complex Financial Products: The proliferation of complex financial instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, made it difficult to accurately assess the true risk exposure of financial institutions and investors.
3. Excessive Risk-Taking: Financial institutions engaged in high levels of risk-taking and leverage, which amplified the impact of the housing market downturn on their balance sheets.
4. Lack of Transparency: There was a lack of transparency in financial markets, making it challenging for investors and regulators to fully understand the risks associated with various financial products.
5. Regulatory Failures: Some regulatory agencies failed to effectively supervise and enforce regulations, allowing risky practices to go unchecked.
6. Contagion Effects: The interconnectedness of global financial markets meant that problems in one sector or region could quickly spread to others, leading to a contagion effect.
While higher capital requirements might have made banks more resilient, they would not have addressed all the underlying issues that led to the crisis. For example, even with higher capital requirements, the interconnectedness of financial institutions and the reliance on complex financial products could have still propagated risks throughout the system.
Moreover, it's important to note that post the GFC, regulatory reforms were indeed implemented to strengthen the financial system. For instance, the Basel III framework introduced stricter capital and liquidity requirements, stress testing, and enhanced risk management practices to address the vulnerabilities that contributed to the crisis.
In summary, while higher capital/equity requirements might have had a positive impact on bank stability and risk management, the GFC was a complex event with multiple factors at play. The crisis would likely have required a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to regulation, oversight, and risk management to prevent its occurrence or mitigate its severity significantly.
I asked OpenAI:
"Do you hold the proliferation of complex financial instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, which much caused the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, was not primarily driven by the financial engineering incentives provided by Basel II’s risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements?"
OpenAI answered:
The proliferation of complex financial instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), was indeed a significant contributing factor to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). These financial products were at the center of the crisis as they played a role in amplifying and spreading risks throughout the financial system. However, it's important to note that Basel II's risk-weighted bank capital/equity requirements were not the sole or primary driver behind the development and use of these complex instruments.
Basel II was a set of international banking regulations that aimed to establish risk-based capital standards for banks. It did provide some incentives for banks to hold less capital against assets that were perceived to be less risky, such as those with high credit ratings. This led to a potential underestimation of risk and encouraged banks to hold relatively lower capital against certain types of assets, including highly rated MBS and CDOs.
The lower capital requirements for higher-rated assets may have contributed to some degree of financial engineering and the creation of complex financial products to achieve higher returns while maintaining regulatory compliance. Financial institutions sought to improve their risk-adjusted returns by holding assets that were assigned lower risk weights under Basel II.
However, it's essential to recognize that the rise of MBS and CDOs was driven by a combination of factors beyond just Basel II capital requirements:
1. Investor Demand: Investors, including banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions, sought higher yields and diversification through complex financial products, which offered seemingly attractive risk-return profiles.
2. Misaligned Incentives: Financial industry participants, including mortgage lenders and investment banks, had incentives to originate and securitize large volumes of mortgages, regardless of their quality, due to the lucrative fees and profits associated with these transactions.
3. Rating Agencies' Role: Credit rating agencies assigned high ratings to many MBS and CDOs, leading investors to perceive them as safe and reliable investments, despite their underlying risks.
4. Lack of Transparency: The complexity of these financial products made it challenging for investors and regulators to fully understand their underlying risks, leading to a lack of transparency in the financial system.
While Basel II's risk-weighted capital requirements may have played a role in shaping banks' behavior and asset allocation decisions, the underlying issues that contributed to the crisis were more extensive and multifaceted. The GFC was a culmination of a housing market bubble, excessive risk-taking, inadequate risk management practices, and the interconnectedness of global financial markets, all of which interacted to create a perfect storm.
In response to the lessons learned from the GFC, regulatory reforms, such as Basel III, were implemented to address the weaknesses and limitations of Basel II and enhance the resilience of the global banking system. These reforms introduced more stringent capital and liquidity requirements, stress testing, and improved risk management practices to reduce the likelihood of similar crises in the future."
I asked OpenAI:
"You hold: 'Financial institutions sought to improve their risk-adjusted returns by holding assets that were assigned lower risk weights under Basel II.'
Does that not imply banks moved from allocating assets based on their risk adjusted interest rates returns, to do so based on the risk interest rates returns adjusted for the capital/equity requirements?
And, if so, would the resulting allocation of bank credit remain the same?"
OpenAI answered:
"Apologies for any confusion. You are correct; the statement I made implies that banks, under Basel II, considered risk-adjusted returns based on the capital/equity requirements in their asset allocation decisions. The risk-adjusted returns in this context refer to the returns adjusted for the capital that banks were required to hold against different assets based on their risk weights under Basel II.
When Basel II was implemented, it introduced a risk-sensitive framework that required banks to allocate capital based on the perceived risk of different assets. This led to banks considering not only the interest rate returns on assets but also the capital requirements associated with them.
As a result, banks may have been incentivized to allocate more credit and investment to assets that carried lower risk weights, such as highly rated securities like MBS and CDOs. This was because the capital required to hold against these assets was lower, making them more capital-efficient choices for banks.
The resulting allocation of bank credit, to some extent, was influenced by the capital requirements under Basel II. Banks had an incentive to allocate more of their capital to assets that offered relatively higher returns adjusted for the capital required to be held against them. This contributed to the growth of complex financial products, including MBS and CDOs, as they were perceived as offering attractive risk-adjusted returns under the capital framework of Basel II.
However, it's important to note that while the capital/equity requirements under Basel II played a role in shaping banks' asset allocation decisions, they were not the only driving factor. Other market conditions, investor demand, regulatory environment, and business strategies of financial institutions also influenced their credit allocation decisions.
The GFC exposed weaknesses and flaws in Basel II's risk-weighted capital approach, as it did not fully capture the systemic risks and interconnectedness of complex financial products. In response, subsequent regulatory reforms, such as Basel III, sought to address these shortcomings and introduced more comprehensive and stringent capital and liquidity requirements to improve the stability and resilience of the global banking system."
Thanks!
You're welcome! If you have any more questions or need further assistance, feel free to ask. Have a great day!
The less the perceived risk of default is, and the higher the leverage allowed, the greater the systemic risk.
My huge problem!
Q. "If Kurowski is right, why are his arguments so ignored? A. If I had argued that the regulators were 5 to 10 degrees wrong, I would be recognized, but since I am arguing they are 150 to 180 degrees wrong, I must be ignored.
The deafening noise of the Agendas
The fundamental reasons why it is so hard to advance the otherwise so easy explainable truth of this financial crisis, is because of the deafening noise of the Agendas…
On one side, we have the "progressives" who want to put all the blame on capitalistic banksters, and, on the other, the "conservatives" who want to blame the socialistic government sponsored enterprises GSEs of Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac.
For any of both sides accepting the fact that it was mostly a regulatory failure of monstrous proportions would seemingly be a highly inconvenient truth that would not help them to advance their respective agendas.
What is more dangerous in a systemic way, that which is perceived as risky or that which is perceived as not risky? Right!
How can the Basel Committee be so dumb?
Systemic risks is about something that can become as big so as to threaten the system… and our bank regulators in the Basel Committee are incapable or unwilling to understand that what has the largest possibilities of growing as big so as to threaten the system is what is perceived as having little or no risk, not what is perceived as risky… which makes their first and really only pillar of their regulations, that of capital requirements of banks that are lower when perceived risks are lower… so utterly dumb!
We must stop our gullible and naive financial regulators from believing in never-risk-land.
The stuff that bonuses are made of
Whenever a credit rating corresponds exactly to real underlying risk neither borrower nor lender loses but the intermediary cannot make profits… it is only when the credit ratings are too high or too low that those margins that can generate that profitable stuff that bonuses are paid for exist.
What were they thinking?
The default of a debtor is about the most common, natural and even benign risk in capitalism, so it is so hard to really get a grip on what was going around in the minds of the regulators when they decided to construe capital requirements for banks based exclusively on discriminating against that risk as it was perceived by some credit rating agencies.
Day by the day it is becoming more relevant... scary!
http://theaaa-bomb.blogspot.com
This I published in November 1999... Read it!
The possible Big Bang that scares me the most is the one that could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause the collapse of the OWB (the only bank in the world) or of the last financial dinosaur that survives at that moment.
Currently market forces favors the larger the entity is, be it banks, law firms, auditing firms, brokers, etc. Perhaps one of the things that the authorities could do, in order to diversify risks, is to create a tax on size.”
This I wrote, October 2004, as an Executive Director of the World Bank
We believe that much of the world’s financial markets are currently being dangerously overstretched through an exaggerated reliance on intrinsically weak financial models that are based on very short series of statistical evidence and very doubtful volatility assumptions.
Regulatory hubris
In a world with so many different risks, some naïve gullible and outright stupid regulators thought everything would be fine and dandy if they just had some few credit rating agencies determine default risks and then gave the banks great incentives, by means of different capital requirements, to follow those credit risk opinions.
On bs.
When experts bs..t the world that’s bad news, but when experts allowed themselves to be bs..ted by bs..ing experts that’s is when the world goes really bad.
This crisis resulted directly from the Potemkin credit ratings the market produced to satisfy the demand for AAAs created by the regulators.
Lower the capital requirements for banks on:
the loans to those who had nothing to do with creating the current AAA crisis, like small businesses and entrepreneurs but are anyhow the ones which most suffer the current scarcity of bank capital
My most current proposal on the regulatory reform for banks
They were supposed to teach the world prudent risk-taking and instead they taught it imprudent risk-aversion.
The deal!
This was the deal! If you convinced risky and broke Joe to take a $300.000 mortgage at 11 percent for 30 years and then, with more than a little help from the credit rating agencies, you could convince risk-adverse Fred that this mortgage, repackaged in a securitized version, and rated AAA, was so safe that a six percent return was quite adequate, then you could sell Fred the mortgage for $510.000. This would allow you and your partners in the set-up, to pocket a tidy profit of $210.000
Calling it quits?
A world that taxes risk-taking and subsidizes risk adverseness is a world that seems to want to lie down and die
Let´s neutralize the wimps!
If we are to keep on using Basel methodology for establishing the minimum capital requirements for banks, beside better risk weights, we must demand it also uses “societal purpose” weights.
What other word could describe a bank regulatory system designed exclusively to avoid bank crisis as if that is the only purpose of banking. You might just as well order the kids to stay in bed all life so as to diminish the risk of them tripping.
The minimum capital requirements of Basel that are based on default risks as measured by the credit rating agency amount to a dangerous tax on the risk, the oxygen of development.
Blindly focusing on default and leaving out any consideration that a credit with a low default risk but for a totally useless or perhaps even an environmentally dangerous purpose is much more risky for the society than a credit with a higher default risk destined to trying to help create decent jobs or diminish an environmental threat, is just silly.
But do I have to be disrespectful and call them silly? Well, individually perhaps they are not, but, as a group, bank regulators are so full of hot air that someone has to help them to puncture their cocoon balloon and let them out.
Breathe!
I’m going to third-pillar what?
By now the desperate bank regulators are throwing at us the third pillar of their Basel regulations which implies the need that we ourselves privately monitor our banks. Great, in my country, a couple of decades ago, I did just that and had a fairly good grip on whom of my banker neighbors were good bankers and whom to look out for.
But sincerely what am I supposed to do know when about 50 per cent of the retail deposits in my country are in hand of international banks (Spain) and that might be losing their shirt making investments in subprime mortgages in California?
Tragedy!
It is very sad when a developed nation decides making risk-adverseness the primary goal of their banking system and places itself voluntarily on the way down but it is a real tragedy when developing countries copycats it and fall into the trap of calling it quits.
Development rating agencies?
A bank should be more than a mattress!
When considering the role of the commercial banks should not the developing countries use development rating agencies instead of credit rating agencies?
Clearly more important than defending what we have is defending what we want to have.
What do we want from our banks?
Over the last two decades we have seen hundreds if not thousands of research papers, seminars, workshops conferences analyzing how to exorcize the risks out of banking; and if in that sense the bank regulation coming out from Basel was doing its job; and centred around words like soundness, stability, solvency, safeness and other synonyms. Not one of them discussed how the commercial banks were performing their other two traditional functions, namely to help to generate that economic growth that leads to the creation of decent jobs and the distribution of the financial resources into the hands of those capable of doing the most with it.
At this moment when we are suddenly faced with the possibilities that all the bank regulator’s risk adverseness might anyhow have come to naught, before digging deeper in the hole where we find ourselves fighting the risks, is it not time to take a step back and discuss again what it is we really want our commercial banks to do for us? I mean, if it is only to act as a safe mattress for our retail deposits then it would seem that could be taken cared of by authorizing them only to lend to the lender of last resort; but which of course would leave us with what to do about the growth and the distribution of opportunities.
We are suffering from more and more answers than questions begging for them, and so I work on the latter.
Read it all in my one and only book!"Voice and Noise"
Pssst... so few have read this book so it is slowly turning into a collector item (I do not say a "cult"... yet) and so you might benefit from getting your very own copy now.